POPQAE 45(4)443–600 (1981)
ISSN 0033–362X

Public Opinion Quarterly

A 0610-1
1/15/82

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COMMENTS AND LETTERS

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WINTER 1981

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The Public Opinion Quarterly

ORGAN OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
EDITORIALLY SPONSORED BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATION
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Volume #45, 4 issues (1981)

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Journals Fulfillment Department
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Single copy and back volume information furnished upon written request. Claims for missing issues can be honored only up to three months from date of issue. Indexed by Public Affairs Information Services, Social Sciences Index, United States Political Science Documents, and Combined Retrospective Index Sets (CRIS).

PUBLICATION NUMBER 449380

Editorial Office: Journalism Building, Columbia University 116th Street and Broadway, New York, New York 10027
Business, Subscriptions, Back Issues: Elsevier North Holland, Inc. 52 Vanderbilt Avenue New York, New York 10017
AAPOR: Post Office Box 17, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
Subscribers and members of AAPOR are urged to notify the Subscription Office as soon as possible of changes of address. In doing so, give the old as well as the new address.

PUBLISHED BY ELSEVIER NORTH HOLLAND, INC.

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Adult Perspectives on Children's Autonomy

GEORGE W. BOHRNSTEDT, HOWARD E. FREEMAN, AND TOM SMITH

CHILDREN'S rights to autonomy have received increased notice in the 20 years since Paul Goodman (1960) called attention to the restrictions the law, community, and family place on the participation of children in decisions that critically affect their personal, social, and economic lives. Underlying current interest in children's rights are the long-established child advocacy movement and the more recent child liberation front (Margolin, 1978; Mnookin, 1977). Also, legal challenges to age as a criterion for either judging competency or special criminal and civil treatment have resulted in a strong concern with whether or not children should have autonomy in deciding how to live their lives (Rodham, 1973; Rosenheim, 1973; Schaar, 1977; Sussman, 1977).

Few systematic data exist on adults' perspectives on children's rights to autonomy. Aside from a survey done more than 20 years

Abstract A representative sample of 1,002 Los Angeles adults responded to vignettes on parent-child conflict by indicating their support for the position of either the parent or the child. Adults' perspectives on children's rights to autonomy were examined in the nine substantive areas of education, privacy, appearance, religion, economics, sexual conduct, access to media, political participation and public responsibility, and social participation. In all these areas, there is a lack of consensus about children's rights among adults. Social characteristics of the sample, however, correlate with views on this issue in ways consistent with a general liberal-conservative orientation.

George W. Bohrnstedt is Professor of Sociology at Indiana University at Bloomington, Howard E. Freeman is Professor of Sociology at UCLA, and Tom Smith is a graduate student in psychology at UCLA. The data for this study were collected as part of Grant #86-P-80086/9, Social and Rehabilitation Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The authors are grateful to Professors Jeanne M. Giovannoni, Principal Investigator, and Rosina Becerra, Project Director, for their collaboration. The authors wish to acknowledge the advice of Orville C. Brim, Jr., Linda B. Bourque, Bernice Eiduson, Norma D. Feshbach, Seymour Feshbach, Robert J. Levy, Lisbeth B. Schoor, John G. Simon, and Heidi Segal. The Foundation for Child Development provided partial support for George Bohrnstedt during the study.

Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 45:443–462 © 1981 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033–362X/81/0045–443/$2.50

ago (Cohen et al., 1958), we found only two studies. Rogers and Wrightsman (1978) developed scales to measure orientations toward children's rights; the polar ends of the scales are nurturance (giving children what is good for them) and self-determination (giving children the right to decide for themselves). They administered the scales to a sample (N = 381) consisting of four groups: high school juniors and seniors from a metropolitan area, undergraduate college education majors, undergraduates enrolled at two small liberal arts colleges in fields other than education, and adults in continuing education courses. All respondents were more likely to favor extending rights of nurturance than rights of self-determination. As Rogers and Wrightsman note, people apparently are more willing to make the children comfortable than to give them freedom.

A second relevant study (General Mills, 1977) found that "strict" (defined as condoning strict discipline for children, including spanking) compared to "temperate" and "permissive" parents were more likely to be older, religious males with three or more children.

Because of the meager amount of previous research, our study was conceived as a methodological as well as substantive inquiry. In this paper, we describe our efforts (1) to measure adult views about children's rights to decide matters for themselves, (2) to identify variations in perspectives related to the age of the child being evaluated and the area of behavior examined, and (3) to locate social demographic correlates of differing perspectives. In the conclusions, we briefly examine the findings in the light of current concerns over the rights of children.

Data and Method

Items on children's rights were included in the tenth Los Angeles Metropolitan Area Survey conducted in 1976 by the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Science Research at the University of California at Los Angeles. The face-to-face survey used a prelisted, cross multistage population sampling design that represents all households in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The sample included 1,002 adult members of the community, 85 of whom were interviewed in Spanish.[1]

[1] Sixty-three persons declined to participate in this part of the survey, reducing the original sample size from 1,065 to 1,002. The questions to which we refer in this paper occurred at the end of a long survey instrument dealing with the more specific issue of child abuse. Some respondents ended the interview prior to our questions, presumably because of time pressures. There are no demographic differences, however, between completed and noncompleted cases. The overall response rate to the survey was 70

We chose items that might evoke conflict between parents and children—in Rogers and Wrightsman's terms, items involving children's rights to self-determination. Although the choices were based on impressions and not on a systematic content analysis of either the mass media or policy statements on children's rights, we believe that the content of the items reflects popular interest and policymakers' concerns. Furthermore, although the Carnegie Council's report (Keniston and the Carnegie Council on Children, 1977) had not been published at the time the study was developed, our survey includes items in most of the areas eventually discussed in their report. Our questions were in the form of vignette incidents in 10 areas of potential conflict: education, family living arrangements, privacy, appearance and personal freedom, religion, economics and work, sexual conduct, access to the media, political participation and public responsibility, and social participation.

PRETESTING

A large battery of vignettes was prepared and pretested, first in questionnaire form on staff of the institute, and second, on UCLA students. Subsequently, the pool of items was narrowed and pretested again on a small sample of members of the community. Vignettes that either were ambiguous or revealed little variation in response were eliminated.

The introduction to the items was particularly difficult to write. We did not want it either to stress parental need to take disciplinary action or to challenge directly the legal right of parents to regulate the behavior of their children. Furthermore, it had to be general enough that both parents and nonparents could respond to it. The version used in the instrument was:

> As you know, there is considerable difference of opinion about parent-child relationships. Recently, family court judges, lawyers, and other experts in family life have become concerned about how to decide disagreements between parents and children that are brought to their attention. I am going to read you a list of disagreements that parents and their children become involved in. In each case, if you had to make a decision, what would it be? Tell me whether you would definitely decide in favor of the parent, probably decide in favor of the parent, probably decide in favor of the child, or definitely decide in favor of the child?

---

percent (nonrespondents include "not-at-homes" and buildings not possible to gain access to in addition to refusals). The ISSR trained interviewing staff tend to be female and of middle age. While we did not undertake a systematic study of interviewer effect on responses, neither refusal rate differences nor interview reports suggest the items are unusually sensitive to interviewer biases.

Unfortunately, the parents' position generally is the normatively conservative one, so that "prochild responses" may reflect either positive views on children's autonomy or a generalized liberal outlook, or both. Further scale development should attempt to include prochild items in which the child's position is the conservative one to better specify the underlying dimension.

For each item an estimate was made of the minimum age at which community members would feel that children had a right either to act independently or to make a decision for themselves. The item was also then written about a child between one and three years older, so that we could evaluate how the age of the child affects evaluation of children's rights. Each respondent was presented with only one of the two variants. The interviewers read the items in random order, with either the younger or the older age inserted. Table 1 shows the items, the relevant ages, and the distribution of responses, aggregated across age of the vignette child.

We did not systematically vary the sex of the child for each item, and as a result, we cannot tell whether adults' responses vary as a function of the sex of the child.

BUILDING SCALES

For items in each area, we constructed summary scores. Two separate intercorrelation matrices were computed, one for each age. The matrices were factor analyzed using Rao's canonical method (Harman, 1967), then rotated to simple structure using both varimax and quartimax criteria. The structure of the relationships is not as simple as the labels in Table 1 might imply. While many of the items clustered together, several in each area were virtually uncorrelated with each other. Although the results of the factor analysis were discouraging, further inspection of the intercorrelations revealed that some of the items did in most areas form interpretable clusters. For example, items within the areas of religion and sex clustered quite well. Items about access to media also were well intercorrelated in both age samples. This suggested summary scores could be constructed that would have at least minimal psychometric integrity.

We computed the average intercorrelation of each item with the others in a cluster, and then placed it in the one in which it appeared to fit best, eliminating items that had approximately the same intercorrelations within two or more clusters. This method generated nine summary scores. The stub column of Table 2 shows the names attached to the clusters of items. Notice that the names correspond closely to those in Table 1; the family area has no summary score

because the items were not sufficiently intercorrelated to build a separate score. Hence, this area is excluded from the remainder of the analyses.

We estimated the reliability of each summary score by alpha (Cronbach, 1951); these values are displayed in the diagonal of Table 2. The intercorrelations between scale scores shown in Table 2 are positive and significantly different from zero: the adults who side with children in one area are reasonably likely to side with children in other areas as well. Intercorrelations are largest in areas conceptually close to each other (e.g., religion and sexual behavior). Although analyses of the responses for both younger and older children showed that a single underlying factor could reasonably well explain the correlations among the separate scores, we decided against building one because it could mask interesting and important differences across the substantive areas.

Results

Our impression is of much more support for children's autonomy than might have been expected from either the views expressed by the Carnegie Council or the legal rationales underlying various court decisions (Goldstein, 1976; 1977). Several examples from the data in Table 1 support our impression. For example, more than 80 percent of the respondents believe 10- and 12-year-old children have the right to know family income when this information might allow them to attend a summer camp without cost (F-4). More than 70 percent of the study group believe that a child should be allowed to sample a variety of religious services if disinterested in his or her own religion (R-4); and certainly the 30 percent who opposed forcing a 12- or 14-year-old boy to go to church on Sunday does not fit with ideas of parental dominance (R-1). Over 70 percent believe that a 12- or 14-year-old girl should have the right to choose basketball over music lessons (SP-5); and somewhat more than 50 percent hold that boys should be allowed to protest coed wrestling even though their parents oppose such an idea (SP-2). Even in matters of sexual conduct and use of mass media, a significant proportion of respondents side with the child in the situations presented. Finally, nearly two-thirds believe that 14- or 16-year-old girls should be able to seek birth control advice from a physician without parents' approval (S-5).

The results in Table 1 suggest that in general, when clearcut social norms specify the appropriateness of parental control, the respondents usually decided in favor of the parent. When the social norms are unclear or contradictory norms exist, community members were

Table 1. Opinions on Parent-Child Relations

Areas of Conflict	*Definitely Decide in Favor of Parent*	*Probably Decide in Favor of Parent*	*Probably Decide in Favor of Child*	*Definitely Decide in Favor of Child*
EDUCATION				
E-1 A 14/16-year-old boy tells his parents that his male teacher has asked him to have sexual relations with him. The boy does not want to complain to the principal because he claims it will be too embarassing with his classmates. The parents are insisting he report the incident to the principal.	70.4%	16.5%	8.6%	4.5%
E-2 A 14/16-year-old girl wants to leave public school. She wishes to attend a special private school that is run by a group that believes in an oriental religion, and provides religious instruction during school hours. Her parents are not permitting her to do so even though there are no expenses.	38.0	37.0	19.4	5.6
E-3 A 16/17-year-old girl wants to quit high school to spend a year taking singing and acting lessons. The drama school she wants to attend has offered her a free scholarship. Her parents are refusing to allow her to do this.	17.3	25.0	38.6	19.1
E-4 The parents of a 8/12-year-old girl have never sent her to school, but insist that since they both went to college, they can teach her better at home. The child wants to move in with her grandmother who promises to send her to school. The parents are refusing.	3.5	4.9	30.0	61.6
FAMILY				
F-1 A 10/13-year-old girl has lived with her divorced father for five years, ever since her mother left to live with another man. Her mother is now remarried and her new husband is very wealthy. The girl wants to accept her mother's offer to live with them because she would benefit from their better economic circumstances. The girl's father is refusing to let her move.	17.3	30.4	34.4	17.9
F-2 A 13/15-year-old boy and his family always have Sunday dinner with the child's grandmother, who lives on the next block. The boy likes to read and wants to stay home so he can read. The parents are insisting he must come along this Sunday and every Sunday.	10.5	22.0	47.3	20.2

most likely to endorse the concept of children's autonomy. For example, compare the first item with the third (E-1 with E-3). In the first item respondents apparently believe that the parents' responsibility to protect a child from sexual molestation is so overriding that they gave little importance to the child's concern with embarrassment. By contrast, in the third item, most of the respondents supported a 16- or 17-year-old girl who wanted to take a year off for singing and acting lessons despite her parents' objection to her quitting high school. Where the values are less clear, most people apparently believe that children have a right to determine their own educational and professional careers.

SCALE SCORES

Variation in responses to individual items also is reflected in the mean scale scores (see Table 2). A mean score of less than 2.5 signifies that respondents sided more with the parents than with the child, whereas a mean score greater than 2.5 represents greater support for the child's than the parent's position. The means in Table 2 show that respondents were most likely to respect children's rights when the issue affected privacy, political participation and public responsibility, and social participation. The doctrine of parental responsibility received the most support in areas that involved educational decisions, restrictions on media exposure, sexual conduct, appearance, and religious behavior. Respondents were more evenly divided on questions about economic decisions.

Effect of child's age. The results in Table 3 also show substantial variation in adults' views as a function of (1) the age of the child in the vignette, and (2) the social background characteristics of the respondent. Consistent with the results in earlier tables, these results indicate no monolithic, consistent set of norms with respect to children's rights; nevertheless, the vignette children's age is an important variable. For all nine scales, respondents were significantly more likely to be sympathetic with demands for autonomy for older children than for younger ones.

Effect of respondent's social background. A systematic examination of the relationship between social background of respondents and children's rights also shows the lack of consensus about whether conflicts should be resolved in favor of the parent or the child. As Table 3 shows, the respondent's religion, ethnic group membership, marital status, age, and education significantly affect whether the respondent sides with the child or the adult. Respondent's sex accounted for significant differences for only two of the nine scale

scores—privacy, and economics and working—and in these two cases the differences were small. Female respondents were slightly more permissive in these two areas.

Those with no religious identification were most likely to side with the child; and Jews were more likely to side with children than were Catholics and Protestants. Although the differences between Catholics and Protestants were small, Catholics seemed the least likely to support children's rights over the enforcement of parents' responsibilities.

With respect to ethnicity, Anglo-whites and Asian-Americans were more likely than blacks and Hispanics to acknowledge children's rights to make their own decisions. One possible explanation is that blacks and Hispanics probably are more traditional and less secular than whites and Asian-Americans because of their religious and other cultural experiences; Hispanics are largely Catholic, and blacks tend to be more religious in a traditional sense than whites. Interestingly, the responses of Asian-Americans and whites are nearly indistinguishable, suggesting they share values with respect to the rearing of adolescents.

Those who had never been married were significantly more likely to side with children than those who were currently married or who had been married in the past. One possible reason for this finding is that people who have never been married have never had to deal with the costs of giving children certain rights. They have not had to worry about the results of children's independent decisions about religion, sexual behavior, education, and the like. Another possible reason is that unmarried people tend to be younger, and younger people are more likely to side with the children. Hence, it is important to examine the net effects of these two variables as well.

There are two possible reasons why age correlates negatively with support of children's rights. First, since younger people are closer in age to the children in the items, they undoubtedly are able to identify more with them. This may make them confident that children can make these decisions responsibly. A second possible reason is that younger people are being reared in what is assumed to be a more secular and permissive society than were their parents. Hence, values may vary with age cohort. Unfortunately, our cross-sectional study does not allow us to test these two alternative explanations.

With respect to education, across all nine areas, those with some college education sided with children more often than those with a high school education or less. Higher income also is positively correlated with support for children's rights (except in the area of education), but the effects are smaller than those due to respondents'

F-3 A 14/16-year-old boy has a 19-year-old brother who is mentally retarded. The boy's parents live very economically since they think they must save up for the retarded brother so he can be taken care of when they die. The 14/16-year-old brother wants them to save for his college too, but the parents tell him it is not possible to save money for him too.	9.9	20.2	40.0	29.9
F-4 A 10/12-year-old boy has the opportunity to go to Boy Scout Camp. The father says he can't afford it. The boy tells his father that he could go for free depending on his parents' income. The parents refuse to tell the boy their income and they are refusing to discuss it further with anyone.	4.3	12.0	41.5	42.2
PRIVACY				
P-1 A 13/15-year-old girl says she has the right to private telephone conversations with her close friends. Since the phone is in the living room, when she uses the phone, she insists everyone leave the room. Her parents are refusing to do so.	45.0	39.1	12.2	3.7
P-2 A 14/16-year-old boy likes to be alone when he comes home from school and locks his bedroom door when in his room. His parents are making him stop this.	20.3	34.3	30.0	15.4
P-3 A 14/16-year-old boy thinks he has contracted venereal disease. He wants to go to a doctor without his parents. His father is insisting on going along with the boy to talk to the doctor.	23.7	23.1	23.9	29.3
P-4 A 13/15-year-old boy has written some love poems to his girlfriend. He is waiting for the right time to give them to her and he keeps them in a locked drawer at home. The boy's parents are demanding to know where the key is kept.	4.9	9.2	32.7	53.2
APPEARANCE—PERSONAL FREEDOM				
A-1 A 14/16-year-old girl likes to follow the latest fashion in her school of not wearing a bra. Her parents are not letting her go to school unless she is wearing her bra.	35.6	34.5	21.7	8.2
A-2 A 12/14-year-old girl wants to wear eye shadow and lipstick to school parties. The parents are refusing to allow her to do so.	25.1	32.5	32.6	9.8
A-3 A 13/15-year-old boy wants to wear his new jeans to religious services. The parents are insisting that he wear slacks.	19.6	29.9	34.3	16.2
A-4 A 12/14-year-old boy has the barber keep his hair long even though the parents do not like long hair on him. The father wants to accompany him on his next visit to the barber to ensure that he has it cut short.	13.4	22.7	40.6	23.3

Table 1. Continued

Areas of Conflict	*Definitely Decide in Favor of Parent*	*Probably Decide in Favor of Parent*	*Probably Decide in Favor of Child*	*Definitely Decide in Favor of Child*
RELIGION				
R-1 A 12/14-year-old boy has a group of friends who meet in a park on Saturday and Sunday mornings. The child wants to meet these friends on Sundays, but the parents are forcing the boy to go to church with them.	26.7	42.9	23.5	6.9
R-2 A 10/12-year-old boy says he does not believe in the existence of a god and is refusing to accompany the parents to church. The parents insist that he must attend with them every Sunday.	29.3	39.5	22.5	8.7
R-3 A 14/16-year-old boy wants to leave the Protestant faith of his parents and convert to Catholicism. The parents are refusing to allow him to do so.	11.6	19.9	42.6	25.9
R-4 A 10/14-year-old girl is uninterested in her Jewish religion and wants to attend the services of a variety of other religions with her friends. Her parents are refusing to allow this.	10.8	17.3	38.7	33.2
ECONOMICS AND WORKING				
EC-1 A 12/14-year-old boy earns money by tending neighbors' lawns. The child wants to spend the money the way he wants, but the parents insist that he save it.	16.0	36.0	35.7	12.3
EC-2 A 12/14-year-old girl wants to practice the violin during her spare time. The parents believe that the child needs to learn responsibility and ask her to spend her spare time helping to clean the house.	11.3	33.1	38.8	16.8
EC-3 A 16/17-year-old girl works 15 hours a week by selling flowers on street corners. The child has eight younger brothers and sisters and they are on welfare. The child wants to be able to spend all of the money for books and clothes, but the parents always take part of the child's earnings.	8.7	34.7	30.0	26.6
EC-4 A 10/14-year-old boy receives $50 as a gift from his relative. The child wants to use the money for a portable radio. The parents want to spend $40 for clothing and are only allowing the child to spend $10.	13.0	27.5	34.5	25.0

SEXUAL CONDUCT				
S-1 A 15/17-year-old boy brings his girlfriend home for dinner. After dinner he takes her into his bedroom and closes the door. The parents are insisting that they leave the door open or come out.	52.3	31.2	12.4	4.1
S-2 A 15/17-year-old girl has had two dates with a college boy. She tells her mother that she is gong to spend the weekend with him.The mother is refusing to discuss the matter and insists she not date him anymore.	40.6	41.6	14.4	3.4
S-3 A 14/16-year-old girl wants to date a boy who is known to have gotten a girl pregnant. Her parents are forbidding her to go out with him.	34.6	36.7	23.9	4.8
S-4 A 14/16-year-old boy buys non-prescription contraceptives (condoms) and the pharmacist calls his father. The boy is refusing to discuss the matter, so the father asks the pharmacist not to sell them to his son.	29.3	23.9	28.7	18.1
S-5 A 14/16-year-old girl wants her family doctor to give her birth control advice without getting the consent of her parents. Her parents find out and are forbidding the doctor to see her.	18.9	20.1	33.9	27.1
MEDIA ACCESS				
MA-1 A 12/14-year-old boy wants to read adult books that use curse words and describe sex acts. The parents are not letting their son read "best sellers" or other adult books because of the sexual references.	32.6	33.2	25.2	9.0
MA-2 A 12/14-year-old boy wants to attend a new movie, but the parents are refusing to let him because the movie has nude scenes.	28.8	36.7	25.2	9.3
MA-3 The parents of a 12/14-year-old girl insist that the child show them all the library books that the child brings home each week. The parents try to restrict the child from reading certain books that they consider "adult books."	21.0	35.1	28.8	15.1
MA-4 A 10/14-year-old girl wants to watch some television shows that show a lot of violence. The parents are demanding that they make television selections for her.	16.9	36.1	34.3	12.7
MA-5 The parents of a 14/16-year-old girl are insisting their child not listen to certain popular records because some of the words of the song describe sex acts.	14.6	25.9	39.0	20.5
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY				
PL-1 A 12/14-year-old boy stole a neighbor's bicycle and is repainting it. The parents catch the child in the middle of painting it. The child agrees to return the bike, but is refusing to go to the police. The parents insist on taking him to the police to confess.	20.7	25.5	37.8	16.0

Table 1. Continued

Areas of Conflict	*Definitely Decide in Favor of Parent*	*Probably Decide in Favor of Parent*	*Probably Decide in Favor of Child*	*Definitely Decide in Favor of Child*
PL/2 A 12/14-year-old girl wants to send a letter to the board of education protesting the political ideas of some of her teachers. The parents are refusing to permit this.	9.9	17.3	41.3	31.5
PL-3 A 15/17-year-old girl is interested in attending a political rally for a candidate her parents are really opposed to. The parents are forbidding their child to attend.	7.0	12.2	42.0	38.8
SOCIAL PARTICIPATION				
SP-1 A 10/14-year-old boy has nightmares once in a while. The neighbor suggested that the child go to a psychiatrist; the mother has set up an appointment, even though the child does not want to go.	26.0	43.5	21.8	8.7
SP-2 A 12/16-year-old boy wants to protest because the wrestling team is coed. The parents think coed sports are good and tell him not to protest.	14.2	33.7	35.7	16.4
SP-3 The parents of a 12/14-year-old boy interview all the friends that their child brings home. They forbid their child to see certain friends again.	14.8	31.7	36.1	17.4
SP-4 A 14/15-year-old child who wears glasses wants to have contact lenses. The parents can afford them, but say it is unnecessary and are refusing.	14.2	24.6	38.8	22.4
SP-5 The parents of a 12/14-year-old girl have been encouraging her to continue her music lessons. She wants to join the basketball team and devote all her after-hours to basketball practice. The parents are refusing to sign the permission slip for after-school basketball.	9.2	20.5	50.1	20.2

NOTE: Item N's vary from 993 to 967 because of no responses to individual items; total sample size is 1,002.

Table 2. Intercorrelations, Reliabilities, Means and Standard Deviations for Scale Scores

Scale Scores	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	$\bar{X}$	*s.d.*
1. Education (E–2, E–3)	.47	.24	.39	.40	.23	.40	.39	.23	.33	2.18	.75
	.49										
2. Privacy (P–2, P–3, P–4)		.48	.47	.41	.37	.54	.46	.43	.42	2.69	.69
	.28	.55									
3. Appearance-Personal Freedom (A–1, A–2, A–4)			.68	.53	.39	.55	.55	.40	.47	2.25	.73
	.34	.48	.67								
4. Religion (R–1, R–2, R–3, R–4)				.74	.33	.57	.63	.55	.46	2.39	.69
	.38	.40	.54	.76							
5. Economics and Working (EC–1, EC–4)					.65	.43	.42	.40	.43	2.52	.80
	.17	.36	.38	.43	.57						
6. Sexual Conduct (S–1, S–2, S–3, S–4, S–5)						.78	.66	.43	.46	1.95	.64
	.40	.51	.60	.53	.38	.75					
7. Media Access (MA–1, MA–2, MA–3, MA–4, MA–5)							.86	.53	.52	2.19	.74
	.36	.51	.61	.56	.37	.72	.88				
8. Political Participation and Public Responsibility								.71	.45	2.95	.82
(PL–2, PL–3)	.26	.42	.40	.45	.32	.44	.51	.57			
9. Social Participation (SP–3, SP–5)									.51	2.63	.74
	.31	.43	.46	.53	.40	.48	.56	.50	.57		
$\bar{X}$	2.34	2.87	2.44	2.60	2.64	2.25	2.49	3.11	2.74		
s.d.	.75	.70	.72	.69	.77	.66	.77	.72	.74		

NOTE: Values above main diagonal refer to correlations when younger age is introduced in item ($N = 487$); values below when older age is introduced ($N = 515$). (See Table 1 for exact ages and item wording.) Correlation values over .09 are significant at the .05 level and over .12 at the .01 level. Diagonal values are Cronbach's alpha, i.e., internal consistency reliability estimates. The items comprising the scale scores are in parentheses after each scale score name.

Table 3. Means of the Nine Scale Scores as a Function of the Independent Variables

Independent Variables	*Dependent Variables*								
	Education	*Privacy*	*Appearance-Pers. Freedom*	*Religion*	*Ec. & Working*	*Sexual Conduct*	*Media Access*	*Pol. Part. & Pub. Resp.*	*Social Part.*
Age of vignette child	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
a. Younger ($N = 487$)	2.18	2.69	2.25	2.39	2.52	1.95	2.19	2.95	2.63
b. Older (515)	2.34	2.87	2.44	2.60	2.64	2.25	2.48	3.11	2.74
Respondent's sex		*							
a. Male (429)	2.27	2.72	2.35	2.52	2.50	2.13	2.40	3.09	2.68
b. Female (573)	2.26	2.83	2.34	2.48	2.64	2.08	2.30	2.99	2.69
Respondent's age	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
a. 17–30 (334)	2.41	2.99	2.50	2.72	2.66	2.34	2.57	3.21	2.89
b. 31–50 (346)	2.20	2.75	2.29	2.47	2.57	2.08	2.34	2.98	2.68
c. 51–94 (312)	2.17	2.59	2.24	2.29	2.48	1.88	2.09	2.91	2.48
Respondent's education	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
a. 0–8 (105)	1.98	2.24	1.94	2.01	2.03	1.64	1.80	2.42	2.20
b. 9–12 (431)	2.24	2.77	2.27	2.46	2.58	2.03	2.27	3.02	2.65
c. 13 or more (465)	2.34	2.91	2.51	2.64	2.71	2.28	2.54	3.19	2.83
Respondent's household income		*	*		*			*	*
a. ≤$8,499 (307)	2.33	2.70	2.28	2.45	2.47	2.07	2.30	2.95	2.60
b. $8,500–$16,999 (275)	2.24	2.78	2.32	2.52	2.60	2.08	2.31	3.01	2.67
c. ≥$17,000 (342)	2.20	2.87	2.43	2.54	2.68	2.16	2.43	3.14	2.80

education. Only five of the nine relationships were statistically significant at .05 level.

Recall that persons who have ever been married are less prochild in their attitudes than single persons are. One might also expect that the number of children one has would explain variation in the scale scores. In general, this is the case, but not unequivocally. As predicted, where significant differences were found, those with fewer children favored children's rights more than those with more children. The number of male children in the respondent's household was more closely related to a lack of support of children's rights than the number of female children, except in the areas of privacy and social participation, but as we shall see, this finding is modified by the introduction of control variables into the analysis.

REGRESSION ANALYSES

To examine the effects of each of the independent variables, taking into account the net effects of the other independent variables, we regressed each of the nine scale scores on the set of independent variables. Because age of the child in each vignette, respondent's sex, religion, ethnicity, and marital status were measured at the nominal level, we used dummy variables (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973) to assess the effects of these variables. The other variables—respondent's age, education, income, and number of male and female children—were treated as interval measures. Since there is an intercorrelation among the nine dependent variables, the tests of significance across the nine dependent variables clearly are not independent of each other. Nevertheless, these analyses help us to explore whether the patterns of relationships across the nine areas differ.

The results indicated remarkable similarity of pattern across the nine areas. For all areas of potential conflict, when the other independent variables are controlled, the age of children in the vignettes and the respondents' age, education, and religion all have strong significant effects. Female respondents also continue to be slightly more permissive in the areas of privacy and economics and working when the other independent variables are controlled. The only variable that had strong zero-order effects but practically no significant net effect is marital status. When the other independent variables are controlled, the number of male children is only weakly related to the lack of autonomy in the areas of religion and sexual conduct. By contrast, the number of female children is strongly related to siding with parents in the areas of education and sexual conduct. Those with several female

children are less likely to give children autonomy in these two areas in which there has traditionally been a double standard.

Because of the similarity of these results to those done at the zero-order level, the detailed results of the regression analysis are not tabled here.[2] The regression results strongly suggest that the most important variables for explaining variation in adults' perceptions of children's rights are the age of the child in the vignette and the respondent's age, education, religion, and ethnicity. *When the child in the vignette is older, and when the respondent is younger, well educated, of no religious identification or Jewish, and is either Anglo-white or Asian, he or she is likely to side with the child in the vignette. When the child is younger and the respondent is older, less well educated, Catholic or Protestant, and black or Hispanic, the interviewee is more likely to side with the parent.*

The conclusions that follow are tentatively and cautiously drawn, keeping in mind the limitations of the study. First, in all the areas studied, there is a lack of consensus among adults about the rights of children to exercise their own judgement, even though in some specific areas, fairly high consensus exists among our study group of Los Angeles adults. Admittedly, the items were developed to emphasize variation in response. But actually, only a few items were eliminated because of lack of variation, and we are convinced the findings strongly suggest a lack of monolithic norms about children's prerogatives. Second, adults' views vary systematically with the age of the child as described in the vignette. The respondents supported the doctrine of parental control and responsibility more strongly for younger than for older children. Third, there are systematic relations between the social background of the respondents and their views about children's rights. The social characteristics correlated with views in ways that parallel findings on liberal-conservative views in general, although, given the confounding between the vignette child's position and the content of the item, we can only speculate on this connection. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that views on children's rights are rooted in more general liberal-conservative postures, and the secular trends in liberalism and conservatism may have important effects on the ways adults feel about children's rights.

There is correspondence between the findings and the current social-political interest in children's autonomy and the right to make their own decisions. According to the Carnegie Council on Children, concern for children's rights is a phenomenon of the 1970s (Keniston and the Carnegie Council on Children, 1977). This is an accurate

[2] The interested reader may obtain the regression analysis results by writing to George W. Bohrnstedt.

observation to the extent that the children's rights movement reflects current concerns with civil rights, equity and freedom of choice, and social action efforts to decrease discrimination against ethnic and racial groups, women, homosexuals, and the handicapped.

But the analogy between children's autonomy and the struggles of disenfranchised groups is limited. Other disenfranchised groups usually have the capacity and potential to compete equally with peers in the community. Both experience and scientific data indicate that mature judgment and the ability to make individual decisions and to participate fully in the social life of the community depend on age-related cognitive and social development

Child advocacy groups, including the widely known Children's Defense Fund (CDF), are quick to disclaim the children's "liberation movement." As they observe: "Children are not adults. They have special needs and are dependent in many ways on the care of adults and institutions. CDF believes children should be extended rights in some instances, especially where arbitrariness or discrimination are likely to occur or where the denial of a right may have serious consequences" (Children's Defense Fund, 1978, p. 3).

The findings from our study suggest that proponents of either children's autonomy or parental control will encounter large opposing minorities at the very least. In brief, our findings support the Carnegie Council's observation that at least in these times, there is an almost inevitable conflict between community norms about familial responsibility for children on the one hand and children's rights on the other.

Conclusions

Diversity, pluralism, and heterogeneity permeate our results. Admittedly, weaknesses in the method suggest a cautious interpretation of findings. In future studies, researchers should design more elegant scales on children's rights and expand the number of areas and types of behaviors. The items should include more variation in the age of children and more situations suitable for either sex. Furthermore, as we indicated earlier, for most of the items, supporting the child's point of view also is supporting a liberal position with respect to the content of the item. Future research should "balance" the items, taking into account both the vignette child's desire and the liberalism versus conservatism content of the item. Moreover, additional social background variables and attitude measures should be included and tested as predictors of perspectives on children's rights. Studies repeated at regular intervals would be valuable for estimating secular changes in community outlook. It also would be most interesting to survey chil-

dren and compare their responses with those of adults, including their parents.

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Crime, Crime News, and Crime Views

JOSEPH F. SHELEY AND CINDY D. ASHKINS

IN AN often cited article written nearly 30 years ago, F. James Davis (1952) presented evidence indicating that official crime rates and crime news coverage are unrelated and that the public's conception of crime more accurately reflects the picture of crime presented in the newspapers. Subsequent research in this area has produced mixed findings (Hauge, 1965; Jones, 1976; Roshier, 1973). In an effort to sort out these contradictions, the research reported in this paper represents a considerably more systematic replication of previous research, and more important, extends previous research by introducing the issue of television crime reporting and its impact on public views of crime.

The issue of official, media, and public views of crime is not now the same one which Davis addressed. Since 1952, television has become a major force in news reporting. The 1976 American National Election Study (Center for Political Studies, 1977:331, 338) indicates, for example, that while 72 percent of its national sample read news-

Abstract This paper compares police, newspaper, television, and public images of crime trends for the seven FBI index crimes over time, the relative frequency of occurrence of these offenses, and the characteristics of persons committing them. Media presentations of crime trends over time are found generally unrelated to trends in police statistics. Newspaper presentation of the relative distribution of crimes approximates police figures more closely than does the television presentation. Public views of the relative distribution of crimes but not of crime trends more closely approximate media presentations than police presentations. Television's impact on public views of crime is apparently minor. Reasons for these findings and their implications for crime news reporting are discussed.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 45:492–506 © 1981 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/81/0045-492/$2.50

papers daily, 64 percent of the sample report reliance on television as their primary source of news about political and current events. Forty-seven percent watch local newscasts frequently. Yet, despite television's popularity, we know little about its crime-reporting practices and less about the extent to which its picture of crime mirrors those of the police, the print media, and the public. This research examines all four images of crime in New Orleans, Louisiana, comparing their respective presentations of (1) crime trends for the seven major index crimes over time, (2) the relative frequency of occurrence of these offenses, and (3) the characteristics of persons committing them.

Literature Review

CRIME-NEWSPAPER RESEARCH

Most recent research into print media news reporting has centered on the process of newspaper story selection, i.e., the process of "creating news" (Tuchman, 1978). That certain crimes receive disproportionate newspaper coverage is well documented. Roshier found violent crime, blackmail, and drug offenses more prominent in British papers. Jones (1976) found that St. Louis newspapers gave crimes against the person 35 times the attention that property crimes received; murder received 90 times the coverage that other major offenses received.

Newspapers appear to carry their concentration on certain offenses even further through organization of these offenses around themes. Fishman (1978) has described the creation of a 1976 "crime wave" against the elderly in New York City. In Fishman's view, the "crime wave" occurred when news reporters became aware of a few crimes against the elderly and began to search for and to highlight such crimes. Ironically, the major source of crime news for reporters is the police wire service, which signals reporters only about certain sensational offenses, crimes in which the police have an interest, or types of crime about which reporters have expressed an interest.

In sum, it seems that images of crime which reach the public through the print media are grossly distorted.

CRIME-TELEVISION RESEARCH

Researchers and critics are as concerned about bias and distortion in television news as in print news. Yet, beyond studies of television crime dramas (Dominick, 1973; Gerbner et al., 1978) and Fishman's (1978) work on the "crime wave" against the elderly, little analysis of

crime news on television has been done. To date, no research has been reported which compares television, newspaper, police, and public images of crime.

Undoubtedly much the same processes govern both television and print news selection. However, since most cities have more television stations than newspapers competing against each other, the pressures on television news organizations seem more intense than do those on newspaper organizations. Formulas must be developed which attract greater audiences and therefore more advertisers. The concern with "marketable" news leads to speculation that television crime news departs more widely from objective reality than does newspaper crime news. Certainly, time is a far more important variable in television news reporting (Gelles and Faulkner, 1978; Schlesinger, 1977). "Good" news for television means immediate news, and immediate news does not necessarily imply accuracy. Television is less concerned with newsworthiness than with the presentation of an appealing product (Epstein, 1973:262, 263). Hence, there is an emphasis on soft (scheduled) news—the human interest story—rather than on hard news—crime events (Shelton, 1978). Hard news is chosen if it reflects severe disruption of or threat to the community and if it can be shown in a manner which displays action and drama and appears live. Therefore, there is a focus on homicides, fires, and accidents.

Hypotheses

The summary above suggests that crime news is generally not fashioned to portray accurately the many aspects of crime in this society. While the public undoubtedly does not base its views of crime solely on media reports, it most certainly relies more upon the media than upon official police reports. Whether or not television reports have more impact on public opinion than newspaper reports do is unknown, though surveys and other research indicate that television may be a powerful force in shaping world views (Gerbner et al., 1978). With these ideas in mind, a number of hypotheses around which the present study is structured are offered:

1. Media presentation of crime trends will be unrelated to trends displayed in police statistics.

2. Newspaper and television presentations of crime trends will display greater similarity to each other than either will to police statistics.

3. The relative frequency distribution of crimes as portrayed by the media will be the inverse of their relative distribution as found in police reports.

4. Newspaper presentation of the relative distribution of crimes will display greater similarity to police reports on relative distribution than will television's presentation.

5. The public's views of crime trends and the relative frequency distribution of crimes will more closely reflect the media images of these variables than the police image and will more closely reflect the television image than the newspaper image.

In addition to examining these hypotheses, the current research seeks an answer to a question about which the literature offers only nebulous answers: Do the police, media, and public offer similar views of the characteristics—race, sex, and age—of offenders?

Admittedly, these hypotheses and the general tone of this paper exaggerate the impact of news on attitudes. More is involved in forming ideas about crime than media information. Even regarding television alone, Gerbner and Gross (1976) argue that the entirety of television programming (not news alone, nor drama alone, and so forth) must be viewed as a system of messages which cultivates a given world view. Testing such a proposition is beyond the scope of the present study. Instead, this study treats the media-attitude relation in terms of its popular image. The public no doubt perceives itself as relying primarily on news programs for crime information, and many researchers have assumed a direct link between crime news and attitudes about crime. They are not necessarily incorrect. The presence of such a link in the present study would suggest that crime views can be predicted if crime news-receiving habits are known and, until there is a definitive study which controls for all types of programming simultaneously, would leave open the distinct possibility of a direct causal path.

Method

In order to examine the hypotheses above and the related research question, data were gathered from the New Orleans police, media, and public concerning crime in New Orleans for a three-month period, August 15 through November 15, 1978. The study period was chosen partly for convenience and partly to provide members of the public who were interviewed with a reasonably short time span to which to refer when asked about crime in New Orleans. There is no evidence, based on reviews of police and media reports before and after the study, that the three-month period studied was unrepresentative. There was neither more nor less crime in that quarter than other quarters of the year. During the study period no particularly spectacular offenses occurred which would have heightened public fears of crime to an unusual degree.

Crime, for the purposes of this study, refers to the seven FBI index offenses: homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. Choice of offenses was informed by the facts that the media seem concerned primarily with index crimes and the police keep detailed statistics only on these offenses.

NEWSPAPER ANALYSIS

New Orleans had two major daily newspapers, both owned by the same publisher and both reporting local crime news in the same fashion. The *Times-Picayune*, the more widely read of the two, was chosen for the present study.[1] The seven index crimes were tallied as reports of them appeared on the pages of the paper for the three-month study period. Only crimes committed, as opposed to those reported in "trial" stories, were included in the tally. Each offense was counted only once. Since New Orleans is the heart of a large SMSA, crimes committed in the suburbs as well as the city proper were counted. (The majority of offenses occurred within the city limits.) Information on the type of crime, the date on which it was reported, and characteristics of offenders (sex, race, age), if given, was recorded. In all, 813 index crimes were counted in the *Times-Picayune* during the study period.

TELEVISION ANALYSIS

Newscast scripts for the three major television stations in New Orleans—Channels 4, 6, and 8—were studied for the three-month period in question. Evening newscasts were chosen for analysis on the basis of two pieces of information provided by the stations: (1) For one station the six o'clock news had the larger audience; for another the audience was evenly split between the six and ten o'clock editions; for the third, audience numbers fluctuated from evening to night editions. (2) All three stations reported that it was rare for a crime story not to appear on both newscasts. As with the newspaper analysis, crimes committed in both the city and suburbs were counted and, again, only once. Information on the type of crime, the reporting date, and characteristics of offenders, if provided, was re-

[1] The two newspapers were remarkably similar in presentation of crime news. Crime was not only covered in the same fashion but was covered in roughly the same place in the papers. During the three-month period studied, every "major" crime received front-page coverage in both papers. Shortly after this research was completed, they were merged into a single daily with expanded editorials and columns but no perceptible difference in news coverage.

corded. The television stations reported an average of 89 index offenses each during the study period.

POLICE STATISTICS

The New Orleans Police Department provided information on index crimes committed in New Orleans during the period under study. The police were also able to supply data on the sex and race of persons committing the offenses, when known. Age statistics were unavailable. To fill this void, data on age of offenders were borrowed from a U.S. Department of Justice (1977) study of criminal victimization in New Orleans in 1974. In all, police figures indicate that 13,246 index crimes occurred in New Orleans in the three months in question.

No claim is made that police statistics accurately reflect actual crime. Indeed, victimization surveys indicate that official statistics reflect only about half of the offenses committed. However, the same survey data indicate that the ordering of crimes by frequency of occurrence is the same for both victimization and police statistics. Police statistics are employed in this study because they are compiled and published more frequently than are victimization data and because the media rely on police reports for crime news.

PUBLIC SURVEY

Economic restrictions prohibited a full, random community survey of New Orleans residents. Instead, a random-digit-dialing sampling technique[2] was employed in a smaller survey of households in the greater New Orleans area between November 16 and November 29, 1978—the two weeks immediately following the three-month study period. Two trained female interviewers made calls between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M. They asked to speak with a member of the household 18 years of age or older, introduced the research as a study of people's attitudes about social problems in New Orleans, and guaranteed anonymity to respondents.

[2] Telephone interviews, when conducted in areas of high phone saturation (95 percent of New Orleans homes have telephones), have generally proven as effective as other sampling techniques in terms of response rates and quality of data (Horton and Duncan, 1978; Klecka and Tuchfarber, 1978). In the random-digit-dialing method chosen for this study, a random sample of the first four digits (the prefix plus the first of the four remaining digits) of telephone numbers was selected from the current New Orleans telephone directory and paired with random, computer-generated three-digit numbers to form seven-digit numbers. These numbers provided random access to both listed and unlisted working numbers in the New Orleans area. One person in each sampled household was interviewed. Respondents must have reached the age of 18 and lived in New Orleans for at least one year.

Number of female children	*		*			*	*		
a. None (708)	2.32	2.80	2.39	2.53	2.62	2.16	2.38	3.07	2.70
b. One (180)	2.14	2.75	2.25	2.43	2.48	2.02	2.29	2.97	2.69
c. Two or more (114)	2.08	2.72	2.18	2.41	2.50	1.93	2.20	2.93	2.59
Number of male children	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*
a. None (687)	2.29	2.82	2.40	2.54	2.63	2.15	2.38	3.09	2.71
b. One (202)	2.14	2.71	2.24	2.46	2.56	2.00	2.30	2.95	2.69
c. Two or more (113)	2.28	2.69	2.20	2.30	2.34	2.00	2.17	2.87	2.54
Respondent's marital status	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
a. Currently married (560)	2.18	2.69	2.28	2.41	2.52	2.01	2.24	2.94	2.63
b. Never married (198)	2.46	3.00	2.59	2.84	2.73	2.42	2.70	3.33	2.93
c. Formerly married (243)	2.29	2.79	2.29	2.41	2.59	2.07	2.29	3.00	2.62
Respondent's religion	*	*	*	***	*	*	***	*	*
a. Protestant (479)	2.18	2.76	2.28	2.46	2.61	2.06	2.31	3.00	2.64
b. Catholic (291)	2.21	2.64	2.18	2.27	2.40	1.89	2.07	2.82	2.57
c. Jewish (67)	2.22	2.86	2.53	2.57	2.73	2.33	2.68	3.37	2.79
d. None (135)	2.60	3.10	2.81	3.02	2.75	2.57	2.85	3.39	3.05
Respondent's ethnicity	*	*	*	*	*	*	***	*	*
a. Black (134)	2.12	2.63	2.06	2.39	2.31	2.06	2.32	2.85	2.50
b. Hispanic (174)	2.19	2.50	2.10	2.19	2.30	1.82	1.98	2.65	2.49
c. Asian (24)	2.72	2.70	2.48	2.68	2.55	2.16	2.48	2.94	2.92
d. White (656)	2.29	2.89	2.46	2.59	2.71	2.19	2.44	3.18	2.77

* $p = < .05$.

On the average, the interviewers dialed about 20 numbers per night. About 12 were working numbers, and about half of the respondents at these numbers consented to interviews which lasted approximately 10 minutes. In all, 170 contacts were made, and 53 percent of those contacted were cooperative. The resultant sample totals 90 respondents. Eight cases in which interviewees terminated the interview before completion are not included in this number.

While such a small sample cannot be considered representative of the New Orleans population, it nonetheless exhibits considerable variation in standard SES characteristics. The sample is 57 percent female, 78 percent white, and 59 percent married. Forty-one percent were under 30, 23 percent between 30 and 45, and 36 percent over 45. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents or their spouses are white-collar workers and 30 percent are blue-collar. The remainder of the sample is a mix of professionals, laborers, retirees, students, and so forth. The median income is $12,000.[3] Asked about their primary and secondary news sources, one half listed television first and the other half newspapers. Only three respondents listed one without the other, i.e., listed only a primary news source.[4] The three television stations receive nearly equal numbers of viewers.

In line with the aims of this study, respondents were asked to rank, in decreasing order of occurrence in New Orleans, the seven index offenses. The list of offenses was rerandomized for each respondent and definitions of the offenses were provided upon request. Respondents were also asked whether they thought crime in New Orleans had increased, decreased, or remained stable since August. Finally, they were asked to indicate the sex, race, and age of the "typical" offender in crimes of homicide, robbery, and rape.

Findings

CRIME TRENDS

Only one source of the image of crime, Channel 6, displays a statistically significant change (decrease) in crime trends over the

[3] With the exception of the racial distribution, the sample is not radically unlike those reported by larger-scale studies of the New Orleans population. A 1974 victimization survey project (Department of Justice, 1977), for example, reported that 56 percent of the population was female, 54 percent white, and 49 percent married. Forty-eight percent of the population were under 34 years of age, 18 percent were between 35 and 49, and 34 percent were over 50.

[4] The fact that so few people received crime news from only one source meant that no direct comparison by source was possible with the present sample. All relationships explored in the analysis reported in this paper were further explored through controls for "primary" news source. Without exception, the relationships remained as they were prior to controls for "primary" source.

three-month period of the study. Changes portrayed by the other sources appear to be random fluctuations.

Although the media portray no consistent variation in crime, and police statistics likewise show no consistent trend over the three-month study period, 76 percent of the survey sample felt crime had increased, 10 percent regarded it as having decreased, and 14 percent viewed it as remaining stable. Only this latter group, then, had a view of crime trends somewhat in line with the image derived from police statistics.

RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF CRIMES

Table 1 displays the relative distribution of the seven index offenses for each of the sources of crime reports examined in this study. The three television stations are markedly similar in their presentation of crime. Murders and robberies account for about 80 percent of the crimes reported in newscasts. The same offenses represent 45 percent of the crimes reported in print. Yet the police department reports that only 12.4 percent of the city's crimes are homicides and robberies.

The only media report which coincides (coincidence is cited for lack of another explanation) with police figures is the proportion of coverage given by the *Times-Picayune* to burglary (23 percent). As the summary statistics in Table 1 indicate, the media do not reflect, and in some cases they nearly reverse, the distribution of offenses as it appears in police reports. Violent crimes occupy the attention of the media whereas they represent but a fifth of New Orleans crime.

Table 2 translates the percentages in the previous table into rank orderings for the police, the *Times-Picayune*, and the television sta-

Table 1. Individual Index Offenses as Percent of Total Index Offenses Reported by Police and Media

Offense	*Police*	*Times-Picayune*	*TV 4*	*TV 6*	*TV 8*
Homicide	.4%	12%	49%	50%	46%
Robbery	12	33	31	30	32
Rape	.6	6	3	3	4
Assault	7	17	2	4	1
Burglary	23	23	3	4	6
Larceny	46	8	12	9	11
Vehicle theft	11	1	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Violent	20	68	85	87	83
Property	80	32	15	13	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 2. Rankings of Relative Frequency of Index Offenses by Police, Media, and Public

Offense	*Police*	*Times-Picayune*	*TV Stations*[a]	*Public*
Homicide	7	4	1	4
Robbery	3	1	2	1
Rape	6	6	5	3
Assault	5	3	3	5
Burglary	2	2	6	2
Larceny	1	5	4	7
Vehicle theft	4	7	7	6

NOTE: $W = .397$; p = n.s. W signifies the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance for use in measuring the relations among several sets of rankings.

[a] All three television stations were so similar in rankings that they are reported here as one.

tions (alike, thus treated as one), and presents rank orderings from the public survey. Larceny is the most frequent crime reported to the police, yet it is very low in the media rankings and is given last place by the public.[5] While the public is more realistic concerning violent crimes than is television, public rankings still differ considerably from police rankings. Overall, there is little concordance among the views of the relative frequency of occurrence of the index crimes (W = .397). Nor are any two of the rankings significantly alike, though the link between the public's view and that presented by the *Times-Picayune* is quite high and narrowly misses statistical signficiance (r_s = .68; p = .071).

OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS

Without particular guidance from the literature, this study sought correlations among police, media, and public images of offender characteristics for three types of crimes: homicide, rape, and robbery. Assault was excluded because it is both ambiguous and multidimensional, combining such diverse events as muggings and domestic disputes, and because offender characteristics generally are unknown. Since robbery is the most frequently committed of the three offenses examined and patterns for the other two offenses differ little from those of robbery, Table 3 presents comparative data on robbers' characteristics for illustrative purposes.

[5] It is possible that some respondents did not understand the meaning of larceny, though the interviewers referred to the offense in standard FBI index offense terms: larceny-theft. If respondents considered larceny an unknown and likely more exotic crime, it is understandable that they would rank it as occurring infrequently. When larceny is removed from the present analysis, police and public rankings of crime by order of frequency of occurrence are more similar (r_s = .43), though still not significantly statistically related.

Table 3. Police, Media, and Public Views of Robber Characteristics—in Percent[a]

Characteristics	*Police*	*Times-Picayune*	*TV 4*	*TV 6*	*TV 8*	*Public*
Sex						
Male	97%	98%	90%	96%	94%	98%
Female	3	2	10	4	6	2
	(5,217)	(192)	(39)	(20)	(30)	(90)
Race						
White	7	7	33	0	17	5
Black	93	93	67	100	83	70[b]
	(5,217)	(42)	(6)	(3)	(12)	(906)
Age						
Under 18	—[c]	24	0	0	0	20
18–25	—[c]	25	43	64	50	70
26–40	—[c]	26	36	26	43	10
40+	—[c]	25	21	0	7	[c]
		(82)	(13)	(14)	(14)	(90)

[a] Numbers in parentheses represent number of cases in which characteristic in question is mentioned in police or media reports and, for public survey, the number of respondents.

[b] Twenty-two respondents (25 percent) felt that robbers were as likely to be white as black.

[c] Data unavailable.

The data presented in Table 3 indicate little variation in police, public, and media views of the sex and race of robbers. The common offender for robbery (and rape and homicide as well), according to police figures, is a black male, an image echoed by the media and the public. Age estimates differ somewhat. The public tends to hold a view of robbers as somewhat younger than the media portray them. While the police could provide no data on the age of robbery offenders, a 1974 victimization survey conducted in New Orleans (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:15) indicates that 30 percent are under 18 and an additional 19 percent are between 18 and 21. The rest are classified as "over 21." It seems, then, that the public view of the offender's age is somewhat more in line with that presented by victimization report statistics.

A similar pattern emerges when victimization data (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:15) are used to determine the age of rapists relative to public estimates and media portrayals. However, age estimates of homicide offenders from the *Times-Picayune*, the public, and official statistics (1974) obtained from the New Orleans coroner's office display greater similarity than is displayed for robbery and rape cases. Since the newspaper reports virtually all homicides, this is not unexpected. Perhaps because television news organizations tend to report more unusual crimes (homicides by older persons are the more unusual), or perhaps simply by chance, the three television stations

portray the homicide offender as somewhat older than do the other sources.

Perhaps as noteworthy as comparisons of characteristics, when given, are differences in the media's level of provision of characteristics. The *Times-Picayune* mentioned age in the majority of cases reported but rarely mentioned race (except when a suspect was reported as still at large). When offenders were known to police, their addresses were reported in the paper, thus providing a major clue to racial identity. Sex of the offenders was always either mentioned or highly evident in the story.

Sex of the offender was almost always specified in television crime stories but age identification varied from 33 percent for one station to 66 percent for another. Race of homicide and rape offenders was rarely mentioned,[6] but stations mentioned race of offenders in reported robberies from 12 percent to 32 percent of the time.

Hypotheses Evaluated

Only some of the hypotheses examined in this research are sustained. Hypotheses three and four find support: the relative distribution of crimes as portrayed by the media is generally unlike that found in police figures; and the newspaper presentation of the relative distribution of crimes approximates police figures to a greater extent than does the television presentation. Hypothesis one is unsupported in the sense that media presentations of crime trends over time are not found unrelated to trends observed in police statistics, though the random fluctuations in both media and police presentations make the null hypothesis difficult to accept. Hypothesis two was not confirmed: newspaper and television presentations of crime trends are not more similar to each other than either is to police statistics.

Hypothesis five, multidimensional, found mixed support in the data. As hypothesized, the public's view of the relative distribution of crimes more closely approximates the image presented by the media than that presented by the police. Yet the same cannot be said of the public's view of crime trends. And somewhat surprisingly, given public attention to television, the public's conception of the relative distribution of crimes is closer to that of the newspaper than to that of television.

Offender characteristics are mentioned so infrequently and in such

[6] Though race of homicide offenders is rarely mentioned in television reports, it can undoubtedly be determined by viewers in many instances. Sufficient footage of the neighborhood and persons viewing the scene permit those familiar with New Orleans' geography to make an educated guess concerning the race of the parties involved.

uneven fashion as to make suspect any relationships found among police, media, and public views of offenders. To the extent that characteristics are discussed, few differences in race and sex images are found. The public's image of age of offenders seems more similar to that of the official statistics than to that of the media for rape and robbery cases. For homicide cases, television tends to portray offenders as older than do the police, newspaper, and public, which are in fair agreement.

Discussion

This study reflects an attempt to shed some light on the relation of crime news reporting in the media, especially television, to public images of crime. With the exception of newspaper coverage of homicide, media crime reporting apparently bears little resemblance to the "reality" of police statistics. Nor are television and newspapers as similar in their crime coverage as one might expect. Further, the public's view of crime trends over time displays little agreement with either police or media figures.[7] Yet the public image of the relative frequency of occurrence of various crimes is similar to the image portrayed by newspapers, though distinctly dissimilar from that provided by television. Indeed, the correlation between the visual medium's presentation of crime news and public attitudes about crime seems surprisingly slight and clearly not equal to that between newspaper presentation and public attitudes. Public, media, and police images of the characteristics of offender sex and race are highly correlated, and images of age of offender are moderately related, though the media do not provide extensive coverage in this area.

These findings are necessarily qualified by limits on the research site and sample and on the time frame. Yet, assuming support for the present findings in future replications, two important questions quickly surface. First, where links exist between media portrayals and public views of crime, can we speak of causal relationships? Second, why does television have so little relation to public views of crime?

As noted earlier, discussions of a causal relationship between media presentation of crime and public views of crime ultimately must address the impact of television's "message" about crime. That is, not

[7] These findings contradict somewhat those recently reported by Warr (1980). His data suggest high agreement between official estimates of crime and public perceptions of those estimates. Yet Warr is basically at a loss to explain his findings, arguing finally that the media must be offering fairly accurate assessments of officially recognized crime incidence and that the public retains this knowledge. This explanation flies in the face of numerous studies (including this one) which point to subtantial crime picture disortion by the media.

only news but also dramatic presentations of the crime problem must be considered. Still, it is difficult not to speak of a causal relationship between news stories, by themselves, and public opinion about crime. Victimization surveys (Garofalo, 1977:19) indicate that crime fears are less often rooted in personal experience than in "outside" sources. Even were the outside sources other persons, we can only assume that they receive their information from the media (Warren, 1972:130).

Regarding the present findings, we must wonder at the near relationship between newspaper accounts and public views of crimes' frequency of occurrence when the same link does not exist with respect to crime trends over time.

The answer undoubtedly lies in the fact that the media not only report individual crimes but present periodic summaries of crime trends as well. Newspapers and television stations receive summaries of crime trends from the police, and they tend to give minor coverage to decreases and banner coverage to increases. Thus, the public gains a sense of increasing crime, not by summing the cases about which it hears or reads, but by noting the stories of increases presented by the media.[8]

New Orleans media gave moderate coverage at one point during the three-month period under study to statements by the city's new chief of police regarding crime statistics. Police figures for the first six months of 1978 showed an increase in crime over the same months in 1977. While the chief attributed the rise to new crime-reporting techniques, the image of New Orleans as a city with a rising crime rate surely did not escape newspaper readers and television viewers.

Television's lack of impact on public opinion about crime is surprising at a first glance. Yet perhaps the public is more sophisticated in its analysis of media reports than is often assumed. At least with respect to local crime news, television may be viewed by the public as a summarizing and highlighting medium while newspapers are seen as providing broader coverage. The mature viewer may understand that there is more to the crime picture than the few murders and robberies reported on television. If this is so, however, public sophistication seems to stop short of a healthy skepticism of newspapers as distorting crime news.

[8] The situation is complicated by the fact that the public has been conditioned to assume that crime is ever-increasing. Since the mid-1960s, crime has indeed increased immensely and politicians have seized on the issue with "war on crime" and "law and order" platforms. In this regard, it is notable that Garofalo's (1977:42–43) analyses of public attitudes toward crime in large cities find 40 percent of the citizens defining crime as more serious than the media report.

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The Polls: A Rebirth of Religion?

JOHN M. BENSON

> The sleeping giant that has lain prostrate across America is beginning to wake itself.
>
> REV. D. JAMES KENNEDY[1]

> There are, of course, changes in the manifestations of American piety, shifts and surface developments; but they are less important than the larger steadiness and energy of the religious instinct among us. American religion is, even now, not a marvel of rebirth but of vigorous old age. It is not Lazarus but Methuselah.
>
> GARRY WILLS[2]

EVER since the rise of the Moral Majority and the conservative election victories of 1980, commentators have been devoting a great deal of attention to the state of American religion. Are we witnessing a late-century Great Awakening? Some observers, like Rev. Kennedy, a director of the Religious Roundtable, believe so. After all, in 1980 all three major presidential candidates were "born-again" Christians. Spokesmen for the Moral Majority have been prominent in the news, and Congress seems to be taking a greater interest in "moral" issues.

Yet some doubts remain about the reality and importance of this latest of American religious revivals. The perceptive comment above by Garry Wills was written not in 1981, but in April of 1978, before anyone had even heard of the Moral Majority. The fact that a substantially similar thesis can be sup-

[1] Quoted in Burton Yale Pines, "A Majority for Morality?" *Public Opinion*, April/May 1981, p. 44.

[2] Garry Wills, "What Religious Revival?" *Psychology Today*, April 1978, p. 81.

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Acknowledgment is also given to the survey organizations whose data are used in this article.

Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 45:576–585 © 1981 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/81/0045-576/$2.50

ported today is perhaps itself a small piece of evidence about the validity of Wills's observation.

What light can recent polling data shed on this controversy about American religion? In the four years since it was established, the Princeton Religion Research Center has become perhaps the most prestigious institution dealing with public attitudes toward religion. Its founder and executive director, George Gallup, Jr., has proposed seven indicators to assess the state of American religious attitudes: confidence in organized religion, religious identification, church/synagogue membership, church/synagogue attendance, importance of religion in personal life, perceptions of the influence of religion on society, and the saliency of religion in today's society. I propose to look at the outset at the last five of these indicators in detail in order to assess the current state of American religious belief and practice.

Church and synagogue membership and attendance data are interesting in two ways: both membership and attendance have risen slightly in the most recent period, while the long-term trends indicate a remarkable persistence in institutional religious observance. Seventy-three percent of the respondents in 1952 and 1965 surveys called themselves church or synagogue members. The figure dropped to 68 percent in 1978 and 1979, then rose slightly to 70 percent in 1981. Attendance during an average week dropped steadily, if not spectacularly, between 1958 and 1973, rose briefly in 1976, then dropped again in 1980. Earliest Gallup figures for 1981 show a slight rise in attendance. Frequency of attendance among those with a religious preference has remained even more stable over the years. In its election surveys, the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan has regularly asked those with any religious preference how often they attend church or synagogue. The percentage of those who attend regularly has fluctuated, but in no discernible pattern. The only significant change has been an increase in the number of those who never attend, a trend not reversed in 1980.

Two of Gallup's indicators are particularly useful in measuring people's attitudes toward their own beliefs. When asked about the importance of religion in their own lives, 75 percent of the respondents in a 1952 survey said religion was very important. This figure fell to 53 percent in 1978, but subsequently rose slightly (56 percent in 1980, 55 percent in 1981). When asked if religion can solve most of today's problems, an amazing 81 percent of all respondents in 1957 replied in the affirmative, compared to only 62 percent in 1974. The most recent Gallup data (May 1981) show a small increase to 65 percent. Both indicators, then, show similar change in attitude: a long decline, followed by a very slight increase.

These data provide some encouragement for the proponents of religious revival, but the increases are small, and a longer period of observation may be needed to confirm any trend. One way to determine if the trend is likely to continue is to look at the attitudes of those 18 to 24 years old, who have consistently found religion "very important" in their own lives less often than the national average. Whatever upsurge in religious enthusiasm there is seems to be taking place uniformly among age groups.

The most volatile of Gallup's seven indicators is the perception of the influence of religion in society. In 1957 69 percent of all respondents felt that religion was increasing its influence on American society. By 1970 attitudes had changed completely: 75 percent thought that religion was losing influence, while only 14 percent thought it was gaining influence. In 1980 35

percent said that religion was gaining influence, while 46 percent said it was losing influence—not a very encouraging prospect for the religious, but certainly an improvement over 1970. The most optimistic recent response, however, came in 1976, probably because of the public attention given to that best known of reborn politicians, Jimmy Carter.

The perception of religious influence seems to have changed more than the influence itself. As Wills has explained it, according to the polls believers did not lose belief, but they thought that others were losing it. We have seen from the data on Gallup's religious indicators that belief did in fact decline a bit during the 1960s. Yet the fact remains that the perception clearly outstripped the reality.

Outweighing in importance the relative decline and subsequent slight increase in the importance of religion in the personal lives of Americans is the dramatic difference in attitude between Americans and respondents in other industrialized nations. Compared to eight other Western industrial nations, the United States had by far the highest percentage of respondents who said that religion was very important in their own lives—more than triple the number in West Germany and Scandinavia, more than double the number in any other country except Italy and Canada. Similarly, a greater percentage of American respondents professed belief in God or a universal spirit and in life after death than did respondents in other Western industrialized nations. And, as the trends show, American belief in God and life after death has been rock solid over the years.

The religiosity of the American people is also reflected in other, more specific beliefs. When asked to describe their feelings about the Bible, 39 percent of those who expressed an opinion said that the Bible is the actual word of God and should be taken literally, another 49 percent said that the Bible is the inspired word of God. Eighty-three percent of those expressing an opinion said that Jesus was God or the Son of God, and 82 percent of all respondents said they believed in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. With such widespread acceptance of basic religious tenets already established, there would seem to be little room for revival.

There is a certain ambivalence in American attitudes about the relationship of religion and government. In 1980 the Los Angeles *Times* asked a national sample if they favored a constitutional amendment to make Christianity the official religion of the United States. An extraordinary 34 percent of those offering an opinion said yes. Forty-three percent of the Protestants interviewed favored such an amendment. Half of those with less than a high school education, more than half of the black respondents, and close to half of the respondents from the South were in favor of the idea.[3]

Yet a majority of Americans seem to have struck a delicate balance in their

[3] In this case, as in the case of many other survey questions, different groups of respondents may have interpreted the question in different ways. The fact that 50 percent of respondents with less than a high school education answered yes, while only 18 percent of college-educated respondents did so, does not necessarily mean that less educated respondents are much more religious. It is more likely that an informational component is involved, namely, that while college-educated respondents are likely to see the question in strictly constitutional terms relating to church-state relations, less educated respondents are likely to see the question as a test of their approval of the Christian faith and its role in American society. Nevertheless, the religious sentiments expressed by the respondents are significant.

conception of church-state relations: churches and members of the clergy may speak out on social questions, but they should not back political candidates. In August 1981 NBC News/Associated Press asked if churches and clergy should speak out on social questions. Fifty-five percent of those expressing an opinion said yes. But when asked if churches should be involved in politics, like backing candidates, two-thirds said no. Similarly, in a Los Angeles *Times* poll just after the 1980 election, nearly two-thirds opposed the endorsement of political candidates by organized religious groups.

Does this mean that Americans want churches and religion to play a lesser role in American politics and government? The answer here is somewhat murkier. In an ABC News/Washington *Post* survey in May 1981, respondents were nearly evenly divided on whether they wanted churches and religion to play a greater or lesser role (29 percent to 33 percent); indeed, a plurality (37 percent) liked things just as they were. But when NBC News/Associated Press asked in August whether religious convictions should be a basis for political action, a large majority said no.

Where all this leaves the Moral Majority is not entirely clear. The Moral Majority got quite a bit of media attention during the 1980 presidential campaign. Yet when Gallup asked a nationwide sample shortly after the election if they had heard or read about the Moral Majority, only 40 percent said yes. Furthermore, only 26 percent were judged "informed" on the basis of their description of the group. Of this 26 percent, 8 percent approved of the Moral Majority, 13 percent disapproved, and 5 percent had no opinion. When the Institute for Social Research in its 1980 Election Study asked respondents to rate evangelical groups active in politics, such as the Moral Majority, two-thirds responded "Don't Know," and unfavorable responses outweighed favorable ones 14 percent to 11 percent.

Awareness of the Moral Majority has increased since last fall. For instance, in an ABC News/Washington *Post* survey conducted in May 1981, 49 percent of the respondents had heard of the Moral Majority (there was no test for "informed" opinion), and of those who had heard, almost as many approved as disapproved of most positions taken by the group. But in an August 1981 NBC News/Associated Press survey, 52 percent had not heard enough to have an opinion, and of those who had an opinion more had unfavorable than had favorable opinions. Public awareness of and sympathy for the Moral Majority are relatively low for a group that considers itself the vanguard of a revival.

Moreover, while all three of the major presidential candidates in 1980 professed to be "born again," public awareness of that fact was quite low. In August 1980, Gallup asked respondents if they knew whether or not each of the candidates considered himself a "(born-again) evangelical Christian." A bare majority was aware that Carter was, but only 14 percent and 11 percent, respectively, were aware that Reagan and Anderson were born again. The lack of public awareness on this point indicates that religion may not have been a primary reason for the presence of these three men before the electorate.

Before concluding, it would be well to review what the polls *cannot* tell us about the state of American religion. While certain aspects of the American religious experience can be quantified, others cannot. One may profess a belief, go to church, and yet be a hypocrite. As Perry Miller has aptly pointed out, the object of revival is only partly the conversion of sinners;

more important is the reinvigoration of God's people.[4] It is not altogether impossible that a revival might take place among the faithful themselves, a rebirth that would be difficult to chart using public opinion data.

Nevertheless, we must venture to answer the central question: Are we witnessing a religious revival? Evidence drawn from various public opinion surveys would seem to indicate that we are not in the midst of a new Great Awakening. Data bearing on Gallup's religious indicators show that after a long decline, we are now witnessing a leveling off or a slight upturn. Whether this is another relatively minor fluctuation or the modest beginning of a dramatic trend cannot yet be determined.

GALLUP: *Did you, yourself, happen to attend (church/church or synagogue) in the last seven days?*[a]

	National	*Protestant*	*Catholic*
1958	49	44	74
1961	47	43	71
1964	45	38	71
1967	43	39	66
1970	42	38	60
1973	40	37	55
1976	42	40	55
1978	41	40	52
1980	40	39	53
1981	43	42	56

[a] Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of May 8–11, 1981. Data for years previous to 1981 represent averages of several surveys.

ISR: (If any religious preference) *Would you say you go to church regularly, often, seldom, or never?* (1952–1968) *Would you say you go to (church/synagogue) every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?* (1979–1980)[a]

	Regularly/ Every Week/ Almost Every Week	*Often/ Once or Twice a Month*	*Seldom/ a few Times a Year*	*Never*
1952	38	18	36	8
1956	42	18	34	6
1960	44	18	33	5
1964	45	17	31	7
1968	38	15	36	11
1972	39	12	34	15
1976	40	15	31	14
1980	40	13	32	16

[a] Surveys by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Studies; latest survey 1980.

[4] *The Life of the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), p. 10.

GALLUP: *How important would you say religion is in your own life—very important, fairly important, or not very important?*[a]

		Very	*Fairly*	*Not Very*
1952	National	75	20	5
	18–24	64	30	6
1965	National	71	22	7
	18–24	58	32	10
1978	National	53	33	14
	18–24	37	43	19
1980	National	56	31	13
	18–24	43	41	15
1981	National	55	28	16
	18–24	44	37	18

NOTE: "Don't know" responses calculated out. The "Don't know" response was 2% or less in each year.

[a] Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of May 8–11, 1981.

GALLUP: *Do you believe that religion can answer all or most of today's problems, or is it largely old-fashioned and out of date?*[a]

	Can Answer	*Out of Date*	*No Opinion*
1957	81	7	12
1974	62	20	18
1981	65	15	20

[a] Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of Jan. 30–Feb. 2, 1981.

GALLUP: *At the present time, do you think religion as a whole is increasing its influence on American life or losing its influence?*[a]

	Increasing	*Same/No Difference*	*Losing*	*No Opinion Don't Know*
1957	69	10	14	7
1962	45	17	31	7
1967	23	14	57	6
1970	14	7	75	4
1974	31	8	56	5
1976	44	8	45	3
1978	37	10	48	5
1980	35	11	46	8

[a] Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 11–14, 1980.

GALLUP: *How important to you are your religious beliefs—very important, fairly important, not too important, or not at all important?*[a]

	Very	*Fairly*	*Not Too*	*Not at All*	*Don't Know*
United States	58	30	7	5	2
Italy	36	42	16	6	*
Canada	36	36	19	9	*
Benelux	26	30	22	19	3
Australia	25	33	29	13	*
United Kingdom	23	26	26	20	5
France	22	33	23	20	2
West Germany	17	30	37	14	2
Scandinavia	17	28	39	13	3

* Less than .5%.

[a] Surveys by the Gallup International Research Institute for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, 1974–75, for foreign; Gallup Organization survey of Jan. 20–23, 1978, for U.S.A.

GALLUP: *Do you believe in God or a universal spirit? Do you believe there is life after death?* (USA 1947) *Do you believe in life after death?* (USA 1968, 1976; all other nations) *Do you believe that there is life after death?* (USA 1978)[a]

	Believe in God	*Believe in Life After Death*
United States		
1947	X	68
1948	94	X
1968	98	73
1976	94	69
1978	94	71
Canada	89	54
Italy	88	46
Australia	80	48
Benelux	78	48
United Kingdom	76	43
France	72	39
West Germany	72	33
Scandinavia	65	35

NOTE: Balance said "No" or were uncertain.

[a] Surveys by the Gallup International Research Institute for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, 1974–75, for foreign; Gallup Organization Surveys, 1947–76, for U.S.A.; Gallup Organization Survey, Jan. 20–23, 1978, for belief in God (1978 USA); Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc. for the Religious Coalition, April 14–17, April 28–May 1, 1978, for belief in life after death (1978 USA).

GALLUP: *Which of the statements on this card comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? Just read off the letters . . . (A) The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word. (B) The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word. (C) The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history and moral perceptions recorded by men.*[a]

Actual Word of God	*Inspired Word of God*	*Ancient Book of Fables*
39	49	12

NOTE: "Don't Know" and "No Answer" (6%) calculated out.

GALLUP: *What do you believe about Jesus Christ—do you think Jesus Christ was God, another religious leader like Muhammed or Buddha, or do you think Jesus Christ never actually lived?*[a]

God/Son of God	*Another Religious Leader*	*Never Actually Lived*	*Other*
83	14	1	2

NOTE: "Don't Know" and "No Answer" (6%) calculated out.

GALLUP: *Do you believe in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, or not?*[a]

Yes	*No*	*Don't Know/No Answer*
82	9	9

[a] Survey by the Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition, April 14–17, April 28–May 1, 1978.

LAT: *Would you favor or oppose a Constitutional amendment which would make Christianity the official religion of the United States?*[a]

	Yes	*No*
National	34	66
By religious preference		
Protestant	43	57
Catholic	29	71
Jewish	6	94
By age		
18–19	28	72
30–44	36	64
45–64	33	67
65+	45	55
By education		
<HS grad	50	50
HS grad	34	66
Some college	31	79
College grad	18	82
By race		
White	33	67
Black	52	48
By region		
Northeast	26	74
North Central	38	62
South	47	53
West	20	80

[a] "Not sure" and "Refused" calculated out. Such responses accounted for less than 10% of the total for all subgroups except "65+" (12%) and "<HS Grad" (11%). Survey by the Los Angeles *Times*, Sept. 2–7, 1980.

NBC/AP: *Should churches and members of the clergy express their views on current social questions, or should they keep out of social matters?*[a]

Should Express Views	*Should Keep Out*
55	45

NBC/AP: *What about politics? Do you think that churches and members of the clergy should be involved in politics, like backing a candidate for public office, or don't you think so?*[a]

Should Be Involved	*Should Not Be Involved*
31	69

NBC/AP: *Do you think religious convictions should be a basis for political action, or don't you think so?*[a]

Should	*Should Not*
22	78

[a] Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, Aug. 10–11, 1981.

LAT: *Do you think that organized religious groups should or should not endorse political candidates?*[a]

Yes	*No*
35	65

[a] Survey by the Los Angeles *Times*, Nov. 9–13, 1980.

ABC/WP: *Would you like to see the churches and religion play a greater role in American politics and government, a lesser role, or about the same role?*[a]

Greater	*About the Same*	*Lesser*
29	37	33

NOTE: "Don't Know," "Not Sure," and "Refused" have been calculated out in each of the above five tables.

[a] Survey by ABC News/Washington *Post*, May 18–20, 1981.

GALLUP: *From what you know about it, how would you describe the Moral Majority? For example, what are its objectives and what does it stand for? In general, would you say that you mostly approve or mostly disapprove of the Moral Majority?*[a]

	%
Approve	8
Disapprove	13
No opinion	5
Total informed	26
Total unaware/uninformed	74

[a] Survey by the Gallup Organization, Nov. 21–24, 1980.

ISR: *And, still using the thermometer, how would you rate the following . . . evangelical groups active in politics, such as the Moral Majority?*[a]

Very Favorable (75–100)	*Favorable (51–74)*	*Neutral (50)*	*Unfavorable (25–49)*	*Very Unfavorable (0–24)*	*Don't Know/ No Answer*
4	7	9	7	7	67

[a] Survey by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1980 Election Study.

ABC/WP: *Have you heard or read anything about the group known as the "Moral Majority"*[a]

Yes	*No*	*Don't Know/No Opinion*
49	51	*

(If Yes) *Would you say you generally approve or disapprove of the positions the Moral Majority takes on most issues?*

Approve	*Disapprove*	*Don't Know/No Opinion*
37	43	21

[a] Survey by ABC News/Washington *Post*, May 18–20, 1981.

NBC/AP: *Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the Moral Majority, or haven't you heard enough about it to have an opinion?*[a]

Haven't Heard Enough	*Favorable*	*Unfavorable*	*Not Sure*
52	12	28	8

[a] Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, Aug. 10–11, 1981.

GALLUP: *Do you happen to know whether or not these men consider themselves to be (born-again) evangelical Christians?*[a]

	National	*Evangelicals*	*Nonevangelicals*
Carter?			
Yes, he does	51	72	47
No, he doesn't	12	7	13
Don't know	37	21	40
Reagan?			
Yes, he does	14	21	12
No, he doesn't	26	18	28
Don't know	60	61	60
Anderson?			
Yes, he does	11	11	11
No, he doesn't	20	13	22
Don't know	69	76	67

[a] Surveys by the Gallup Organization, Aug. 1–4 and Aug. 15–18, 1980.

A0610-1 4/1/22

POPQAE 46 (1)1–142 (1982)
ISSN 0033–362X

Public Opinion Quarterly

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SPRING 1982

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The Public Opinion Quarterly

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Possible Falsification of Survey Data: An Analysis of a Mail Survey in the Soviet Union

STAN A. KAPLOWITZ AND VLADIMIR SHLAPENTOKH

REMARKABLY little attention has been given to the problem of deliberate and systematic falsification of data. Much attention has been given to unintended threats to validity from experimenter expectancy effect (Rosenthal, 1966), demand characteristics (Orne, 1962), from response set (e.g., Jackson and Messick, 1958; Jackman, 1973), from social desirability (e.g., Nunnally, 1967), and from poorly drawn samples (Kish, 1959). Some attention has also been given to cheating or distortion by interviewers or other hired hands (Roth, 1965; Hauck, 1969; Shapiro, 1970; Collins, 1970), but virtually none has been given to deliberate falsification by researchers or by others intending to deceive researchers.

Falsification does, however, take place. Statistical analyses have

Abstract Analysis of data from a mail survey in the Soviet Union, carried out by the agency responsible for the distribution of *America Illustrated*, strongly suggests that the data were falsified. Information about Soviet society (including the results of a number of other surveys of the Soviet population) and probability theory were used to generate a set of expected results for this survey. The actual results differed dramatically from the expected—the response rate was much too high, the sample was too young and contained too many workers, and too many people had managed to see almost all of the previous year's issues. These discrepancies, combined with the fact that the results served the interests of the Soviet officials and that it would have been easy for them to falsify the data, lead us to suspect that they did so. The conclusion discusses the conditions under which various kinds of falsification are most likely and general strategies for detecting falsification.

Stan A. Kaplowitz is Associate Professor and Vladimir Shlapentokh is Visiting Professor in the Department of Sociology, Michigan State University. Authors are listed alphabetically. Versions of this article have been presented at meetings of the North Central Sociological Association in Cleveland in April 1981 and the American Sociological Association in Toronto in August 1981. The authors wish to thank Daniel Steinmetz, Edward L. Fink, and Bernard Finifter for their valuable comments and James P. McGregor, Office of Research at the International Communication Agency, for providing us with supplementary data from the *America Illustrated* mail survey.

Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:1–23 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-1/$2.50

indicated that Newton, Mendel, and Dalton (or their assistants) "fudged" some of their data (Barber, 1976). More recently, psychologist Cyril Burt has published data which are considered falsified "beyond reasonable doubt" (Hearnshaw, 1979). Brazilian authorities appear to have falsified data to make it seem that polio had been wiped out (Keerdoja et al., 1980), and there is suspicion of falsification in parapsychology research (Barber, 1976).

In sociology, we almost never question the veracity of data as historians do, and we do not have the protection via replication that natural scientists do. In social science, discrepant results can typically be attributed to differences in methodology or in the population being studied. Naturally, both the lack of attention to the problem and the difficulty of detecting it make it more likely that there will be falsification when it is in someone's interest to have it so. We believe that the detection of falsification is, however, possible, and we shall demonstrate this by arguing that the data from a mail survey done in the USSR, by an American agency, were probably falsified.

The major evidence of falsification is inconsistency between the actual data and the data which would be expected on the basis of some reasonable assumptions. But agencies that engage in falsification will obviously try to disguise this fact. Hence, the assumptions used to generate the expected data may have to be based on impressionistic data and indirect evidence.[1] In short, demonstrating falsification requires that we be not only scientists but also detectives, building a case out of a chain of circumstantial evidence.

The detection of falsification requires both sociological knowledge about the topic and society under study and mathematical/statistical knowledge. Conversely, those who falsify data can avoid detection if they know enough sociology to make their results consistent with other findings in their society and enough about probability and statistics to simulate randomness, where that is appropriate.

Overview of the *America Illustrated* Survey

America Illustrated (AI) is a monthly Russian language publication produced by a U.S. government agency, the International Communication Agency (ICA), for distribution in the Soviet Union. Its distri-

[1] Such indirect methods were used by Trabalka et al. (1980) in arguing that the Soviet Union had experienced a serious (and unreported) nuclear accident in the late 1950s. Maps showed that a community had disappeared and other evidence showed high levels of radioactive contamination in that general area. Moreover, while a Soviet publication mentioned a planned experiment in contamination, the large size of the contaminated area convinced the investigators that deliberate contamination was very unlikely.

bution is governed by the 1973 USA–USSR Cultural Exchange agreement, which also permits the English language publication *Soviet Life* to be distributed in the United States. The agreement specified that 62,000 copies of each issue be distributed, specified the proportions to be available by subscription and at newsstands, and also specified a minimal number of cities where these publications were to be distributed.

From late 1977 to early 1978, ICA undertook a mail survey of Soviet readers to learn what *AI*'s readers thought of the publication, what kinds of people read *AI*, and whether *AI* was, in fact, being circulated outside of the largest cities. Four questionnaire forms were placed in each of the 62,000 copies of three different issues of *AI*. Respondents were to mail their completed responses to the American embassy. As an incentive, each respondent was to receive a set of prints by American artists. The description of the survey and its results appears as "Survey of Soviet Readers of America Illustrated," (SSRAI—see McGregor, 1978).

The ICA was obviously pleased with the results. First, while the return rate, which we estimate at 2.0 percent,[2] was very low by the standards of mail surveys in Western countries, "the number of returns (1,962) is by far the highest of any known survey effort undertaken by a Western governmental agency in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union" (SSRAI:i). Moreover, the results showed a high degree of reader loyalty, as the median number of issues read of the past 12

[2] The response rate depends not just on the number of responses (1,962) but on the number of people who received one or more copies of the questionnaire. We know that there were 62,000 copies of each issue, three issues with a questionnaire, and four copies of the questionnaire within each issue. To determine the number of different people who received one or more copies of the questionnaire we must estimate the mean number of issues containing a questionnaire received by each respondent. To do this, we use the data in SSRAI Table 5, which tells us the distribution of the number of issues seen by respondents in the past year. If a respondent has seen k of the past 12 issues, the expected number, of the three issues containing questionnaires, which he/she has received is $1 + \frac{2(k-1)}{11}$. (If a person responds, then even if he or she saw only one issue, it must have been one of the issues with the questionnaire.) We then find that the mean number of those issues which a respondent read was 2.34. Dividing the total number of issues containing questionnaires (186,000) by 2.34 gives us 79,500 different recipients of those issues.

We must next take into account the fact that there was more than one questionnaire in each issue and that 16 percent of the respondents (307) indicated that they had gotten their copy from a friend or relative. To do this we subtract the 307 respondents who indicated that they had gotten their copy of *AI* from a friend or relative from our 1,962 respondents, giving us a response rate of 2.0 percent among those who were initial recipients of an issue. We further assume that when a pass-along reader had access to a questionnaire, he or she had the same probability as an initial recipient of responding, thus leaving the overall response rate at 2.0 percent.

was between 9 and 10 (SSRAI:12). Finally, the ICA may well have been pleased to find that *AI* was read by a broad cross-section of the Soviet population, reached over 200 cities, and was available at kiosks as well as by subscription.

Not only did the ICA have reason to be pleased with these results, so did the Soviet government. First, the results suggested that the Soviet government is living up to its agreement regarding the distribution of *AI*. The Cultural Exchange agreement calls for *AI* to be distributed in 85 specific cities. Responses were received from 77 of those 85 (SSRAI:10). Moreover, the Soviet distribution agency claims that one-fourth of the copies are subscription and three-fourths via kiosk (SSRAI:15). SSRAI (p. 14, Table 6) reports that almost twice as many respondents received *AI* at a kiosk as via subscription. This suggests that here, too, the Soviet government has kept its word.

The data on articles preferred by readers should also please the Soviet authorities, since the results show a "strong preference for lighter topics, and the avoidance of economic and political subjects" (SSRAI:18–20).

Evidence of Falsification

SSRAI points out that the sample, being self-selected, may well have been unrepresentative and further points out the possibility of interference by Soviet postal and security authorities. Having reached these insights, the report then downgrades their significance.

What initially suggested to us that the data had been falsified was the finding (SSRAI:5, Table 1c) that the educational level of the respondents corresponded almost exactly to the educational level of the entire Soviet population, with 7 percent of each group having higher education. These figures were astounding when compared with surveys which found that 39 percent of the readers of *Pravda*, and 25 percent of the readers of *Trud* (a publication especially oriented towards manual workers) had higher education (Shlapentokh, 1970:169). If *AI* were readily available, we would expect at least as high a percentage of *AI*'s readers to have higher education as is true of *Pravda*'s readers. In fact, *AI* is a very scarce good (62,000 copies available, as compared with about 10 million each for *Pravda* and *Izvestia*), and in the Soviet Union scarce goods are reserved for privileged people (Smith, 1976).

What could account for the sample being so unrepresentative in education? One possible explanation was that highly educated people in the Soviet Union have a lower response rate to mail surveys than less educated people. Shlapentokh (1976:160) has, however, found the

opposite. While a probability sample found that 39 percent of the readers of *Pravda* were highly educated, 49 percent of the respondents to a mail survey included in *Pravda* reported higher education. We could think of no plausible explanation for such discrepancies except falsification of the data, by someone who had done a very poor job of concealing the evidence.

After completing most of the work on this report, we told the researchers at ICA of our suspicions and expressed our amazement at the data on the educational level of the respondents. The researchers checked their computer printout and found that in preparing SSRAI, some of the numbers had been garbled. The "true" responses were 41 percent higher education, 51 percent secondary, and 7 percent elementary. This was a much more plausible result, but by this time we had accumulated further evidence suggesting falsification. We will now present this evidence.

THE RESPONSE RATE

While the response rate (2 percent) was very low by Western standards, it is high in the Soviet context. Moreover, we conclude that if the data are genuine, this is the most courageous set of respondents ever found in the Soviet Union. Because they expect each survey to bring them unpleasant results, Soviet authorities look rather suspiciously even at surveys conducted by Soviet sociologists, under government sponsorship (Shlapentokh, 1969:122–24). For this reason, even when they permit a survey, they tend to classify the results and forbid their publication. Understanding this ambivalent attitude of the regime, Soviet citizens try to avoid responding to mail surveys because they fear that their frank responses even to officially approved questions can damage their political reputation.

Aware of the psychology of Soviet respondents, Soviet sociologists do their best to stimulate people to send back mail questionnaires. They promise them absolute confidentiality. They ask, even insist, that respondents do not indicate their names and addresses. Despite all these efforts, however, Soviet sociologists have very rarely succeeded in raising the return rate in mail surveys above 5–6 percent. One of the authors of this article found that he could not exceed this limit in the mail survey of *Pravda* readers in 1968 despite the support not only of the editors of the leading newspaper of the country but of the local Party organization (Shlapentokh, 1970:160).

What would be the reaction of Soviet sociologists if they learned that in their country 2 percent of those surveyed participated in a survey organized by the government of a country regarded as the main enemy of the USSR, both ideologically and militarily? Would

they not be amazed to realize that the respondents not only provided that government with information, but also, defying fears accumulated for many decades, gave their full name and full address?

It might be argued that if reading *AI* is legal (even a privilege), why should people be afraid to respond to this questionnaire? The danger in responding is not, however, that one is identifying oneself as a reader of *AI* but that contact with foreigners is suspect (Smith, 1976) and that contact with the American embassy exposes a Soviet citizen to a suspicion of willingness to collaborate with the enemy. If we realize that even a Moscow intellectual prefers to shun the part of the street where the American embassy is located, and that an attempt to enter the building is openly regarded as a crime, this claim becomes more plausible.

A few points in SSRAI add support to our claim that the response rate was surprisingly high. First, the ICA's own earlier attempt in 1968 to survey the Soviet population had yielded a response rate of .06 percent. Second, SSRAI reports evidence of the Soviet government's hostility to the 1977–78 survey. While all surveys sponsored by the Soviet government have prepaid return postage, the ICA was not permitted to prepay postage on this survey (SSRAI:2). The contrast probably told potential respondents something of the government's attitude. Moreover, at a showing of the ICA's "Agriculture USA" exhibit, U.S. officials were asked to remove the questionnaires from copies of *AI* being handed out by exhibit personnel (SSRAI:10).

The distribution of responses among certain social categories is also quite surprising. SSRAI reports that 31 percent of the respondents were younger than 20 and 65 percent were younger than 30, while only 5 percent were over 60 years old. Not only does this substantially overrepresent young people and underrepresent the old, as compared to the general population, it also contradicts other relevant survey research in the USSR. A random sample has found that *Literary Gazeta*, known in the USSR as one of the adult publications most respected by the young, has only 40–50 percent of its readership under the age of 30 (Shlapentokh, 1976:160). (Only 20 percent of the readership of most newspapers is younger than 30.) The fact that *AI* is such a scarce good should further skew its readership away from the young and toward the old. Since subscriptions are distributed to a few privileged people, through their place of work, young people would have little direct access to subscriptions. As for obtaining this scarce good at a kiosk, it is obvious that those in the best position to do so would be those with the most free time—the retired. These considerations suggest that at most, 50 percent of the readership of *AI* is under 30. That 65 percent of the respondents to this mail survey are

under 30 would be plausible only if younger people had higher rates of responding to mail surveys than older people. But in surveys of the readers of a wide variety of Soviet publications, Shlapentokh (1976:160) found just the opposite. Young people were consistently a lower proportion of the respondents to a mail survey than to a random-sample-interview survey of readers of the same publication.

An alternative to the falsified data hypothesis is that these young people did not buy or subscribe to *AI* on their own but are the sons and daughters of retired people or officials, and sent in a questionnaire in order to receive American photographs. In this case, these young people would be defying their parents' wishes by contacting the American embassy and giving their home addresses. We do not consider this very likely.

Another curiosity is that only 2 of the 582 respondents who obtained their copy through subscription were officials. The Soviet government claims that one-fourth (15,000) of the total number of copies are available through subscription. If we knew how many of these subscriptions were received by officials, we could calculate the response rates for both the officials and the nonofficials, to see if these rates are plausible.

Since *AI* is a scarce and desired good, and since such goods are allocated to the privileged (Smith, 1976), we can safely assume that at least 50 percent (and perhaps as many as 90 percent) of the subscribers are officials. In order to determine the response rate of officials and nonofficials, we must deal with the 37 percent of these respondents who were students[3] and divide them up by the occupation of their parents. Table 1 presents response rates for subscribers, divided between officials and nonofficials on the basis of various assumptions about the percentage of subscribers who are officials and the percentage of students whose parents are officials.

No matter which assumptions are used, the officials had a lower response rate than the nonofficials, and, under almost all of our different assumptions, officials had a lower response rate than the sample as a whole. By contrast, our various assumptions lead to a response rate among nonofficials which is at least as high as, and perhaps much higher than, response rates found by Shlapentokh (1970) to surveys conducted with official sponsorship. While the low response rate for officials can be explained on the grounds of caution, the high response rate shown by the other subscribers would make

[3] This figure was estimated as follows: Data given to us by ICA show that the entire sample contained 36 percent nonemployed people, of whom 34 percent were students. Among subscribers, 39 percent were nonemployed, indicating that about 37 percent were students.

Table 1. Response Rates of Officials and Nonofficials Who Were Subscribers, on the Basis of Various Different Assumptions

Assumptions		*Derived Response Rates*	
% of Subscribers Who Are Officials	*% of Student Respondents Whose Parents Are Officials*	*Of Officials*	*Of Nonofficials*
50%	100%	2.9%	4.9%
50	50	1.5	6.3
50	0	0.3	7.7
75	100	1.9	9.7
75	50	1.0	12.6
75	0	0.02	15.5
90	100	1.6	24.3
90	50	0.8	31.5
90	0	0.001	38.7

sense only if these others were an especially daring, nonconformist group. But since a subscription to *AI* is a rare privilege, we would expect that those who were selected for it are at least as conformist as the general population. It should be noted that the lowest response rates for nonofficials come from assuming that all student respondents were children of officials. But if officials were so reluctant to respond, it would be surprising indeed if their children had higher response rates than the children of others.

Still another "remarkable achievement" of this survey is the discovery of a surprisingly large proportion of workers (11 percent of the respondents) who are exposed to Western influence and courageous enough to show this influence. While 11 percent may not seem very large, it is as high as the working class proportion of respondents to a mail survey of readers of *Pravda*. Moreover, *Pravda* is widely available, and the Party organization makes great efforts to get workers to subscribe to it.

NUMBER OF ISSUES READ IN PAST 12 MONTHS

Table 5 of SSRAI divides the respondents by the number of issues they have read in the past 12 months, finding that 29 percent have read all 12 issues and 70 percent have read seven or more issues. We will show that it is impossible for such a large number to have read so many issues, unless almost all of those who purchase *AI* at a kiosk have their copy reserved for them through some under-the-counter arrangement.

As SSRAI points out, the supply of *AI* is much less than the demand for it. Therefore, without under-the-counter arrangements, each reader has a probability, p, of obtaining each issue. If a person

tried each month and p is small, the probability, P_k, of getting k issues in 12 months can be determined by the Poisson approximation of the binomial distribution:

$$P_k = \frac{e^{-(np)}(np)^k}{k!} \tag{1}$$

where n is the number of trials (12).

The crucial step in this process is estimating p. We will deliberately err against our falsification hypothesis by setting p as high as plausible. To determine p, we must first estimate the ratio of the supply of *AI* to the demand for it. In a survey conducted for *Pravda* in 1968, Shlapentokh found that 8 percent of all Soviet adults listen to foreign radio, which is seriously frowned upon by the authorities.[4] Since reading *AI* is viewed less negatively and it is both an attractive and an inexpensive publication,[5] we would expect at least twice as many people to want *AI* (16 percent of the adult population, or 24 million people). Since only one copy of *AI* is ordinarily sought for a single household, we must estimate the number of households which contain one or more adults who want *AI*. To set p as high as plausible, we will estimate the minimum number of households desiring *AI*. We will assume that whenever a single member of a household reads *AI*, all do. Since the typical household averages three adults, we have 8 million households wanting *AI*. If the Soviet government is doing what it says and three-quarters of the copies are sold at kiosks, 8 million households are competing for 45,000 copies, giving each one a .0056 probability of finding *AI* at the kiosk in any given month.

The idea that 8 million households could want *AI* may seem fantastic, to anyone aware of the lack of comparable demand for *Soviet Life*, the Soviet counterpart to *AI*. The situation is fundamentally asymmetric, however. First, Soviet citizens have a great hunger for information about the West but except for Communist publications, *AI* and *Anglia* (*AI*'s British equivalent) are the only Western publications legally available in the Soviet Union. Second, in the Soviet Union, Western goods have high prestige independent of their actual quality (Smith, 1976). By contrast, Soviet goods have no particular status value in the United States. Finally, *AI* is one of the most

[4] This particular finding was never published, but other parts of the survey were published as Evladov et al., 1968.

[5] One issue of *AI* costs 50 kopek (about 75¢). For comparison, in Moscow, the international editions of the *Herald Tribune* and London *Times* cost 60 kopek and a kilogram of apples costs one ruble forty kopek. In the U.S.A., the newsstand price of *Time* magazine is $1.50.

physically attractive and best illustrated publications available in the USSR. Although *Soviet Life* is also attractive, it must compete with many other attractive publications within the United States.

While each household desiring *AI* has only a .0056 probability of finding it at a kiosk, one can also read *AI* if a friend has bought it and will share the issue. Hence p in equation (1) above also depends on the number of friends with whom one might share a copy. We are convinced, however, that almost no one would let more than two households of friends read his/her copy. First, *AI* is too valuable, and second, as stated earlier, while reading *AI* is acceptable, circulating "foreign propaganda" to others is frowned upon by the authorities. Finally, the fact that only 16 percent of respondents claim to have gotten it from friends and relatives further indicates the small amount of sharing copies with friends.

Assuming, however, that each person who wants *AI* will get it provided that one of three people (oneself or two friends) has succeeded in getting it, the probability, p, of receiving each issue is .017. Assuming no under-the-counter arrangements, the number of issues received by each person who regularly tries at the kiosk is given in column B of Table 2.

In order to determine the theoretically expected number of issues read by each respondent, we must take into account the following considerations. (1) The more issues of *AI* someone received, the greater is the probability that he/she received one of the three issues containing the response forms. (2) As stated in SSRAI, those who

Table 2. Theoretical and Actual Distribution of Issues of AI Read by Nonsubscribers in Previous 12 Months (Assuming Probability of Obtaining AI = .017)

A *Number of Issues (k)*	*B* *Fraction of Those Seeking* AI, *Who Have Read That Number of Issues*	*C* *Theoretically Expected Distribution Respondents* [a]	*D* *Actual Distribution of Respondents Who Obtained Current Issue at Kiosk*
0	.8155	0	0
1	.1664	.8155	.051
2	.0170	.1664	.049
3	.0012	.0170	.055
4	.000059	.0012	.086
5	*	.000059	.078
6	*	*	.089
7–12	*	*	.592
			(N = 931)

* Less than 10^{-5}.

[a] Arrived at by multiplying column (B) by (A) × .25 (the expected number of copies with questionnaires a person would have seen) and dividing by the sum of those products, summed over all values of k.

received more than one of the three issues containing the questionnaire may have been more likely to notice it than those who received just one such issue. Let us now assume, therefore, that a reader's probability of responding is proportional to the number of issues containing a questionnaire which he/she received.[6] Therefore, for each possible value of k, we should multiply the proportion receiving k issues by the expected number of issues containing a questionnaire which someone receiving k issues would have seen. This expected number of questionnaire issues is simply:

$$Q_k = \frac{3}{12} \; k \quad = .25k$$

This will give us the relative frequency distribution of respondents among values of k. The final theoretical distribution is derived by normalizing these relative frequencies so that they add up to one and is column C of Table 2.

The actual distribution of interest to us is the number of issues read by those who obtain their copy at a kiosk.[7] This actual distribution, in Table 2, column D, is dramatically different from the theoretically expected distribution.

One possible explanation is again falsification. The major alternative explanation is that a number of people pay the kiosk operator extra to reserve them a copy. If these data have not been falsified, they permit us to estimate the number of such under-the-counter arrangements. Assume that all of the 5.1 percent who saw only one issue obtained it without under-the-counter arrangements. According to Table 2, column C, this number should be 81.6 percent of those who received *AI* on the open market. Hence, only about 6 percent of those who receive *AI* at the kiosk do so in the open market. While some under-the-counter arrangements are plausible, 94 percent seems like much too high a figure.

[6] This assumption is also biased toward rejecting our null (nonfalsification and non-under-the-counter) hypothesis. While someone who receives three issues with a questionnaire may have a somewhat higher probability of responding than someone who receives just one such issue, we doubt that the probability is close to three times as high. Many people make a decision, one way or the other, the first time they see the questionnaire.

[7] This is previously unpublished data, given to us by ICA. In addition, we excluded from the kiosk respondents those who might have been subscribers for half or more of the year. To estimate this number, we noted that 36 current subscribers had obtained fewer than six issues, suggesting that they had been subscribing less than half of the year. Assuming that the number of total subscriptions is constant from year to year leads us to estimate that 36 people had also lost or discontinued their subscriptions during the year.

The most crucial assumption in this entire chain of reasoning is that each person wanting *AI* has a probability of .017 of getting each issue. While this seems like a fair, even slightly generous, assumption, we cannot be certain. It is instructive, however, to imagine that the true probability is twice as high as we have assumed. In this case, we would still expect 70 percent of the kiosk respondents to have seen just one issue and over 99 percent to have seen three or fewer. In addition, we would still conclude that if the data were not falsified, only 7 percent of the kiosk respondents managed without under-the-counter arrangements. In fact, if the demand for AI was only one-twentieth of what we have assumed, then, without under-the-counter arrangements, only 15.6 percent of the kiosk buyers should have seen seven or more issues (as compared to the 59.2 percent actually observed).[8]

THE PASS-ALONG READER DISCREPANCY

Some strong evidence for the falsification hypothesis comes from a discrepancy between two different ways of estimating the number of "pass-along" readers (those who read a copy purchased by someone else). One way was through a question asking people how they had gotten their copy. To this question, 16 percent answered "friends or relatives" (SSRAI: Table 6). The other method makes use of the fact that each copy of *AI* containing the survey had four copies of the survey form.

The response forms were printed on a single page, one above the other, with perforations between them which enabled respondents to tear them out. It is reasonable to assume that the response card located on the top or bottom

[8] As discussed below, many more responses were received from the largest cities than would be expected if all cities responded in proportion to their population. First, might this mean that an individual seeking *AI* at a kiosk in Moscow had a higher probability of obtaining it than someone elsewhere? Second, if the probabilities differ, might this alter our conclusion as to the plausibility of the data in Table 2 column D?

To answer the first question, it is not clear that people in Moscow did have a higher probability than others elsewhere finding *AI* at a kiosk. If the responses were genuine, the greater number from Moscow may have reflected a great concentration of subscribers and/or a greater response rate rather than a disproportionate number of copies available at a kiosk. And even if the number of copies at kiosks, per capita, was higher in Moscow, the educated, cosmopolitan population of that city might have also had a proportionately higher demand for *AI*.

Given the above consideration, we regard it as highly unlikely that a resident of Moscow had more than twice the nationwide average probability of obtaining *AI* at a kiosk. While the assumption that some people had twice the average probability (and that others had a below average probability) would increase the number we would expect to have seen a large number of issues, we have already pointed out that if everyone had twice as high a probability of getting *AI* as we have assumed, the data would still be extremely unlikely.

of the four would most likely be filled out by the first reader of the magazine, and the middle two cards would be completed by pass-along readers. About a third (36 percent) of the response cards were identified as being second or third cards and thus pass-along reader candidates. This is over twice the proportion of responses (who listed themselves as pass-along readers). This, too, probably seriously underestimates the number of pass-along readers because secondary and tertiary readers could also use cards one or four depending on which form the first reader tore out. (SSRAI: 15–16)

Since other research and anecdotal evidence suggests large numbers of pass-along copies, the authors of SSRAI see the discrepancy between 16 percent and 36 percent as indicating that the true pass-along figure is considerably higher than 16 percent. We look at this discrepancy differently, however. What incentive would a pass-along reader have for saying that he/she had purchased the magazine at a kiosk, or was a subscriber? To please the survey researchers at ICA? Not very likely, since it is not clear what response ICA would want and since ICA has no ability to affect the respondent's fate. To please Soviet officials? Why is it preferable to have bought the magazine than to have gotten it from a friend or relative?

But perhaps pass-along readers denied being so, not to protect themselves but to protect their friends. Since it is not illegal to read underground material but a serious crime to circulate it, readers may feel that helping circulate foreign propaganda such as *AI* is viewed more negatively than reading it oneself. Perhaps it is better in this case to admit to a small sin than to implicate a friend in a larger one.

While some respondents may have lied for this reason, we suspect that their number is small. First of all, recall that while reading *AI* is tolerated, responding to the survey, regardless of how one obtained a copy, is risking official disapproval. Second, Soviet citizens assume that if the authorities want to know how a person obtained *AI*, they can find out, regardless of what is put on the questionnaire.

Still another possible explanation is that the only pass-along respondents were the 16 percent who so marked their forms but that some sole respondents used a middle copy of the response form. This seems likely only if the respondent had first damaged one of the other forms. For this explanation to fit the data, 20 percent (36 percent − 16 percent) of the respondents must have damaged an outer copy. We see this as very unlikely.

This discrepancy is, however, readily explained under the following assumptions:

1. Some of these responses were sent in by Soviet officials.
2. When Soviet officials sent in forms, they used all four response forms in each issue in their possession. Hence 50 percent of the

responses they sent in were on the two middle copies of the response form.

3. The Soviet officials made no attempt to make middle copies of the form correspond with those they marked as pass-along respondents.

4. All genuine respondents accurately indicated their source of the magazine (subscriber, kiosk, friend, relative, etc.).

5. The first genuine respondent to take one of the questionnaire forms from an issue always took one of the outer copies.

6. When two or more genuine respondents used forms from the same issue, only one at most was an original purchaser.

Combining assumptions 5 and 6 implies that the number of middle copies sent by genuine respondents is less than or equal to the number of genuine respondents who were pass-along readers.

These assumptions will enable us to estimate the proportion of responses sent in by Soviet officials. Let G be the proportion of responses which were genuine. Let B be the proportion which were bogus. Let P_g be the proportion of pass-along readers among the genuine respondents. Let P_b be the proportion of bogus responses which were labeled pass-along responses. Finally, r is the ratio of middle forms to pass-along readers, among the genuine respondents. (By assumptions 5 and 6, $r \leq 1$).

We now have the following equations:

$$P_gG + P_bB = .16, \tag{2}$$

the proportion of responses labeled pass-along.

$$rP_gG + .5B = .36 \tag{3}$$

the proportion of responses which were on middle copies. Combining the two equations and solving for B gives us

$$B = \frac{.36 - .16r}{.5 - P_b} \tag{4}$$

Let us first assume $r=1$. P_b cannot be less than zero and if $P_b = 0$, $B = .4$. As P_b increases, B also increases, reaching 1.0 when $P_b = .3$. If $r < 1$, the numerator of eq. (4) increases, and the minimum possible value of B (at $P_b = 0$) is greater than .4. In short, our assumptions tell us that at least 40 percent, and possibly all, of the responses were sent in by Soviet officials.

Some Arguments Against the Falsification Hypothesis

While SSRAI considered the possibility that these data were falsified by Soviet officials, they give several arguments against this hypothesis. They note that responses were received from 77 of the 85 cities specified for distribution in the Cultural Exchange Agreement, that one or more responses were also received from over 100 additional cities (cities not on the official list specified by the agreement), and that almost half of the responses are from Moscow. They then say that if these results had been manipulated by Soviet officials, all cities on the list of 85 would be represented, no city not on that list would be represented, and a smaller percentage of the responses would be from Moscow.

We find none of these arguments convincing. If Soviet officials were falsifying results, they wished to achieve two objectives: to have the results show them as fulfilling their agreements, and to elude detection. Having data from 77 of 85 cities on the list indicates wide distribution, while apparently producing less suspicion than if responses came from all 85 cities. The responses received from cities not on the list indicate that Soviet officials are doing more than required. At the same time, judging from ICA reactions, the data do not appear "too good to be true."

Similarly, because the political and cultural elite, who have the greatest access to *AI*, are disproportionately concentrated in Moscow (and a few other large cities, such as Leningrad and Kiev), failure of the responses to overrepresent these large cities would be further evidence of falsification. But the fact that the large cities are overrepresented in no way disproves the falsification hypothesis. It simply suggests that these who falsified the data had at least some degree of sociological sophistication and assumed that those they wished to deceive had a similar level of knowledge.

One might wonder if the unusual results we have found might be a result not of falsification, but of a 2 percent response rate. Large *random* error is very unlikely because our 2 percent contained over 1,800 respondents, as large a sample as in most public opinion polls in the United States. But could our self-selected 2 percent have been a very *unrepresentative* sample? Undoubtedly so, but let us see how much this weakens the case we have made.

One piece of evidence is the glaring discrepancy between two measures of pass-along readership. It is difficult to imagine how an unrepresentative sample could have contributed to such a result.

A second part of our case is the distribution of the number of issues read in the past year. Here, one might expect that the more issues one

has received, the more likely one is to respond, thus skewing the distribution toward a greater number of issues read. But in calculating our theoretical distribution (column C of Table 2), we have already assumed that the probability of responding is proportional to the number of issues read.

A third source of evidence is that the overall response rate and the response rate among certain subgroups is remarkably *high*, when one considers the source of this survey and compares its response rate with such rates in officially sponsored surveys. Such a comparison in no way assumes that our respondents are a representative sample of *AI* readers. It simply assumes that *AI* readers, as a whole, are no bolder than the general Soviet population. We believe that the subscribers to *AI*, being privileged people, would be *less* bold than the average Soviet citizen, but their response rate was 4 percent (582 respondents for 15,000 copies), as compared to 5–6 percent in an approved survey.

Finally, we argued that the sample had a surprisingly large number of workers and young people and a surprisingly small number of older people. Here, too, our conclusion is not based on the assumption that we have a representative sample of *AI* readers. It is based, instead, on information from many other Soviet surveys, as to the direction which the deviation from representativeness should take, if the results were genuine.

Who Might Have Falsified the Data?

There are four different actors who could falsify or distort survey data: (1) respondents, (2) hired hands of the researchers, (3) the researchers, or (4) agencies desiring to deceive the researcher. These different kinds of falsification are likely to occur under different circumstances and to leave different kinds of evidence.

Falsification or distortion by respondents is most likely when there are social desirability pressures toward certain responses. Such pressures are stronger in a face-to-face interview than in a mail survey both because mail surveys usually offer complete anonymity to respondents and because, with mail surveys, it is easy to avoid responding at all. In addition, such social desirability pressures are more likely with attitudinal questions than with demographic ones.

Falsification by hired hands is most likely when the data collection and/or coding is arduous, and considerable time can be saved by fabricating responses (Roth, 1965). These conditions are more likely to be met in face-to-face and telephone surveys than in mail surveys and are more likely for open-ended than for closed-ended questions.

All the considerations above suggest that for the *AI* survey, falsification by either respondents or hired hands is most unlikely.

Falsification by researchers or other agencies is most likely with mail surveys. Face-to-face or telephone surveys require a larger staff, which means that there are many people who may be aware of discrepancies between the true results and the results reported by the researcher. As for other agencies, it is surely easier to mail in bogus responses (and, in authoritarian societies, to intercept mail) to the researcher than to have one's own agents appear at the proper times and places to pose as genuine respondents.

Having narrowed our suspects to ICA and Soviet officials, we are more inclined to suspect the latter. First, while the results are reasonably consistent with the desires of both groups, they are more consistent with the interests of the Soviet government than of the ICA. The lack of interest in political articles shown by respondents serves the interests of the Soviet government rather than the ICA.

Second, the discrepancy between the two measures of pass-along readership further suggests that Soviet officials, rather than the ICA, falsified the data. If the ICA were in fact falsifying, the desire to show high pass-along readership could have been better met by having a much larger percentage of respondents identify themselves as pass-along readers in the first place.

Summary and Conclusions

The case we have made for the falsification hypothesis rests on the following central assumptions: (1) The demand for *AI* enormously exceeds the supply; (2) such scarce goods are allocated predominantly to the privileged, especially officials; (3) to correspond with the American embassy is to risk official reprisals. All these assumptions are supported by a considerable amount of evidence.

We combine these assumptions with empirical research on response rates to Soviet surveys and behavior patterns of various subgroups in the society, and with our knowledge of probability theory to generate a set of expected results. Our comparison of the expected with the actually observed data yields a number of glaring discrepancies. First, the overall response rate was much too high, as was the response rate among certain categories of people (subscribers who were not officials, young people, workers, and children of officials). Second, of those respondents who purchased their copy at a kiosk, far too many saw more than half of the past 12 issues. An additional source of evidence for our hypothesis was an otherwise difficult-to-explain discrepancy between two measures of the same variable (pass-along

readership), one an obtrusive measure, the other an unobtrusive one (Webb et al., 1966). We have argued earlier that each of the results above is rather implausible if there were no falsification. For all these results to have occurred simultaneously is all the more unlikely.

The basic method of detecting falsification involves locating inconsistencies between the expected data and the observed data. To provide a fuller sense of the kinds of inconsistencies one should look for, we will describe two other lines of investigation we pursued. These did not provide strong additional evidence of falsification (they in no way contradict our previous evidence, however), and are for this reason reported more briefly.

The authors of SSRAI assumed that since responses were not received from all 85 cities on the official distribution list, the data had not been falsified. We, on the other hand, performed calculations to see whether receiving responses from 77 of 85 cities was either too large or too small a number if these were all genuine respondents.

To do this, we assumed that (1) all individuals receiving a questionnaire form had the same probability of responding (the overall response rate), and (2) all responses were independent events. If we know the number of questionnaires received in a city, these two assumptions permit us to calculate the probability that at least one person will respond from a city. Moreover, if a set of cities all received the same number of questionnaire forms, one can easily calculate the probability of receiving one or more responses from any number of those cities.

One can make such a calculation with somewhat more difficulty if the cities receive different numbers of questionnaires. Since we had no data on the number of questionnaires distributed to each city, we had to make certain additional assumptions: (3) For most cities, the number of questionnaires received was assumed proportional to the city's population. (4) For a few cities (e.g., Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev) the number of responses was obviously much greater than one would expect from the population. We assumed that these large cities received questionnaires in proportion to their number of respondents (e.g., Moscow, which had 46 percent of the respondents, was assumed to have received 46 percent of the questionnaires). Using the four assumptions above, we found that receiving responses from 77 cities was not so improbable as to be further evidence of falsification.

The second line of investigation makes use of a study (Grushin, 1980:132) of mass media availability in the Soviet city of Taganrog. From the information in this study, we were able to estimate the number of copies of *AI* available in the city and to compare the expected number of responses with the observed number. Again, the results were not so improbable as to be further evidence of falsification.

We are not suggesting that a large fraction of social science research is based on systematically falsified data. We do believe, however, that the problem merits more consideration than it has been given. It is especially important in doing research in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, as these regimes have great ability to ensure that the data suit their purposes. We do not advocate dismissing all results which contradict our preconceptions. But when such discrepancies appear, we should be willing to question the data as well as our preconceptions.

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Reply to Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh

JAMES P. MCGREGOR:

Professors Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh raise interesting questions in their paper on falsification of survey data, but they come no closer to proving that our data were falsified than we can show that they were not. The case that they attempt to make is built on a series of shaky assumptions and apparent errors of fact, only a few of which can be pointed out in the space available here.

Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh were less than forthcoming in their description of our study. The text is heavily caveated, and we considered at length the question of falsification. In fact, many of the authors' most telling criticisms could have been taken directly from our report. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

Assuming that the Soviet authorities set out to delude us, the effort that must have gone into the project had to be massive. Anyone who has ever attempted to create a simulated data set for teaching purposes knows how hard it is to develop even simple bivariate relationships for a small set of cases. Yet Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh assert that the Soviet authorities were able to fake a 2,000-case, 20-variable data set while maintaining relatively good consistency in bi- and trivariate relationships—and all of this from a standing start in a matter of days. We grant the possibility that the Soviet authorities could arrange for response cards to be sent in from over 200 cities in hundreds of different hands, but we question why they would bother to go to such an effort when it would be easier to do what they have in the past: arrange for a zero response rate.

Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh quite rightly devote much attention to

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James McGregor is the author of the report discussed by Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh. The opinions expressed here are those of the author. They do not represent the position of the U.S. International Communication Agency or the U.S. Government.

the number and nature of respondents to our survey. On the one hand they dismiss the 2 percent return rate as too low to be valid (but Professor Shlapentokh apparently felt free to publish results from his own surveys where the return rate was not above 6 percent), while on the other hand they regard the number of respondents to be far too high, given what they regard as Soviet reality. We agree that 2 percent is not much of a return rate, although it may actually be higher than that depending on the number of questionnaires that actually got to readers. Moreover, the type of people who responded—over a third were students—suggests that these are precisely those who would be willing to take a chance on communicating with the United States embassy. The authors dismiss too readily the attraction of the premium offered for responding: a set of large-size, color prints by American artists (this, incidentally, was the reason respondents had to supply their address).

We have to question Shlapentokh and Kaplowitz's statement that if the results of the survey pleased both us and the Soviet government, the data must ipso facto have been cooked up. How are the authors to judge what results might please either the U.S. or Soviet governments? As researchers, we were delighted that we got as many responses as we did (even though the response rate was very low), and it is possible that the readers of our report were happy with some of the results. But to imply that we were in a state of bliss that blinded us to the possibility of manipulation is going a bit far.

In their very proper efforts to provide a measure by which to determine whether or not the data were falsified, the authors set standards that most Western surveys would fail. Many of the assumptions that Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh make in developing their theoretical distributions are inappropriate or wrong. For example, several of the theoretical distributions assume a random distribution of the magazine among all possible readers. This is not the case and the authors themselves say so. We know from our informal kiosk "surveys" (embassy officers periodically make the rounds of kiosks in Moscow and elsewhere, inquiring about the availability of *America Illustrated*) that the number of kiosks where the magazine is sold is very small. Moreover, consumer goods of all types are acquired in the Soviet Union through under-the-counter arrangements, and much anecdotal evidence is available that this is the case with *America Illustrated*. How, then, can Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh use a model which assumes random distribution to prove falsification?

Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh also make a surprising number of factual errors about the Soviet Union for people as well acquainted with the country as they are. For example, their assertion that *America*

Illustrated and *Anglia* are the only Western publications legally available in the Soviet Union is not true, nor is it the case that all officially sponsored Soviet surveys are postpaid.

We have necessarily been very general in this reply. It is possible to disagree or to provide alternative speculation on almost every point (equally speculative) that Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh make. We do not object to the authors investigating the possibility of falsification, but the assumptions they make in order to establish their case are so weak that the paper proves nothing. What they say provides food for thought, but little more.

Comment on Kaplowitz and Shlapentokh

LEON RABINOVICH:

While the statistical evidence marshaled by the authors is quite solid and convincing, its content is not always as sound. Defining a current official attitude toward Western publications and, consequently, the degree of danger involved, the acute and well-trained Soviet reader harnesses clues not always appreciated by an outside observer. One of the most important of these clues is jamming—or the absence of jamming—of the Voice of America. At the time of the *AI* survey, VOA had been operating unimpeded for more than five years. This was taken by the Soviet audience as, in fact, an implicit authorization of the listening. And rightly so: from January 1973 till the time of the invasion of Afghanistan, neither militia nor the secret police interfered with those openly listening to the Voice of America on the beaches, in the parks, or on buses or commuter trains. Not infrequently the volume of receivers was brought to the maximum for the benefit of those around. (In this connection, incidentally, the authors' rationale for estimating *AI*'s readership on the basis of the 1968 data on foreign radio listeners does not hold: that was the year of the Czech crisis, when the jamming was resumed.)

Second, the reader of *AI*, like his or her compatriots in general, grew bolder as a result of the general atmosphere in the USSR at the time of the survey. In 1978, the year of palpable progress in the SALT II negotiations and a big wheat deal, the authorities—the Shcharansky and Orlov trials notwithstanding—were comparatively quite lenient toward "*quiet*" consumers of Western cultural goods. In another relevant development, Jewish migration from the Soviet Union—which, as many agree, mirrors a current state of the USA–USSR relations rather accurately—increased almost twofold in 1978 over 1977.

Leon Rabinovich, recently arrived from the USSR, is a graduate student of sociology at Columbia University.

Having all this in mind, one would regard these assumptions by the authors as considerably overstated: that circulating *AI* in 1978 was tantamount to circulating "foreign propaganda" and was "frowned upon by the authorities," that responding to a survey was "risking official disapproval," and that the young respondents were "defying" their parents by contacting the American embassy and giving their home addresses. My reservations about this last assumption appear to be further strengthened by the authors themselves when they point out that respondents showed a "lack of interest in political articles." In the case of the young people this was very probably done at the insistence of parents, who knew all too well where to draw the line: to mail a questionnaire in exchange for a classy American poster would be looked at as a regrettable but innocuous and understandable (again, in 1978) whim of youth. To display an affinity for reading the political section of *AI* would be something entirely different.

The overrepresentation of the young in the sample may, at least partially, be explained by the perennial and omnipresent irresponsibility of those under 30—which, in the Soviet case, disappears with a political clearance to pass, another step on the "nomenclature" ladder to make, and the Party card to guard. In addition, sons and daughters of those who are able to secure the *AI* subscription can and do get away with items much "hotter" than the one which made the authors so suspicious—although, again, it would be highly inappropriate for the subscribers *themselves* to answer the call.

The underrepresentation of those over 60, which is another source of the authors' concern, becomes more plausible if we take into consideration a barter system which, in the USSR, includes everything coveted among foodstuffs, clothing, or entertainment. The rare quality goods and services are exchanged for one another. "Tell me where you work," suggests a Soviet saying, "and I will tell you what you carry in your bag coming home from work." Sometimes it is possible to buy—provided the payment is several times the nominal price. In both cases, however, the retired, having neither the potential exchange items nor much money, are by no means "in the best position" to obtain *AI*, as the authors contend. In fact, they are in the worst position possible.

The same applies to the doubts expressed about the frequency of under-the-counter arrangements. With negligible exceptions, the entire stock of desired goods is either delivered to exclusive stores or sold under the counter. Why should the figure of 94 percent seem "much too high" if, in the theater ticket booth next to a newsstand selling *AI*, *all* tickets for the currently "prestigious" shows—still less sought-after status symbols than a copy of *AI*—are sold in this fashion? It seems that the 98–99 percent rate would be more accurate.

Changes in Americans' Policy Preferences, 1935–1979

BENJAMIN I. PAGE AND ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO

How HAVE the policy preferences of Americans changed over the last four or five decades?[1] This question has two distinct facets we wish to address: (1) what substantive changes there have been, and (2) whether there have been gradual movements, sharp breaks or fluctuations, or general stability. In addition, we are concerned with whether the nature of change has varied across types of issues.

[1] As economist friends have pointed out, we are using the term "preferences" differently from the way they do, to refer to (verbal) *choices*, which may reflect changes in prices or other external circumstances rather than underlying needs or wants.

Abstract Using responses to 3,315 survey questions asked of national samples, we examine how policy preferences of Americans have changed over the last 45 years. The data indicate that there has been considerable stability in public opinion: responses to half the 613 repeated policy items show no significant change at all; approximately half the detectable changes were less than 10 percentage points; and rarely did preferences fluctuate significantly back and forth within a short time period. Foreign policy changes were no larger or more frequent than domestic, but they did tend to occur more abruptly. When opinion shifts occurred, they were not random or capricious; they were usually related to important changes in citizens' social and economic environments. Rapid shifts generally coincided with major events in international affairs or the economy.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:24–42 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-24/$2.50

In the literature of public opinion, some scholars have maintained that opinions are highly labile, especially concerning foreign policy matters (Almond, 1950; but cf. Caspary, 1970). Such a view seems consistent with the notion that the average person is uninterested in politics, unaware of what is going on, and subject to influence by a host of arbitrary forces. Others have suggested that although the opinions of individuals may be volatile (Converse, 1964), the aggregate distributions of preferences are generally quite stable and change slowly (Key, 1961; Erikson and Luttbeg, 1973; Monroe, 1975; Erikson et al., 1980).

Generalization has been hampered, however, by reliance on fragmentary or unsatisfactory data. Journalistic accounts have often stressed the instability of public opinion while reporting sudden jumps in the president's popularity rating or wild fluctuations in preelection polls.[2] But these data do not gauge changes in polity preferences; the stimuli are not fixed policy alternatives but rather ever-changing politicians about whose latest words and actions new information is constantly available. When policy preferences are actually discussed, alleged fluctuations often represent only sampling error, or are artifacts of variations in question wording, sample design, or the research procedures followed by different polling organizations (see Lipset, 1976). The comparison of responses to even slightly different questions is hazardous; yet scholars have not generally had access to any comprehensive collection of responses to identical policy preference questions, asked repeatedly over time by the same survey organizations (see Cantril, 1951; Hastings and Southwick, 1975; Smith, 1980; Miller et al., 1980, for helpful but limited collections).

Data

In connection with a study of dynamic relationships between public opinion and public policy in the United States (see Page and Shapiro, 1980), we have assembled an unusually large collection of data on Americans' policy preferences. In fact, we are attempting to collect the marginal frequencies of responses to *all* policy questions that have been asked of national samples by reputable survey organizations, in order to find every item that has been repeated with identical wording and to appraise how (if at all) responses have changed. In this paper we report results from a preliminary collection of 3,315 different policy items fielded during the period 1935–1979 by three organi-

[2] For example, Buckley's (1979) comment alludes especially to Gallup and Harris presidential performance ratings. Roll and Cantril (1972:51) suggest that primary election polls are particularly labile, because voters are not guided by party loyalties.

zations: the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago; the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup); and the Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies (SRC/CPS), University of Michigan. Amidst the mass of survey data we found 613 items which were asked with identical wordings at two or more points in time.[3]

These 613 policy questions provide a substantial data base for analyzing change. To our knowledge they constitute the most extensive collection of opinion trends yet assembled; 327 (53 percent) of the questions concern domestic matters and 286 (47 percent) deal with foreign affairs or national defense. They address all types of policy activity (government spending, laws, regulations, actions of officials, outcomes) by all branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial), in a wide variety of policy areas.

Findings: The Extent of Change

The first question of interest is just how much change and how much stability are found in the data. To us, the striking finding is one of stability in Americans' policy preferences. We used the modest standard of a 6 percentage point shift in responses to constitute a significant change (a criterion corresponding to statistical significance at better than the .05 confidence level for multistage cluster samples of 1,500, with a 50–50 percent split in opinion), and also required that the level of change not depend on how "don't know" or "no opinion" responses were treated.[4] Even by this rather generous measure, fully half of our repeated items—318 of the 613, or 52 percent—showed no significant change at all.

Moreover, most of the 355 changes that did occur (in the responses

[3] We expect eventually to find more than 10,000 policy items, including perhaps 1,500 repeated questions. We would be most grateful for suggestions of sources we may have missed; please write to the authors at the National Opinion Research Center, 6030 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637; or telephone (area 312) 753–1300.

[4] We defined an instance of opinion change as a shift in response frequencies of 6 percentage points or more between two repetitions (not necessarily adjacent) of a survey question, in which there is no significant (6 percent or more) intervening change in the opposite direction. To determine the size of each opinion change, we dichotomized the response categories in various ways to find the largest shift that occurred. For each case in which we obtained different estimates when we included or excluded the "don't know" or "no opinion" responses, we selected the smaller change. When questions contained three or more ordinal categories, our dichotomizing procedure in effect required that the *balance* of opinion change, that is, that opinion not merely polarize, with the extreme response categories changing in the same direction. We also raised the criterion to more than 6 percentage points for questions asked of small samples; to determine the amount of change required, we multiplied the standard errors for these small samples by 1.64, the adjustment factor that produces the 6 percentage points standard for samples of 1500.

to the 295 questions showing one or more changes) were rather small. Approximately half of them (161, or 45 percent) were less than 10 percentage points. Most of those involved preference changes of 7 or 8 percentage points—statistically significant but hardly earth-shaking.

Contrary to what one might expect, foreign policy items did not differ much from domestic in either the proportion or the magnitude of significant changes. As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, approximately half the items in each policy area showed change, and only a few more than half the changes in each area amounted to 10 percentage points or more. (It would be misleading, however, to conclude that foreign and domestic changes took exactly the same form. As we shall see, changes in foreign policy opinion tended to be more abrupt.) Examining more specific types of policy, we did observe some differences in the magnitude of change.[5] Americans' preferences concerning civil liberties, abortion, Nixon and Watergate, and U.S.–China relations tended to change more than others, whereas on the average, preferences about social welfare policies and gun control changed less.

Although we have emphasized the stability of preferences, we also found some noteworthy instances of change. In fact, we found 42 cases (12 percent of the total) with changes of 20 percentage points or more. And 14 of these (to be sure, only 4 percent of all the cases of change) were of 30 points or more. In domestic affairs, for example, there were large increases in tolerance toward communists, socialists, and atheists. Opinion became much more favorable toward abortion, interracial marriage, desegregation of housing, and (by a hefty 38 percent)[6] desegregation of schools; it moved heavily against

Table 1. Significant Changes in Repeated Policy Questions

	No Change	*Change*	*Total Items*
Domestic policy	53% (174)	47% (153)	53% (327)
Foreign policy[a]	50 (144)	50 (142)	47 (286)
Total items	52 (318)	48 (295)	100 (613)

Gamma = Q = .06 (n.s.).

[a] Includes questions concerned with national defense.

[5] We compared the shifts in preferences for 27 types of policy issues: civil liberties, civil rights, social-style issues, abortion, crime, gun control, education, social welfare, labor, big government, political reform, Nixon-Watergate, economic issues, international organizations, Russia, World War II, Korean War, Vietnam, draft, China, foreign aid, world communism, national defense, Middle East, domestic not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.), foreign n.e.c., domestic-foreign n.e.c. On the average, each type included 13 instances of change.

[6] We will hereafter often use shorthand expressions like "38 percent" for the awkward "38 percentage points."

Table 2. The Magnitudes of Significant Changes in Preferences

	6–7%	*8–9%*	*10–14%*	*15–19%*	*20–29%*	*30%+*	*Total*
Domestic policy	26% (48)	19% (35)	31% (58)	12% (23)	5% (10)	6% (12)	52% (186)
Foreign policy	20 (34)	26 (44)	30 (50)	12 (21)	11 (18)	1 (2)	48 (169)
Total	23 (82)	22 (79)	30 (108)	12 (44)	8 (28)	4 (14)	100[a] (355)

Gamma = .02 (n.s.).

[a] Percentages reported do not sum to 100% due to rounding.

(and later, for) capital punishment. Large numbers of Americans turned toward favoring greater strictness by criminal courts, and during the unraveling of the Watergate scandal there was a strong swing toward favoring the impeachment of President Nixon. There were also a few big changes of a less familiar sort. These included a 28 percent drop in support for the idea of national identification cards between wartime 1942 and libertarian 1977, and a steep (35 percent) increase between 1949 and 1974 in approval for employing epileptics.[7]

In foreign policy, there have been substantial changes in preferences about defense spending, the size of the army and navy, the stationing of troops abroad, and the giving of military aid. Feelings about post-war policy toward Germany became markedly more harsh during the course of World War II; attitudes toward Russia and China mellowed in the 1950s; there were increased desires for deescalation as the wars in Korea and Vietnam wore on; and the Salt II treaty lost a lot of its support. By far the largest change in foreign policy preferences was a drop of 37 percent in support for the idea of requiring a popular referendum before declaring war, from isolationist 1935 to nuclear-era 1973.

We classified our instances of opinion change according to whether they were gradual, abrupt, or fluctuating. We called a change abrupt if it occurred at a rate of 10 percentage points or more per year. This criterion, of course, represents an arbitrary cutoff point in the continuous rate-of-change measure which we computed: it is as reasonable as any such dichotomy and includes as abrupt any significant (6 percent) changes that occurred within approximately seven months, along with bigger shifts that occurred more slowly. A fluctuation, in contrast, is defined by the number of reversals in direction of significant change within a given time interval. We took two or more

[7] And presumably people with other disabilities as well. Although the questions concerning epileptics and national identification cards were asked in surveys which did not use strictly identical procedures, we are confident that the changes described are real.

significant changes in opposite directions within two years, or three or more within four years as constituting a fluctuation. A fluctuation, of course, might or might not include some abrupt changes. We strictly required that fluctuations be based on statistically significant changes in order to avoid giving false substantive interpretations to sampling error. Gradual changes, then, are shifts in opinion that are neither abrupt nor part of a fluctuation.

Gradual Shifts in Preferences

Many of the changes in policy preferences we found involved gradual trends, often with a strong linear component. We graphed each of the 355 instances of change. One hundred and seventy came from 119 questions with sufficient time points to detect fluctuations. Among those 170 we observed 77 cases (45 percent) with fairly smooth shifts. Seldom did the opinion points fall neatly in a straight line, but often they moved in the same direction for sustained periods. In most cases the survey responses were highly autocorrelated; each observation could be predicted fairly well by the previous observation.

Some of these cases of gradual change, particularly those monitored by the NORC General Social Survey, have been reported in the literature. Although there are years missing in some of these time series, the trends are compelling. On civil liberties, for example, as measured by nine different questions about speeches, books, and teaching by communists, socialists, and atheists, Americans' attitudes became much more tolerant (by approximately 30 percent between 1954 and 1972 (see Stouffer, 1955; Davis, 1975), and then leveled off.

The public also became more favorable toward the availability of birth control information. Similarly, five items gauging attitudes toward abortion under various circumstances (birth defects, rape, poverty, unmarried mother, no desire for more children) showed 27–32 percent increases in approval between 1965 and the mid-1970s, with some dropoff occurring thereafter (see Blake, 1971; Taylor, 1978).

Civil rights attitudes liberalized greatly from the mid-1950s through the early 1970s. There was a 38 percent increase (the largest change in our data) from 1956 to 1974 in responses that children of both races should attend the same schools. From 1968 to 1972, 20 percent more disagreed with the idea that whites had the right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods, and during the period 1963 to 1977 there was a 33 percent increase in opposition to laws forbidding interracial marriage. This trend in favor of civil rights for blacks, however, leveled

off or reversed slightly by the mid-1970s (see Schwartz, 1967; Greeley and Sheatsley, 1971; Taylor et al., 1978; Taylor, 1979; McNichol, 1980).

The legalization of marijuana had been raised as a political issue by the late 1960s. The 17 percent decrease in the public's opposition to legalization between 1969 and 1977 (Gallup), and 15 percent from 1973 to 1978 (NORC), represented more liberal positions on new social or lifestyle issues.

This general liberalization of social attitudes extended also to capital punishment: opposition rose 20 percent between 1953 and 1966. But as fear of crime grew in the late 1960s, support for capital punishment rose again by 23 percent between 1966 and 1976, and opposition to the rights of the accused increased 11 percent from 1974 to 1979. Preferences for harsher treatment of criminals by courts rose 26 percent from 1965 to 1969 (Gallup) and 15 percent during the period 1972 to 1978 (NORC; see Stinchcombe et al., 1980).

There are historical reasons to suppose that Americans' attitudes toward federal government social welfare programs underwent considerable change during the New Deal of the 1930s (see Schiltz, 1970; Cook, 1979), but this has not been tracked by repeated survey questions. From the responses to individual survey items asked at various times since 1935 (mostly by Gallup) we have found support for such programs as Medicare and medical aid for the poor; the creation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; unemployment compensation; old age pensions and Social Security; antipoverty programs; food stamps; slum clearance and low-income housing; special assistance for mothers; and federal aid to education. But the repeated items show recent changes in a conservative direction concerning government spending on social welfare, health, the cities, and drug addiction, and concerning government provision of both jobs and a decent standard of living (see Davis, 1980; Smith, 1982).

Contrary to assertions about a confused or vacillating citizenry, these gradual changes in opinions are understandable in terms of underlying secular changes. Americans became more willing to allow communists and socialists to retain basic civil liberties, as there came to be less reason to fear subversive activity. In addition, demographic changes, particularly the maturing of new and better-educated cohorts, contributed to greater social and political tolerance (see Stouffer, 1955; Davis, 1975, 1980; Taylor, 1978). In the area of civil rights, there was increased awareness of racial segregation and its consequences, and less belief that blacks were inferior. The civil rights movement undoubtedly contributed to consciousness raising, and Supreme Court action was a reflection of the change in the

national mood—if not a cause then a consequence of it (see Taylor, 1978). And in the case of abortion, technology had improved the safety of the procedure, while rubella, thalidomide, and other sources of birth defects made the public reconsider the complexities of the abortion question. In addition, unplanned pregnancy became more problematic for the increasing numbers of women who were working (see Karplus, 1980).[8]

Our illustrations of gradual change have thus far all concerned domestic policy. This is no accident, for gradual shifts are more prevalent in domestic than in foreign policy areas. In fact, as shown in Table 3, among survey items asked frequently enough to allow us to observe fluctuation, 64 percent of domestic but only 28 percent of foreign policy changes were gradual.

There were, however, also some cases of gradual change in foreign policy preferences. Americans' desires for the United States to take an active part in foreign affairs rose rather steadily (by 13 percent) between 1947 and 1965, presumably reflecting new U.S. power and responsibility; then, with the discouraging Vietnam experience, they dropped 18 percent by 1975, according to NORC surveys. Similar items fielded by Gallup showed a rise in activism from 1945 through 1946 and a fairly level response up to 1950 (see Caspary, 1970). Still another question, asked by SRC/CPS, revealed steady opposition to isolationism at the 75–80 percent level in 1968 and 1972, with a small drop occurring by 1976.

Support for military aid to U.S. allies rose slowly between 1951 and 1953 and then declined to the 1951 level by 1956. Between the Korean War year 1952 and more peaceful 1957, preferences moved strongly (by 26 percent) toward economic rather than military aid as being more important. Sentiment that there was "too much" spending on foreign aid stayed steady at a high (74–79 percent) level from 1973 to 1976, and then dropped a bit by 1978.

Table 3. Gradual Changes in Policy Preferences

	Gradual	*Not Gradual*	*Total Changes*
Domestic policy	64% (53)	36% (30)	49% (83)
Foreign policy	28 (24)	72 (63)	51 (170)
Total changes	45 (77)	55 (93)	100 (170)

Gamma = Q = .65.

[8] From 1938 to 1975 there was also a remarkable 48 percent increase in public approval of a woman working "if she has a husband capable of supporting her" (Gallup). Although we did not consider this a policy question, it was the most impressive attitude change that we encountered.

From 1948 through 1951 there was a decline in support for giving the United Nations power to call up American and other troops, no doubt related to dissatisfaction with the UN "police action" in Korea. Desires for continuing United States membership in the UN stayed steadily near 80 percent with some small ups and downs, including a post-Korea rise in the years 1951–1955; they dropped gradually during the 1965–1976 reaction against Vietnam but rebounded by 1978, according to NORC surveys. Gallup polls showed the same trends: increased opposition to giving up UN membership between 1951 and 1962, but then a decline through 1975.

More Americans favored trade with Japan between 1946 and 1951, continuing to 1955, as war memories faded and a new alliance was formed. Similarly, opposition to Chinese membership in the UN gradually dropped by 15 percent from 1954 to 1958, and by a solid 33 percent between 1964 and 1971 as the Korean hostilities became distant, and talk of a Sino-Soviet split and of China's improving relations with the West replaced the image of monolithic world communism. And as the Cold War eased during the 1950s, the preferences for continuing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union rose gradually by 12 percent; desire for trade with Russia also moved up between 1957 and 1959 and then held steady to 1963.

One of the strongest gradual shifts concerned defense spending. According to a number of Gallup surveys between 1969 and 1977, as the Vietnam War wound down and alarms were sounded about increasing Soviet military strength, feelings that we were spending too much on defense steadily fell a total of 29 percent. NORC surveys between 1973 and 1978 also showed a 16 percent rise in those thinking too little was spent. Similarly, the opinion that too much was being spent on space exploration declined by 13 percent between 1973 and 1978.

Fluctuations

There have been a number of shifts in policy preferences that were not gradual. For the most part they were not fluctuating, however. Of the 119 survey questions asked frequently enough to detect fluctuations, the responses to 56 (47 percent) changed gradually while 63 (53 percent) shifted abruptly. We found only 19 items (16 percent) with fluctuation. (All, as it happens, were among the 63 questions showing abrupt change.) The data provide little evidence, therefore, that public preferences are capricious, or vacillate wildly. Although there may be too few cases to be certain, we did not find significantly different numbers of fluctuating opinions for foreign versus domestic issues, either.

Even the few fluctuations we observed did not necessarily represent unpredictable or irrational shifts in policy preferences. Some appear to be artifacts of question wording. Three of the domestic policy questions—whether taxes were too high, whether President Kennedy's policies should move to the left, whether President Johnson was pushing racial integration too fast—referred to current government activity at the moment of the interview, which could be quite different at different interviewing dates. The same applied to three foreign policy items asking whether the United States had gone too far concerning world affairs, whether people were making too many sacrifices for national defense, and whether the United States should be firmer with Russia. Changes in these responses somewhat resemble the public's volatile impressions of political figures or of the president's performance, where evaluations of personal qualities or actions change as new information about them is received. Here, too, the survey questions use shifting referents. Responses vary as the stimuli themselves change, even if underlying policy preferences remain constant.

In other cases of fluctuation, where policy preferences do actually change, it would still be wrong to assume that rapid shifts are random or irrational merely because they reverse direction. They may be reasonable responses to changing circumstances, as we shall see in examining the abrupt changes in opinion (including fluctuations) that have occurred during the last 45 years.

Abrupt Changes in Preferences

We found quite a few cases in which Americans' policy preferences changed abruptly, at the rate of at least 10 percentage points per year. Of our 355 instances of change 137 (39 percent) were abrupt.[9] This is not an enormous number, particularly out of the 613 repeated policy items in our data set. Still, the rapidity of change in some cases is quite striking, especially concerning foreign policy matters.

The mean rate of change for all our foreign policy instances of change was 28 percentage points per year, compared to 7 percent for domestic cases (medians of 11 percent and 3 percent, respectively)—four times as rapid.[10] Table 4 shows that 58 percent of

[9] For this purpose (in contrast to the analysis of fluctuations) we can use the full set of instances of change, including some based on only two time points.

[10] Our measure of rate of change is simply the number of percentage points in an instance of change divided by the number of years (or fraction of a year) within which it takes place. This generally gives a higher estimate, if there are more than two data points, than the regression of opinion on a time variable, e.g., in Schwartz (1967), Taylor (1980), or Smith (1982).

Table 4. Abrupt Changes in Preferences

	Not Abrupt (<10%/yr)	*Abrupt (10%+)*	*Total Changes*
Domestic policy	79% (147)	21% (39)	52% (186)
Foreign policy	42 (71)	58 (98)	48 (169)
Total changes	61 (218)	39 (137)	100 (355)

Gamma = Q = .68.

the changes on foreign policy, but only 21 percent of domestic, met our 10 percent per year criterion for abrupt change.

One complication in making this comparison is that survey organizations have tended to repeat foreign policy questions at shorter time intervals than domestic, an average of 4.6 times per year versus 1.5. The high rate of change we found for foreign policy opinions could conceivably be an artifact of this, because abrupt changes are more likely to be detected when questions are asked frequently. Comparing domestic and foreign policy questions asked equally often, however, we still found more rapid changes in responses to the latter, particularly among questions asked several times per year. Survey organizations may well choose to ask questions about foreign affairs more often, precisely because they expect shifting responses to these items; thus the frequency of questions results from abruptness of change, rather than artificially creating it.

It should not be inferred that the many abrupt changes in foreign policy attitudes represent capricious shifts in the public "mood" (Almond, 1950).[11] On the contrary, virtually all the rapid shifts we found were related to political and economic circumstances or to significant events which sensible citizens would take into account. In particular, most abrupt foreign policy opinion changes took place in connection with wars, confrontations, or crises in which major changes in the actions of the United States or other nations quite naturally affected preferences about what policies to pursue.

Virtually all the shifts we observed in preferences concerning World War II were abrupt ones. Prior to America's entry into the war, support increased sharply for building a larger navy (late 1938) and for military and economic aid to the Allies (six questions, 1939–1941). Opinion became more favorable toward defending Canada if invaded (1939–1941), and opposition increased against sending war materials

[11] To be sure, Almond can be read as stressing that changes are rapid rather than capricious, but he suggests opinions will respond rapidly to a crisis and then continue to shift abruptly back and forth. He calls this reaction "a mood, a superficial and fluctuating response" (Almond, 1950:53), which presumably cannot be explained any further.

to Japan. After the United States entered the war, the public became less concerned that Russia and China pay for their lend-lease assistance (early 1942). As the war progressed, preferences shifted about wartime goals and postwar issues; Americans showed increasing support for the destruction of Germany (1943–1944) and for the acquisition of new military bases from Japan (1943–1944).

After the war abrupt changes occurred concerning the developing confrontation with the Soviet Union and world communism, and the related issues of foreign aid and control of atomic weapons. The public usually responded quickly to threats abroad, turning militant as conditions became menacing, and becoming less so as conditions relaxed. During the immediate postwar period, support increased for stopping Russia in Europe and Asia (1946–1947), maintaining unilateral control (for defense bases) of islands captured from Japan (1946–1947), universal military training (1947–1948), military aid to South America (1946–1947), and military supplies for use against the Chinese Communists (1948). Public opinion sometimes reversed itself as time passed, quite possibly because the foreign threat appeared less urgent, or because further massive economic aid would bring diminished returns to America's security. In early 1949, for example, there was a drop in approval for military aid to strengthen Europe against future attack. There was a decline in support for the Marshall Plan, and more of the public felt we were spending too much on European recovery (1949). Support fell sharply in the case of military aid to China as the Nationalists failed to win their civil war.

Other shifts in opinions about confronting communism, too, can be linked with events or international conditions. Support increased for military aid to Europe when NATO was established in April 1949. The public became firmer toward Russia after the treaty was signed (June 1949–March 1950), and there was greater agreement that it was very important to stop the spread of world communism. Later, Stalin's death and the Korean armistice reduced world tension, and there was a drop in support for war against Russia (November 1951–September 1954). Preferences also became more favorable toward a trade agreement with Russia (August 1953–June 1955), but just after the Soviets crushed the revolts in Eastern Europe, public opinion cooled, shifting against cultural exchanges of musicians and athletes (November 1956–March 1957). Support for the control of atomic weapons was likely also affected by U.S. and Soviet actions. From February to October 1947, public approval of UN inspection rose, while in March the Soviets rejected a proposal for UN control. After the announcement in September 1949 that the Soviets had exploded an A-bomb and after Truman ordered the development of the H-bomb

(January 1950), public opinion again moved against international control (October 1949–June 1950). (Similarly, opposition to the ratification of the Salt II treaty almost 30 years later increased as government officials and experts voiced dissatisfaction with various aspects of the agreement [March–October 1979].)

The Korean War heightened feelings of confrontation and crisis, and the public reacted quickly to the progress of the war. At the time of Korea, NATO was also being bolstered, so that U.S. policy was confronting communism in Europe and in Asia. Abrupt but plausible changes in preferences occurred concerning policies for both continents. The Korean conflict began in June 1950, and from April 1950 to June 1951 surveys showed that the defense of Asia against communism gained in importance compared to Europe. But support for European defenses also increased as more people responded that Russia (as opposed, presumably, to other Communist countries; Communist China entered the Korean War in late November 1950) was a greater threat there than in Asia (August 1950–January 1951).

Although the public came to be less in favor of American troops in Europe (September–December 1950), its support for military aid to Europe increased (March 1950–March 1951, November 1951–February 1952). There was also greater willingness to allow Germany to build up an army (June 1950–July 1950) and participate in Europe's defense (October 1951–February 1952). When the Korean War began, Americans placed increased emphasis on the role of the UN in U.S. foreign policy (June 1950–July 1950), but as the war deepened, the public gave greater importance to alliances and to America's own defenses (July 1950–March 1951).

With the start of the Korean conflict, public opinion became more favorable toward economic aid to friendly Asian countries (July 1950–April 1951); and interestingly, support increased for Hawaiian statehood (January 1950–July 1950), conceivably because of its vulnerability as a distant territory. During the war's first few months, more and more people responded that not enough sacrifices were being made for national defense (October 1950–December 1950), but six months later, as the conflict wore on, such enthusiasm declined. After the truce talks began in July 1951, support for bombing China fell (August–October 1950), but it rose again as the negotiations dragged on (October 1951–March 1952). Subsequently, opinion shifted in favor of pulling out of Korea (December 1951–February 1952), and also toward training and equipping the South Korean army (February 1952–November 1952). From March to June 1952 opposition increased against returning POWs who did not want to go back to North Korea. The public seemed to respond to the course of events in

the war but also to maintain an underlying commitment to contain communism. Perhaps for this reason preferences showed increased support for sending U.S. troops to Indochina from the month after the Korean Armistice to the day Dienbienphu fell (August 1953–May 7, 1954).

The rest of the 1950s were relatively quiet, but we also observed several abrupt changes in opinion during the Vietnam War period. As the war in Vietnam escalated, preferences shifted against stepping up the war effort from April to May 1965 when President Johnson made overtures for negotiations and halted bombing for five days. Opinion moved in the opposite direction from August to November 1965, with people becoming more willing to vote for congressmen who favored sending more men to Vietnam, after North Vietnam apparently failed to respond to the bombing halt. From February to April 1968 opinion became less "hawkish" as the Tet offensive was interpreted as a disaster. Opinion shifted again from June to September against a bombing halt as the peace talks in Paris became deadlocked. Support for the withdrawal of U.S. troops grew rapidly as President Nixon slowly removed U.S. soldiers from Vietnam: from December 1969 to May 1970 preferences increased in favor of complete withdrawal by the end of 1970. This rapid opinion change may have also been a response to the invasion of Cambodia and the ensuing turmoil at home after the Kent State shootings. A final change in opinion related to Vietnam concerned punishment for draft evaders. From June 1972 to February 1973 more people responded that they would not allow these men to return without punishment. This may have become a sensitive issue as it appeared more and more likely that the efforts of American troops in Vietnam had failed.

There were far fewer abrupt shifts in public preferences in the area of domestic policy, but some occurred during periods of urgency in foreign affairs or at times of changing economic conditions. From December 1943 to March 1945, when people were experiencing worse inflation than ever before, the public increasingly wanted the government to keep prices and wages from going higher. In contrast, from October 1950 to October 1951, opposition rose against wage and price controls during a year of substantial price increases. But people may have preferred tax cuts, in order to put more money into their pockets; from February 1951 to February 1952 more Americans felt that taxes were too high, and from August 1951 to April 1952 support increased for a 25 percent limit on taxes. Prices rose less the following year, and the drop from February 1952 to February 1953 in responses that taxes were too high may have reflected this. Although prices began rising sharply in 1965 with the escalation of the Vietnam War,

there were fewer responses that a wage-price freeze would be a good idea during the war. During this period unemployment was dropping substantially; hence real disposable income rose greatly, and economic conditions were seen as reasonably good. This was not the case from February 1978 to May 1979, when opinion favoring wage and price controls rose, especially by April 1978; prices were increasing at a record rate, while the unemployment rate changed hardly at all.

Spending preferences may have also been sensitive to inflation. From January 1957 to July 1957 support dropped for federal aid to build schools; prices at this time were rising faster than any year since 1951. Similarly, support for welfare spending dropped considerably from February 1975 to April 1976, as prices continued their mid-1970s climb.

Economics undoubtedly influenced opinion toward policies affecting the availability of gasoline. During the period from May to August 1979, the high price and scarcity of gasoline contributed to the increased public support for presidential authority to ration gas.

Government activity, events, and changing circumstances were also apparently related to shifts in preferences concerning labor issues, crime, and various executive actions. Public support for the Child Labor Amendment, approved by Congress in 1922, increased from April 1936 to February 1937 as it was finally being considered seriously by several state legislatures. The increased threat of war probably underlay the shift in opinion from October to November 1941 against the right to strike in defense industries. After the United States entered World War II and the immediate danger of defeat diminished, and as workers put in long hours in war industries, support declined for working more than 48 hours per week without overtime (March 1942 to October 1942).

From September 1965 to January 1966 public opposition rose against a seven-day strike limit. During this period President Johnson averted a steelworkers' strike, although there had also been a 25-day strike by newspaper workers in New York. Public opinion, however, became more favorable toward the strike limit from December 1965 to August 1966 after strikes by airline machinists, New York City transit workers, and railway firemen.

Public support for capital punishment and for more severe criminal penalties increased most rapidly when the crime rate began to climb and when spectacular crime-related events attracted attention. Public demand for harsher treatment of criminals by the courts rose sharply from April to September 1965. Although this may have been triggered by the rioting in Watts in mid-August, it was probably also a response

to the report of a sudden increase in crime beginning in 1964. Closer analysis of the survey evidence has shown that fear of crime was strongly related to the desire for harsher courts in 1965—more so than in later years (Stinchcombe et al., 1980:67–68, Table 21). From May 1966 to June 1967, opinion favoring capital punishment rose, and during this time people may have been responding to the murder of eight nurses by Richard Speck. March 1972 to November 1972 was also a period in which support increased for this punishment; in June 1972 the Supreme Court ruled the death penalty unconstitutional, after years in which there had been major riots, assassinations, and highly publicized murders.

Of all the policy preferences we examined, opinions toward Nixon and Watergate showed the most dramatic rapid change: a drop of 34 percent in the opposition to impeaching the president and compelling him to leave office, from June 1973 to May 1974, as evidence of his misdeeds accumulated. From June 1974 to August 1974 the public also became increasingly favorable toward bringing Nixon to trial, and from June to August 1974 support for his removal from office rose by 13 percent. Related closely to this issue was opinion favoring public versus private campaign contributions, which also climbed from June 1973 to September 1973.

Watergate was certainly unique, but opinions also changed abruptly about presidential activity and policy making on a few other occasions. When President Roosevelt tried to reorganize the Supreme Court, public opinion moved against him, favoring less power for the president (1937–1938). After President Truman proposed his national health plan, debate and controversy apparently led to greater public opposition (1949). In contrast, preferences became more favorable toward integrating public facilities between June 1963 and January 1964, two months after President Kennedy's death.

Because abrupt changes in preferences are intrinsically interesting and have been relatively neglected in the literature, we have devoted more attention to them than their number alone would warrant. It is well to remember that they are only exceptions to the general rule of gradual change or no change at all. But our main point here is that when preferences do shift rapidly, there is no reason to presume that the public is fickle, confused, or irrational; most abrupt changes have been associated with important objective events.

Conclusion

Our examination of the data indicates that there has been considerable stability in Americans' policy preferences. Half of our 613 re-

peated items showed no significant change at all, and nearly half the significant changes we did find were modest in size—less than 10 percentage points. Most changes were gradual. Only rarely did preferences fluctuate back and forth to a statistically significant extent within a short period.

Moreover, when opinion changes did occur, they were not random or inexplicable; they were usually related to important changes in citizens' lives and in their social and economic environments. Abrupt shifts in preferences generally coincided with major events in international affairs or the economy.

To be sure, our discussion of the causes of opinion change is only intended to be suggestive, not definitive. A considerably more sophisticated analysis than just matching events and preference changes is required if we are to understand fully such important aspects of opinion dynamics as the impact of event stimuli, the role of the media, and the nature of time lags and diffusion processes (see Erbring, 1980; Erbring et al., 1980). In particular, we do not wish to give the impression that public preferences are necessarily an autonomous engine of democracy, welling up from individuals' objective needs and external realities, and presenting themselves to politicians for action. Quite a different picture is also consistent with the data (and is hinted at in our discussion): a picture of public opinion, especially on foreign policy, as subject to leadership or manipulation by politicians, interest groups, and others—public opinion that is created or molded, as well as responded to. We intend to pursue these themes in the future.

For now, we would only emphasize that Americans' policy preferences have tended to move, when they have changed at all, in orderly and understandable ways. The evidence suggests that citizens may be more responsible than volatile. If this is so, students of democratic politics may want to reconsider the nature and political role of public opinion. Connections between citizens' preferences and the policy-making process seem eminently worthy of reexamination.

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Contrast Effects in Estimating Policies of the Federal Government

DONALD GRANBERG AND CAROL ROBERTSON

THIS article reports analyses of new questions in which respondents estimate the current policy of the U.S. federal government. The survey was done at a time when Congress had been led by the Democratic party for over 15 years and Jimmy Carter had completed his third year as president and was a candidate for reelection. Before discussing the results, we shall briefly review the related theoretical and empirical literature.

Placement of Political Candidates

A series of articles has dealt with estimations made by citizens of where politicians stand on issues. These "placement judgments" are the outcome of the dual processes of impression management by the candidate (Goffman, 1959; Hall, 1972) and impression formation by the citizen (Granberg and Brent, 1980). Using the same scale to measure attitudes and attributions, people tend to assimilate, that is, to distort in the direction of their own position (Sherif and Hovland, 1961) when estimating the position of a preferred candidate. This is indicated by a positive regression coefficient between people's atti-

Abstract This article reports analyses of the relation between respondents' attitudes and what they estimated to be the policies of the federal government on three scales using the 1980 NORC General Social Survey. Although previous articles have reported the assimilation tendency as stronger than contrast, the result in the present case was a pervasive contrast effect. The more conservative the respondents' attitudes, the more liberal the policies attributed to the federal government. The effect occurred among people selected with regard to confidence in the government, party affiliation and prior voting behavior, and various status and demographic characteristics.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:43–53 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-43/$2.50

tudes and the positions attributed to the candidate. However, the tendency to contrast (Hovland et al., 1957; Sherif et al., 1965)—that is, to distort in the direction away from their own position—has been found to be weak or nonexistent when estimating the position of a nonpreferred candidate (Sherrod, 1972; Page and Brody, 1972; Granberg and Brent, 1974; Granberg and Jenks, 1977; King, 1978; Kinder, 1978; Granberg and Brent, 1980).[1] A contrast effect would be inferred from a negative regression coefficient between own attitudes and the positions attributed to a candidate.

Balance Theory

Heider (1946) reasoned that it would be unpleasant for a person (P) to acknowledge either agreement with a disliked other (O) on some issue (X) or disagreement with a liked O. In such an unpleasant situation, P would be motivated to change the attitude toward O, the attitude toward X, or the estimate of O's attitude toward X. If P estimates O's attitude toward X, and if there were no reality constraint, P might be expected to maximize the subjective agreement with a liked O and to maximize the subjective disagreement with a disliked O (Granberg and Brent, 1980:618).

Although simplistic, this mode of thinking has served as a useful point of departure. The prediction that people either assimilate a preferred candidate or contrast a nonpreferred candidate has certainly received empirical support (Holm and Robinson, 1978). That the tendency to assimilate a preferred candidate is more robust than the tendency to contrast a nonpreferred candidate was not anticipated from balance theory, and this has led some to cite a positivity bias (Sears, 1969) or a Pollyanna tendency (Granberg and Seidel, 1976) to account for the asymmetry.

Placement of Groups and Organizations

In the 1972 and 1976 surveys done by the Center for Political Studies, people were asked to estimate the positions of the Demo-

[1] This work has presumed that attraction ($P + O$) leads to assimilation, but has not ruled out the alternative that perceived similarity leads to attraction. An experiment manipulating attraction or perceived similarity which seeks to demonstrate that one leads to the other can only show that that is one way it *could* work in the real world (Byrne et al., 1969; Henshel, 1980; Granberg and King, 1980). Recent analyses have tried to unravel this matter using two-stage nonrecursive simultaneous regression equations or cross-lagged panel analyses. It appears that the causal relation between perceived similarity and attraction is bidirectional, but the flow from attraction to perceived similarity seems to be somewhat stronger than from perceived similarity to attraction (Page and Jones, 1979; Granberg and Brent, 1980).

cratic and Republican parties as well as the positions of the candidates. Granberg and Brent (1980:624) reported that assimilation and contrast effects in placing the parties parallel quite closely the results for candidates. The position of a preferred party is assimilated and this tendency is stronger than the tendency to contrast a nonpreferred party.

Granberg et al. (1981) found that when people estimated the attitudinal position of people in racial and age groups, the tendency to assimilate was enhanced when the group was a membership and a reference group for the individual. However, even when the group was a nonmembership group to which the person did not feel close, no tendency toward contrast was observed; on the contrary, such people showed some slight tendency toward assimilation. These findings resemble other studies of the attribution of attitudes to groups (Travers, 1941; Wallen, 1943; O'Gorman, 1979; Fields and Schuman, 1977). The implication is that an egocentric bias (Ross et al., 1977) or assumption of similarity to self (Granberg, 1972) is manifested except when there is unequivocal evidence of objective disagreement or when O is an extremely negative stimulus for P.

Placement Estimates of Governmental Policy

In the 1980 General Social Survey of U.S. adults ($N=1,468$), done by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, respondents were shown three 7-point scales pertaining to defense spending, aid to minority groups, and social services. In addition to indicating their own attitude ("Where would you place yourself on this scale?"), respondents also estimated the current policy of the U.S. federal government ("Where would you place what the Federal Government is doing at the present time?"). The end points for the three 7-point scales were defined for the respondents as follows:

A. Defense Spending Scale: "should spend much less money for defense (1)" and "defense spending should be greatly increased (7)."

B. Aid to Minorities Scale: "the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks and other minority groups, even if it means giving them preferential treatment (1)" and "the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves (7)."

C. Social Services Scale: "it is important for the government to continue the services it now provides even if it means no reduction in spending (1)" and "the government should provide fewer services,

even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending (7)."[2]

Even though it is a stimulus of a different level of abstraction, the federal government is an organization, or institution. There was no a priori reason why the federal government should evoke different placement tendencies from those reported for candidates, parties, and other groups. It was hypothesized that people who have a positive attitude toward the government would assimilate in the estimates, while those who have a negative attitude might assimilate less or be inclined toward contrast. One could also reason in reverse. If a group of people showed a strong tendency to assimilate in their estimates of government policy, this might imply that they have a positive attitude toward the government. Similarly, if they showed contrast, one could infer a negative attitude.

Overall, one might expect some tendency to assimilate in estimates of government policy. A citizen has a unit relationship with the government as a consequence of affiliation and exchange. This unit relationship might lead to attraction and, in turn, to an assumption of similarity to self (Darley and Berscheid, 1967; Tyler and Sears, 1977; Arkin and Burger, 1980). However, over the past 30 years, the image of the U.S. federal government held by citizens has deteriorated and there has been an increase in cynicism and distrust (Nie et al., 1976). In 1980 it was not clear that President Carter had succeeded in halting this trend.

Results

On the defense spending and aid to minorities scales, respondents leaned in the conservative direction (average attitudinal positions = 4.9 and 4.8). On the social services scale, the average self-placement was 3.6, slightly in the liberal direction. On all three scales, the average estimate of federal government policy was more liberal than the average self-placement. The attributions averaged 4.0 for defense spending, 3.2 for aid to minorities, and 3.1 for social services.

The overall tendency of the sample toward assimilation or contrast was examined by a series of three one-way analyses of variance with people's attitudes as the independent variables and the estimations of government policy as the dependent variables. The results, shown in Figure 1, indicate that on each scale there was a significant tendency toward contrast in estimating the government's policy. The tendency

[2] Actually, the social services scale was the reverse of this in the survey. In our analyses, it was recoded so all three scales would go from liberal (1) to conservative (7).



NOTE: The analyses are based on the March 1980 General Social Survey done by the National Opinion Research Center. The wording of the scales is given in the text.

Figure 1. Relationship Between People's Attitudes and the Position Estimated to Be the Policy of the Federal Government on the Same Scale, Using Three Different Scales.

is strongest on the defense spending scale but is also present on the other two scales.

In Figure 1, there appears to be some departure from linearity in the direction of a step function. For two of the scales (defense spending and social services), the deviation from linearity was, in fact, significant. Even in these cases, however, the linear component accounted for the bulk of the between-group variance, 86 percent on the social services scale and 91 percent on defense spending. On the aid to minorities issue, the deviation from linearity was not significant, and the linear component comprised 94 percent of the between-group variance.

Because the theoretical contrast curve had a step function (Granberg and Brent, 1980), and because there was some appearance of that in Figure 1, the scales were recoded and the analyses of

variance were repeated. The attitude scales were recoded 2 and 3 combined with 1, and 6 and 7 with 5, so that three groups were obtained: 1-2-3, 4, and 5-6-7. However, the regression coefficients in Figure 1 were basically unchanged (−.38, −.26 and −.28). Therefore, for the more specific analyses, there appeared to be no advantage in such a recode, and the results which follow are based on the 7-point scales as in Figure 1.

From the contrast observed in Figure 1, one could infer that U.S. adults had a negative attitude toward their federal government in 1980. Theoretically, however, it is important to refine the analysis by introducing additional variables. The closest this survey came to asking people their attitudes toward the "Federal Government in Washington" was when people indicated how much confidence they had in the people running these institutions: the executive branch of the federal government, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court. In determining the level of defense spending and social service programs, the executive branch has been especially important, the Congress also is important, but the Supreme Court has not been important. On aid to minorities and affirmation action, the Supreme Court has been quite important, but so have the other two.

Table 1 gives the correlations between people's attitudes and the policies attributed to the federal government within groups selected so the people would have a given level of confidence in one or more of the branches of the federal government. It was expected that those who had the least confidence would show the largest tendency toward contrast.

On the aid to minorities and social services issues and on the average across issues, this hypothesis was supported. However, on defense spending, the largest tendency toward contrast was shown by people who had a "great deal of confidence."

People who voted for President Carter in 1976 made a behavioral commitment (Festinger, 1964; Kiesler, 1971), and those who identified with the party in control of the presidency and Congress shared an additional unit relationship with the people running these institutions. They should assimilate in their placement judgments of the federal government, or at least show less contrast than Republicans who voted for Ford in 1976. Some tendency in the predicted direction occurred, although each group tended toward contrast. Averaging across issues, Republicans showed the most contrast (−.38) followed by Independents (−.33) and Democrats (−.23). People who had voted for Carter (−.26) showed slightly less contrast than those who voted for Ford (−.33). Combining these two criteria, Democrats who voted for Carter tended toward contrast (−.23), but to a lesser extent than Republicans who had voted for Ford (−.36).

Table 1. Correlations Between Respondents' Own Attitudes and Policy Positions Attributed to the Federal Government on Three issues, Controlling for Confidence in the Branches of the Federal Government, Based on NORC General Social Survey, 1980

		Correlation Between Respondent's Own Attitude and Position Attributed to Federal Government on:				
	Level of Confidence of Respondents	*Defense Spending*	*Aid to Minorities*	*Social Services*	*Average Correlation*	*Average N*
	1. All respondents	−.38	−.27	−.29	−.31	1,227
Executive branch of the federal government	2. Great deal	−.48	−.21	−.05 (n.s.)	−.25	143
	3. Only some	−.33	−.20	−.22	−.25	633
	4. Hardly any	−.42	−.36	−.43	−.40	432
Congress	5. Great deal	−.46	−.14 (n.s.)	−.02 (n.s.)	−.21	109
	6. Only Some	−.41	−.26	−.23	−.30	665
	7. Hardly any	−.34	−.30	−.42	−.35	427
U.S. Supreme Court	8. Great deal	−.39	−.22	−.08 (n.s.)	−.23	313
	9. Only some	−.41	−.23	−.31	−.32	628
	10. Hardly any	−.29	−.37	−.44	−.37	242
Executive branch and Congress	11. Great deal	−.60	−.11 (n.s.)	−.03 (n.s.)	−.23 (n.s.)	56
	12. Only some	−.37	−.22	−.19	−.26	445
	13. Hardly any	−.38	−.36	−.47	−.40	266

NOTE: ns = not significant; for other correlations in this table, $p < .05$. In rows 2–4, people were grouped on the basis of the level of confidence in the executive branch of the federal government; rows 5–7, the level of confidence in the Congress; and in rows 8–10, the level of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court. In rows 11–13, people were selected who had the same level of confidence in the executive branch and Congress.

Finally, the pervasiveness of this contrast effect was examined by considering demographic and social status cohorts. Whites showed a significant tendency toward contrast (−.32), while blacks showed a nonsignificant tendency in the same direction (−.12).[3] Men showed only a slightly stronger tendency toward contrast than women (−.33 to −.29). In 1980 there was a larger gender difference in the actual vote for president than in previous elections, with women more likely to vote for the incumbent Carter than men. Each of four educational groups showed a significant contrast effect, but the tendency toward contrast did increase somewhat as education increased (Robinson, 1970).[4] The tendency toward contrast was not affected much by age or the amount of time spent watching television.

Discussion

The tendency toward contrast, uncovered in our analysis of estimates of federal governmental policies, was surprising and intriguing. The finding is very different from comparable reports which dealt with estimates of the positions of candidates, parties, age and racial groups. Those studies found assimilation to be pervasive and stronger than contrast. This article clarifies that there is nothing inevitable, inexorable, or limitless about the asymmetry reported previously (Granberg and Brent, 1974; Kinder, 1978; Granberg et al., 1981).

The contrast effects observed in our analyses may be as close as anyone has come to observing the pure contrast effect in the model provided by Granberg and Brent (1980: Fig. 1). However, a slight difference is that while a step function did appear, it seemed to be that people at positions 1 and 2 were estimating similarly, as were people at positions 6 and 7, while a more linear relationship occurred between positions 2 and 6. In Granberg and Brent's model, people at position 3 estimate similarly to those at positions 2 and 1, those at position 5 estimate similarly to those at positions 6 and 7, and the linear relationship goes between positions 3 and 5.

The contrast effects observed in this article were quite pervasive and relatively immune to controls for other attitudes, past behavior, status characteristics, and group affiliations. In particular, controlling

[3] The tendency of blacks was almost the same on all three issues (−.11, −.14, and −.12 for defense spending, aid to minorities, and social services, respectively). The difference between blacks and whites in this respect is probably not just a matter of party preference. Black Democrats showed less of a tendency toward contrast of the federal government (−.11) than did white Democrats (−.25).

[4] The contrast coefficients averaged −.43 for college graduates, −.34 for those with some college, −.31 for high school graduates, and −.24 for those with less than a high school education.

for confidence as in Table 1 did not have as large a moderating effect on the displacement relations as might have been expected from balance theory.

We do not believe there is anything inherent in the nature of these scales that would inevitably lead to contrast. In the present situation, under President Ronald Reagan, a person who prefers a large increase in the military budget might also "perceive" (correctly) that the government is embarked on a major increase in military spending. Continuing this hypothetical example, if people who favor a decrease in military spending were less likely to recognize that the current policy was to greatly escalate military spending, an assimilation effect would be obtained.

That the federal government was the stimulus in the present study which evoked significant contrast is certainly a matter of interest and one to be taken seriously. In an era of good feelings in which people have a positive relationship to their government, one would not expect this to occur. In common usage, the "Federal Government in Washington" has often become a pejorative label for a wasteful, abstract, and ill-defined "bureaucracy." This abstraction was something that Jimmy Carter criticized, not only as a candidate, but even after he had become president and therefore the chief executive of this entity. This may explain why identification with Carter and the Democratic party did little to diminish the contrast effect.

In closing, it would be of considerable interest to have comparable data regarding state and local governments or in regard to the national governments of other countries. Also, it will be fascinating to see whether President Reagan can alter the national mood so that by 1982 or 1984 this contrast effect does not occur.

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House Effects and the Reproducibility of Survey Measurements: A Comparison of the 1980 GSS and the 1980 American National Election Study

TOM W. SMITH

CONCERN has been growing about measurement error in survey research and the lability of subjective indicators. Both practitioners of survey research and critics from outside have questioned the reliability and validity of survey-based measures. For example: The federal government's major program to measure criminal victimization was suspended and is currently being overhauled because of serious response effects (Panel, 1976; Clarren and Schwartz, 1976; and Biderman, 1980). Charles Turner's analysis of confidence questions (Turner and Krauss, 1978) and various order effects (Turner, 1981) highlighted a great deal of lability in survey measures. The Serge Lang and Seymour Martin Lipset/Everett Carll Ladd dispute over "The 1977 Survey of the American Professoriate" raised concerns about survey design throughout the academic community.

The National Data Program for the Social Sciences at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) and the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan decided to study the reliability of survey-based measurements and examine house effects by asking

Abstract This paper examines a collaborative experiment between the General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center, and the American National Election Study, Center for Political Studies. Identical items were asked by both surveys, thereby permitting a test of reproducibility and house effects. Significant differences were found between the houses, with the largest and most systematic differences involving item nonresponse. Various explanations for the differences are examined and a general assessment of the importance of the differences is presented.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:54–68 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033–362X/82/0046–54/$2.50

several identical questions on NORC's 1980 General Social Survey (GSS) and Michigan's 1980 American National Election Study (Survey Research Center-SRC).

Reproducibility is a basic test of the reliability of a measurement. If a measurement of a particular phenomenon can be replicated by independent observation under like conditions, then there is presumptive evidence that the measurement is, within a given degree of exactitude, accurate and reliable. Of course, mere replication does not insure perfection. Measurements reliable enough for one purpose may prove to be too crude for other purposes. In addition, constant error may be distorting all measurements, and finding that a measurement is reliable says nothing about its validity. Thus reproducibility under like conditions is usually an important but incomplete criterion of reliability.

Given the internal constraints of the two ongoing surveys, the limited extent of the collaboration, and related factors, it was not possible to rigorously standardize all relevant factors such as instrument content, training, field period, and numerous other variables. We were able, however, to adopt identical wordings and tried to minimize differences in timing and context. Time was controlled for by selecting items for the March GSS which appeared on both the Michigan SRC-P1 survey in January-February and the SRC-C1 survey in April. This minimized the interval between surveys and allowed control for any monotonic short-term change. Because of fixed schedules, Michigan was unable to place any GSS questions before its SRC-P2 survey in June (Wave 2 of the SRC-P1 panel). This longer interval between Michigan and NORC readings naturally increased the possibility of true change occurring.

We tried to reduce context effects by selecting from the Michigan study three basic policy questions that immediately followed a self-ranking liberal/conservative scale. The Michigan questions asked about a person's position on an issue, about the position of six or seven political figures, and then about the position of the federal government (see Appendix A). Next came questions on the importance of the issue and the importance of the federal government's position.

The GSS versions of the questions were placed after a self-ranking liberal/conservative question similar to the Michigan question and appeared in the same order, but they excluded the sections on political figures and importance. This arrangement controlled for the sequence of topics (liberalism/defense spending/minority assistance/social spending), but did not standardize the number and focus of questions about each topic. This partial control was unfortunately

further disrupted when Michigan at the last minute was forced to drop the minority assistance question from the SRC-P1 survey because of time overruns on the pretest. This prevented us from boxing in the minority assistance question and increased the context differences between SRC-P1 and GSS. It also proved impossible to match the GSS and SRC-P2 contexts for the spending priority items. These were the lead item on the GSS survey, whereas on the Michigan questionnaire they came near the start after a series of questions about what the respondent thought was the most important problem the government should deal with. However, because the spending item has 11 subparts, it is possible that at least after the initial inquiries this item creates an internal context that is more relevant than that emanating from prior questions. In brief, while we were unable to establish a rigorous house effects experiment that controlled for all factors except for embedded organizational differences between NORC and SRC, we were able to eliminate differences due to wording and reduce differences due to time and context.

To examine possible house effects we will first compare the marginal distributions and then analyze differences in correlations. Looking at Table 1, we see that on 16 of 17 items there are significant differences across houses. (See Appendix B for marginal distributions.) A major and systematic reason for these differences are the DK categories (haven't thought about the issue and don't know). On every item Michigan gets substantially more responses in these categories than GSS does. On the six policy items Michigan averages 5.8 percentage points more than the GSS, and on the spending priority scale the average difference is 4.2 percentage points. This apparently results from house-related differences in instructing interviewers how to handle DKs.[1] While both SRC and NORC generally instruct interviewers to probe tentative DKs, on the American National Election Studies respondents are encouraged to acknowledge nonattitudes. In addition, SRC interviews are more accustomed to using the filter format of these questions than NORC interviewers. The filter format is also introduced on the preceding liberalism question on the SRC version, thereby giving SRC respondents more familiarity with the no opinion option. Such differences on DK levels have been detected in other interhouse comparisons and appear to be the most

[1] The differences between the spending scales could also be related to two additional factors. SRC-P2 is a panel of SRC-P1 respondents, and studies often find attrition is greater among the uninterested (those with many DKs for example). Crespi (1948) finds a learning effect that decreases the proportion DK among panel persisters. Both factors would of course argue for even bigger differences in DKs than those observed here when comparing the GSS to SRC-P2.

Table 1. Differences in Distributions

			DKs Excluded	
	Prob.[a]	χ^2	*Prob.*	χ^2
A1 Respondents position on defense spending				
SRC-P1/GSS80/SRC-C1	<.001	97.3	<.0001	70.2
GSS80/SRC-P1, SRC-C1	<.0001	83.8	<.0001	63.3
A2 Federal government's position on defense spending				
SRC-P1/GSS80/SRC-C1	<.0001	108.2	<.0001	89.3
GSS80/SRC-P1, SRC-C1	<.0001	90.7	<.0001	72.4
B1 Respondent's position on minority assistance				
GSS80/SRC-C1	.0042	22.8	.162	9.2
B2 Federal government's position on minority assistance				
GSS80/SRC-C1	.0509	15.4	.096	10.8
C1 Respondent's position on social spending				
SRC-P1/GSS80/SRC-C1	<.0001	50.3	.063	20.3
GSS80/SRC-P1, SRC-C1	<.0001	42.2	.053	12.4
C2 Federal government's position on social spending				
SRC-P1/GSS80/SRC-C1	<.0001	79.0	.001	40.6
GSS80/SRC-P1, SRC-C1	<.0001	58.1	.005	18.8
D Spending priorities				
Space	.001		.0360	
Environment	.0001		.0001	
Health	<.0001		.0461	
Urban	.0006		.5370	
Crime	<.0001		.0047	
Drugs	.0004		.0121	
Education	.0019		.9696	
Blacks	.0012		.7642	
Arms	.0223		.0381	
Foreign Aid	.0105		.0131	
Welfare	.0114		.5243	

[a] Statistical tests were based on simple random sampling assumptions. Since this underestimates sampling variation, we are accepting some differences as significant when they are not.

common type of house effect (Schuman and Presser, 1978; Smith, 1978 and 1981).

If we exclude the DKs from the analysis we find that three of the six policy items do not show significant associations and all differences are reduced. The indexes of dissimilarity average 9.7 with DKs included and 8.2 with them excluded. On the spending scale 4 of the 11 differences become nonsignificant and the other differences decrease. The indexes of dissimilarity drop from an average of 6.6 to 4.4.

There are several possible explanations for the differences that do appear even after the exclusion of DKs. First, true change could account for all the observed differences. On the four policy items which had a SRC point immediately before and after the 1980 GSS, we tested to see if linear true change could account for the differences. Respondent's position on social spending showed no significant between-group differences (confirming the results of the chi-square tests in Table 1). On the federal government's position on social spending we found a significant linear fit and no significant unexplained variance. Respondent's and government's position on defense also showed significant linearity but still had a highly significant deviation from linearity. Thus monotonic change is a plausible explanation for the differences on the federal government's position on social spending, but not for the defense spending items. Since we see no independent evidence of a spurt for defense spending (and in the public's perception of the federal government's position) that had largely subsided by the time of the second SRC survey in April, we doubt that true change explains the differences on defense spending. True change is distinctly possible in the case of the spending priority scale, however. There was both more time between readings for real shifts in preferences and some indication that attitudes were changing. For example, support for defense spending continued to go up sharply, a trend consistent with changes on the GSS between 1978 and 1980 and recent events. It is unfortunately impossible to specify in what instances and to what extent true change did cause differences.

Second, there is some evidence that context variations might explain some of the difference. Differences on the social spending questions were less between GSS80 and SRC-C1 than between GSS80 and SRC-P1 or SRC-P1 and SRC-C1. This greater similarity could have resulted from their closer topical context, since the minority assistance items preceded the social spending items on GSS80 and SRC-C1. Also, the differences between the spending priority items are greater among items that occurred early on the list (and thus were most susceptible to influence from the previous questions) than among items that occurred later. However, since the association between house differences and item order is not significant, we must not overemphasize this tendency.[2]

[2] The rho between the index of dissimilarity and item order was −.309 (prob.=.178) and −.409 (prob. = .106) between net spending (percent too much—percent too little) and item order. If we exclude defense, for which there is evidence of significant true change, the respective relationships moderately increase to −.442 (.100) and −.503 (.069).

Third, it is possible that some of the difference that remains after the DKs are excluded from analysis still comes from this source. The GSS has larger standard deviations than either SRC survey on the six policy items with the DKs excluded. Converse argues that substantive responses are frequently contaminated by nonattitude holders who give random substantive responses rather than admit their ignorance (Smith, 1980). If we assume that the lower DK levels on the GSS surveys result in fewer of the nonattitude holders being separated from true substantive responses, then we would expect these random responders to increase the standard deviation. Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether nonattitude guessers necessarily distribute themselves in such a fashion or even if the GSS actually fails to remove more nonattitude holders from the substantive categories (SRC might push more people with real attitudes into the DKs).

In sum, distributional differences between the 1980 GSS and SRC election surveys result from various factors. In probable order of magnitude these are (1) house styles in handling item nonresponse, (2) true change, (3) context effects, and (4) other procedural differences (coding, survey nonresponse, etc.).[3] On the other hand, while statistically significant differences do exist they tend to be small (indexes of dissimilarity usually less than 10.0), and there are also several instances of similarity between the houses. The analysis of variance revealed that while the means were significantly different between SRC and GSS, the *difference* in the means between respondent's and government's position were quite similar. On defense spending the federal government was thought to be less in favor of spending than respondents by .933 on SRC-P1, .955 on GSS80, and .961 on SRC-C1; while on social spending the government was thought to be more liberal by −.515, −.469, and −.403, respectively.

The surveys also agreed in finding more DKs on the federal government items than on the respondent items and were close on the magnitude of the increases. Similarly, while seven of the spending priority items showed significant differences, the rank orders had a correlation of rho = .955. In brief, even in areas where differences appear in the marginals, there are often notable similarities of one type or another.

We next examine how SRC and NORC compared on bivariate correlations. First, the intercorrelations between all items were compared. This gave 6 comparisons between the seven-point scales on

[3] Differences in sample composition do not appear to contribute notably to interhouse variation. Distributions from SRC-P1 and GSS80 on selected variables were, respectively: Catholic .227, 247; college educated .355, .338; union member .149, .145; white .886, .898; married .601, .606; and under 30 .263, .245.

SRC-P1 and GSS, 15 comparisons between SRC-C1 and GSS; 6 comparisons between SRC-P1 and SRC-C1; and 55 comparisons on the 11 three-point spending scales between SRC-P2 and GSS. Second, correlations between education, sex, race, and religion and the seven- and three-point scales were compared. This gave 16 comparisons between SRC-P1 and GSS; 16 between SRC-C1 and SRC-P1; 24 comparisons between SRC-C1 and GSS; and 33 comparisons between SRC-P2 and GSS (education was not available in this last instance.)

Of the intercorrelations between the seven-point scales used on P1, GSS, and C1, there were three statistically significant differences (at the .05 level, assuming simple random sampling) between each pair of surveys. This is well above chance, indicating that real differences exist. Looking at the average difference, we see that there is a greater difference between houses (mean net difference in correlations r = .063 for GSS-P1 and .029 for GSS-C1)[4] than within houses (mean net differences in r = −.014 for P1-C1.) For example, the correlation between social spending and federal government position on social spending was −.067 on P1, −.285 on GSS, and −.169 on C1. On the three-point spending items there was also a larger number of statistically significant differences (7 out of 55 comparisons) than expected by chance (ca.3), but there was no systematic difference in magnitude or direction (mean net difference in correlations = .−006). In sum, on the seven-point scales a significant amount of variation occurs both within and between houses. The between-house differences are slightly larger than the within-house differences, and on average GSS has slightly higher intercorrelations than SRC. On the three-point spending scales, between-house differences are small and largely random.

On the correlations with demographics, the differences are trivial. Of 16 comparisons between GSS and P1, one is statistically significant; and between GSS and C1, three differences were significant. The mean net differences in correlations were small (.0095 for GSS-P1; −.007 for GSS-C1;[5] and −.006 for P1-C1). On the spending items none of the 33 comparisons of correlations showed a statistically significant difference, and the mean net difference was −.004. Thus, the difference in the correlations between demographics and the attitude scales shows virtually no indication of statistically significant house effects.

[4] If we include the eight additional comparisons with the minority scale, the mean difference between GSS and C1 drops to .014 and none of the added correlations are statistically significant.

[5] One of the eight differences between the minority scales and the demographics was significant and the mean difference was +.005.

In sum, this comparison of the GSS and SRC studies shows one large and systematic house effect: the Michigan surveys record more DKs than the GSS does. This results from different survey treatments of item nonresponse, and the difference could presumably be narrowed or eliminated by standardizing interviewer training and instructions. With the DKs excluded from analysis the frequency and magnitude of differences between houses were notably reduced. Many of the other differences, especially those concerning spending priorities, may have been the result of true change. Other evidence points to context and a residual DK effect as causes of the remaining differences. In addition, other house-related factors such as survey nonresponse, sample frame, or coding could contribute to the observed differences. The comparison of correlational differences indicates somewhat larger-than-expected interhouse effects on interitem correlations, but negligible difference on correlations with demographics.

All in all, these data stress the strong connection between DK levels and house, suggesting that this factor should always be carefully evaluated when comparing results across surveys done by different houses. In addition, enough differences remain even after DKs are adjusted for and true change is considered to suggest the operation of other survey-specific (e.g., context) or house-general (e.g., interviewer training) effects.

On the other hand, the differences in distributions and correlations are neither so large nor so common as to brand these items or surveys in general as labile and unreliable. While more study of nonsampling error is needed, surveys appear to be generally capable of reasonably reliable and reproducible measurements.

Appendix A

SEVEN-POINT SCALES, GSS

91. Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point Number 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. ENTER CODE IN BOXES.

HAND CARD P

DEFENSE SPENDING

01	02	03	04	05	06	07
GREATLY DECREASE DEFENSE SPENDING						GREATLY INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING

A. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

☐☐

Haven't thought much 08
Don't know 98

B. Where would you place what the federal government is doing at the present time?

☐☐

Haven't thought much 08
Don't know 98

92. Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups, even if it means giving them preferential treatment. (Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1.) Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.) ENTER CODE IN BOXES. [Format for reply same as above.]

93. Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to continue the services it now provides even if it means no reduction in spending. ENTER CODE IN BOXES. [Format for reply same as above.]

SEVEN-POINT SCALES, SRC

N4. (R.B., P. 6) Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.



a. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

★_____ [8. DON'T KNOW] [0. HAVEN'T THOUGHT MUCH]

TURN TO P. 22, N8

	RATING	8 DON'T KNOW
b. Where would you place Jimmy Carter?		
c. Where would you place Ronald Reagan?		
d. (Where would you place) Ted Kennedy?		
e.* (Where would you place) John Connally?		
f. [omitted]		
g. (Where would you place) Jerry Brown?		
h. (Where would you place) Baker?		
i. (Where would you place) Bush?		
z. Where would you place what the federal government is doing at the present time? ★		
	TURN TO P. 21, N5	TURN TO P. 22, N8

* The SRC-C1 (April) study omitted Connally and substituted Anderson for Baker.

N5. (BLUE CARD), READ AS NECESSARY:

> Here is a scale from 0 to 100. 100 on this scale means the greatest possible importance, while 0 means not at all important. The other numbers on the scale from 0 to 100 represent higher and higher amounts of importance.

INTERVIEWER CHECKPOINT:

R'S NUMBER RATINGS FOR STARRED ITEMS (N4a AND N4z) ARE:

0. THE *SAME* NUMBER	1. DIFFERENT BY *ONE* POINT	2. DIFFERENT BY *TWO OR MORE* POINTS

N5a. READ AS NECESSARY:

> Now, for the issue we just talked about, I see that your position on this issue (matches/comes close to) what you feel the government is doing at the present time.

You placed yourself at point (NUMBER GIVEN IN N4a) and what the government is doing at point (NUMBER GIVEN IN N4z). Using the blue card, tell me: How important is it to you that the government continue what it is doing so that it stays close to your own position on this issue?

_____ RATING

N5b. READ AS NECESSARY:

> Now, for the issue we just talked about, I see that your position on this issue does not match what you feel the government is doing at the present time.

You placed yourself at point (NUMBER GIVEN IN N4a) and what the government is doing at point (NUMBER GIVEN IN N4z). Using the blue card, tell me: How important is it to you that the government change what it is doing so that it comes closer to your own position on this issue?

_____ RATING

N8* (R.B., P. 7) Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups, even if it means giving them preferential treatment. (Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1.) Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.)

N12. (R.B., P. 8) Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to continue the services it now provides even if it means no reduction in spending.

* Asked in SRC-C1 survey only.

THREE-POINT SCALE: GSS*

1. First I would like to talk with you about some things people think about today. We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM)? READ EACH ITEM; CODE *ONE FOR EACH.*

	Too Much	*Too Little*	*About Right*	*Don't Know*
A. The space exploration program	3	1	2	8
B. Improving and protecting the environment	3	1	2	8
C. Improving and protecting the nation's health	3	1	2	8
D. Solving the problems of the big cities	3	1	2	8
E. Halting the rising crime rate	3	1	2	8
F. Dealing with drug addiction	3	1	2	8
G. Improving the nation's education system	3	1	2	8
H. Improving the conditions of Blacks	3	1	2	8
I. The military, armaments and defense	3	1	2	8
J. Foreign aid	3	1	2	8
K. Welfare	3	1	2	8

* The SRC three-point scale does not vary appreciably from the GSS version.

Appendix B

MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS

Survey	Position 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	DK	Haven't Thought About	
A1 Respondent's Position on Defense Spending										
SRC-P1	2.1	1.7	3.8	13.1	22.8	21.0	20.2	2.6	12.7	(1,008)
GSS80	3.2	3.3	6.6	21.1	22.9	12.9	19.0	1.7	9.2	(1,463)
SRC-C1	3.1	2.0	4.8	14.8	22.0	18.4	18.4	4.5	12.1	(964)
SRC-P1	2.5	2.0	4.4	15.5	26.9	24.8	23.9	—	—	(854)
GSS80	3.6	3.8	7.4	23.6	25.7	14.5	21.3	—	—	(1,303)
SRC-C1	3.7	2.4	5.7	17.8	26.4	22.0	22.0	—	—	(804)
A2 Federal Government's Position on Defense Spending										
SRC-P1	2.5	3.5	13.2	22.1	21.1	8.7	6.4	7.1	15.3	(1,008)
GSS80	4.0	8.6	21.1	21.9	13.4	7.9	5.6	4.2	13.4	(1,464)[a]
SRC-C1	2.6	5.6	15.4	21.0	19.0	9.9	3.3	6.6	16.7	(964)
SRC-P1	3.2	4.5	17.0	28.5	27.2	11.3	8.3	—	—	(782)
GSS80	4.9	10.4	25.6	26.5	16.2	9.5	6.8	—	—	(1,207)[a]
SRC-C1	3.4	7.3	20.0	27.3	24.8	12.9	4.3	—	—	(739)
B1 Respondent's Position on Minority Assistance										
GSS80	4.6	4.8	9.5	23.2	16.5	14.1	20.2	1.6	5.5	(1,464)
SRC-C1	5.5	4.3	7.9	21.7	17.4	15.9	16.1	3.1	8.1	(963)
GSS80	5.0	5.1	10.2	24.9	17.8	15.2	21.7	—	—	(1,361)
SRC-C1	6.2	4.8	8.9	24.4	19.6	17.9	18.1	—	—	(855)
B2 Federal Government's Position on Minority Assistance										
GSS80	16.5	18.8	16.9	14.1	8.9	6.6	3.5	5.3	9.5	(1,466)[a]
SRC-C1	12.6	19.3	18.6	13.4	10.3	5.2	2.7	6.6	11.4	(964)
GSS80	19.4	22.0	19.8	16.5	10.5	7.8	4.1	—	—	(1,250)[a]
SRC-C1	15.3	23.5	22.7	16.3	12.5	6.3	3.3	—	—	(750)
C1 Respondent's Position on Social Spending										
SRC-P1	6.0	7.1	10.8	15.1	15.6	12.2	16.4	3.5	13.6	(1,003)
GSS80	8.3	8.4	12.2	18.5	13.3	10.8	17.8	2.4	8.3	(1,464)
SRC-C1	5.8	9.2	11.8	15.3	12.1	12.7	15.7	4.1	13.4	(961)
SRC-P1	7.2	8.5	13.0	18.1	18.8	14.7	19.7	—	—	(832)
GSS80	9.3	9.4	13.7	20.7	14.9	12.1	20.0	—	—	(1,308)
SRC-C1	7.1	11.1	14.2	18.5	14.6	15.4	19.0	—	—	(793)
C2 Federal Government's Position on Social Spending										
SRC-P1	1.6	0.9	6.2	17.1	19.3	16.5	13.6	7.4	17.5	(1,008)
GSS80	2.2	4.2	9.3	18.0	17.9	16.4	15.3	3.7	12.9	(1,467)[a]
SRC-C1	2.2	3.4	8.4	14.3	18.2	17.9	10.6	7.2	17.9	(963)
SRC-P1	2.1	1.2	8.2	22.7	25.8	21.9	18.1	—	—	(757)
GSS80	2.7	5.1	11.2	21.6	21.5	19.7	18.3	—	—	(1,224)[a]
SRC-C1	2.9	4.6	11.2	19.1	24.2	23.8	14.1	—	—	(722)

D Spending Priorities

Survey	*Too Much*	*Too Little*	*About Right*	*DK*	
Space exploration program					
GSS80	39.2	18.0	34.5	8.3	(1,466)
SRC-P2	41.3	13.6	31.6	13.5	(829)
GSS80	42.7	19.8	37.6	—	(1,344)
SRC-P2	47.7	15.8	36.5	—	(717)
Improving and protecting the environment					
GSS80	15.4	47.9	31.0	5.7	(1,465)
SRC-P2	13.2	38.4	38.2	10.3	(836)
GSS80	16.4	50.8	32.9	—	(1,382)
SRC-P2	14.7	42.8	42.5	—	(750)
Improving and protecting the nation's health					
GSS80	7.6	54.7	33.5	4.1	(1,467)
SRC-P2	8.3	47.2	36.0	8.5	(839)
GSS80	8.0	57.1	35.0	—	(1,407)
SRC-P2	9.1	51.6	39.3	—	(768)
Solving the problems of the big cities					
GSS80	21.3	40.0	26.0	12.7	(1,464)
SRC-P2	18.2	36.7	26.0	19.1	(837)
GSS80	24.4	45.8	29.8	—	(1,278)
SRC-P2	22.5	45.3	32.2	—	(677)
Halting the rising crime rate					
GSS80	6.0	68.9	20.8	4.3	(1,463)
SRC-P2	4.8	59.7	25.1	10.4	(836)
GSS80	6.3	72.0	21.7	—	(1,400)
SRC-P2	5.3	66.6	28.0	—	(749)
Dealing with drug addiction					
GSS80	7.7	59.8	25.1	7.3	(1,460)
SRC-P2	7.1	52.0	29.5	11.4	(834)
GSS80	8.4	64.5	27.1	—	(1,353)
SRC-P2	8.0	58.7	33.3	—	(739)
Improving the national education system					
GSS80	10.2	52.7	33.1	4.0	(1,463)
SRC-P2	10.0	50.3	31.8	7.9	(837)
GSS80	10.6	54.9	34.5	—	(1,404)
SRC-P2	10.9	54.6	34.5	—	(771)
Improving the condition of blacks					
GSS80	23.9	24.1	44.1	7.9	(1,462)
SRC-P2	23.8	22.6	40.6	13.0	(836)
GSS80	25.9	26.2	47.9	—	(1,347)
SRC-P2	27.4	26.0	46.6	—	(727)
The military, armaments, and defense					
GSS80	11.5	56.3	25.7	6.5	(1,465)
SRC-P2	10.7	59.9	20.9	8.5	(838)
GSS80	12.3	60.2	27.5	—	(1,370)
SRC-P2	11.7	65.4	22.8	—	(767)
Foreign aid					
GSS80	69.8	5.1	19.8	5.3	(1,466)
SRC-P2	73.5	3.2	16.3	6.9	(839)
GSS80	73.7	5.4	20.9	—	(1,389)
SRC-P2	79.0	3.5	17.5	—	(781)

D Spending Priorities (Continued)

Survey	*Too Much*	*Too Little*	*About Right*	*DK*	
Welfare					
GSS80	56.5	13.4	25.8	4.2	(1,463)
SRC-P2	54.9	14.4	23.4	7.3	(836)
GSS80	59.0	14.0	27.0	—	(1,401)
SRC-P2	59.2	15.5	25.3	—	(775)

[a] On the Michigan questions people who were DK, hadn't thought, or NA on their own position position were not asked subsequent parts. They are included in the "haven't thought" category on the federal government questions. On the GSS questions no such screen was used. The above GSS figures were adjusted to be comparable with the Michigan figures.

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Measuring Depression in the Community: A Comparison of Telephone and Personal Interviews

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COMPARISONS of the quality of data obtained in telephone and personal interviews have generally reported little difference between the two methods (Rogers, 1976; Klecka and Tuchfarber, 1978; Kegeles et al., 1969; Colombotos, 1969), although some studies have reported that certain types of response bias may present more of a problem in telephone interviews (Jordan et al., 1980; Yaffee et al., 1978; Groves and Kahn, 1979). Despite potential method effects, the relatively low cost and ease of administration of telephone interviews have made them an increasingly acceptable alternative to personal interviews in a wide range of substantive fields. Cost and quality of data are especially important in health-related research where large samples and lengthy interviews are often used to estimate the occurrence of illness. In community mental health research, the limitations of clinical

Abstract Interview method effects in response to the Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D) are compared among a community sample ($N = 546$) of adults randomly assigned to either telephone or in-person interviews. The interviews were conducted in Los Angeles during 1980. No significant differences were observed between the two interview methods in nonresponse to symptom items, preference for specific response categories, reliability, mean level of depression, or proportion classified as depressed. Furthermore, no significant interactions were found between sociodemographic characteristics and the method of interview.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:110–121 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier North-Holland, Inc. 0033–362X/82/0046–110/$2.50

treatment data have led to a renewed interest in population-based epidemiologic studies and to subsequent efforts to develop standardized measures to assess psychological states (Radloff and Locke, forthcoming). Although previous studies have examined interview method effects for a variety of health-related measures (Siemiatycki, 1979; Hochstim, 1967; Yaffee et al., 1978), the comparability of assessing mental health by telephone and personal interviews has not been widely studied (see Henson et al., 1977).

Depression in particular is viewed as a major public health problem because of its high prevalence, the resulting impaired social functioning, and the possibility of successful treatment (Radloff and Locke, forthcoming). One widely used measure of depression is the Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D). This scale was developed by the Center for Epidemiologic Studies of the National Institute of Mental Health to measure the current level of depressive symptomatology in community settings (Radloff, 1977). The reliability and validity of the scale have been tested on several different clinical populations and household samples (Radloff, 1977; Craig and Van Natta, 1976; Weissman et al., 1977). However, its utility in telephone surveys is unknown.

The present study examines interview method effects on responses to the CES-D among a community sample ($N=546$) of adults randomly assigned to either telephone or in-person interviews. This field experiment was conducted during the spring and summer of 1980 to assess several effects related to the longitudinal portion of a larger investigation of the epidemiology of depression in Los Angeles County (Frerichs et al., 1981). The results presented below compare responses to the CES-D in the two interview methods along several dimensions including nonresponse, preference for specific response categories, scale characteristics, and the interaction of sociodemographic characteristics and interview method.

Methods

STUDY POPULATION

The Los Angeles Metropolitan Area Sample (LAMAS) was used to select respondents for this study. The LAMAS sampling frame was developed by the UCLA Survey Research Center based on the 1970 Census (updated in 1976), and is considered representative of the adult population aged 18 years and older residing in Los Angeles County (Sumner, 1978). The sample can be described as a three-stage cluster sample with probabilities proportional to size.

PROCEDURE

Participation was solicited with a letter describing the study and a subsequent personal contact by an interviewer at the respondent's home. During this initial contact a household roster was completed and one resident adult was selected using the Kish selection method (Kish, 1965:398–401). A random assignment code to either the telephone or in-person interview method was integrated into the Kish table. Thus, assignment was made concurrently with the selection of the respondent. These codes were preassigned in a ratio of 45 percent in-person to 55 percent telephone to ensure a sufficient sample size in both experimental conditions.

The field work for the survey was conducted by professional interviewers from the UCLA Institute for Social Science Research. While the telephone interview was considerably shorter than the in-person interview, the CES-D was administered near the beginning of the interview in both methods. The interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

MEASURES: THE CES-D

The 20-item CES-D provided the operational definition of depression. The 20 symptom items are listed in Table 2 and can be grouped into four types: depressed affect, positive affect, somatic and retarded activity, and interpersonal. Subjects were asked how often they experienced each symptom during the previous week. Four ordinal response categories were used to rate the symptoms as follows:

0 = rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day).
1 = some or a little of the time (1–2 days).
2 = occasionally or a moderate amount of the time (3–4 days).
3 = most or all of the time (5–7 days).

The values of these response categories are reversed for the positive affect items. The total CES-D score is the sum of these 20 items and can range in value from 0 to 60. Previous research has employed a cutoff score of 16 or more to designate an individual as depressed.

After assessment of CES-D item nonresponse, missing data were substituted for those individuals missing only one or two items. Predicted values were estimated proportional to summated scores on the nonmissing items and the sample distribution of responses to the specific item. One individual in each method was eliminated from the scale analysis because of excessive missing data.

RESPONSE CARD

For the in-person interview, respondents were presented with a card listing the response choices and their codes. At the time of the initial contact, a similar list was left with the telephone respondents who were requested to leave it near the telephone in order to facilitate and shorten the subsequent interview. Approximately half of the telephone sample ($N=147$) had the response card at the time of the interview and half ($N=160$) did not. Anglos (52.5 percent) and blacks (56.5 percent) were substantially more likely to have retained the response card than were Hispanics (38.8 percent).

Results

RESPONSE RATE

Of 832 eligible households, 159 (19.1 percent) were initial nonrespondents and consequently were not assigned to either interview method (73 refused, 71 were inaccessible, and 15 were other nonrespondents). The remaining 673 households were randomly assigned to an interview mode. Of the 296 respondents assigned to the in-person interview, 238 (80.4 percent) were interviewed, 27 refused, 24 were inaccessible, and 7 were other nonrespondents. Of the 377 respondents assigned to the telephone interview, 308 (81.7 percent) were interviewed, 24 refused, 18 were inaccessible, 9 were other nonrespondents, and 18 had no telephone available for the interview. The rate of nonresponse in the two modes after assignment did not significantly differ with similar proportions refusing and being inaccessible.

SAMPLE VALIDATION

The sociodemographic characteristics of the two samples were compared to assess potential bias resulting from attrition after assignment to an interview method, as shown in Table 1. The overall comparability of the two samples is apparent. The only characteristic on which the two samples differed significantly was race/ethnicity. While the proportion of missing income data was greater for the telephone than in-person method (16.2 percent versus 8.4 percent, $p < .01$), the level of income reported among those with valid income codes did not differ significantly. It would appear that overall, except for the race/ethnicity difference, the two groups are comparable in terms of their sociodemographic characteristics.

NONRESPONSE TO THE CES-D

Individuals were classified as nonrespondents if they did not answer one or more of the 20 CES-D items (listed in Table 2). The rate

Table 1. Sociodemographic Characteristics of the Sample by Interview Method

	Interview Method			
	Telephone		*In-Person*	
Characteristic	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Total	308	—	238	—
Sex				
Male	136	44.2	103	43.3
Female	172	55.8	135	56.7
Age				
18–24	38	12.3	41	17.2
25–44	135	43.8	100	42.0
45–64	91	29.5	55	23.1
65 and over	44	14.3	42	17.6
Race/ethnicity*				
White, non-Spanish	200	64.9	132	55.5
Hispanic	67	21.8	52	21.8
Black	28	9.1	32	13.4
Other	13	4.2	22	9.2
Marital status[a]				
Never married	68	21.1	50	21.0
Married	157	51.0	126	52.9
Divorced	34	11.0	31	13.0
Separated	11	3.6	7	2.9
Widowed	38	12.3	23	9.7
Employment status				
Employed	203	65.9	151	63.4
Unemployed	29	9.4	15	6.3
Homemaker	33	10.7	31	13.0
Retired	37	12.0	32	13.4
Other	6	1.9	9	3.8
Education				
Less than high school	76	24.7	62	26.1
High school	122	39.6	96	40.3
Some college or more	110	35.7	80	33.6
Total family income				
Less than $8,500	58	18.8	45	18.9
$8,500–$13,999	61	19.8	44	18.5
$14,000–$24,999	70	22.7	63	26.5
$25,000 or more	69	22.4	66	27.7
Refused/don't know	50	16.2	20	8.4

NOTE: Significance tests for differences in the sample distributions were calculated using the χ^2 statistic.

[a] One respondent with missing marital status data.

* $p < .05$.

of nonresponse for the telephone group was slightly but not significantly higher than for the in-person interviews (6.8 percent versus 5.5 percent; χ^2 (1) = 0.42; ns). Nonresponsive to individual items on the CES-D ranged from 0–1.3 percent for the in-person and 0–2.9 percent for the telephone interview, averaging 0.6 percent for both methods.

Table 2. CES-D Items by Interview Method: Telephone and In-Person

	% Presence		% Persistence		Item Means		Item-Total Correlations	
	T	*P*	*T*	*P*	*T*	*P*	*T*	*P*
Depressed affect symptoms								
I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends.	16.9	17.7	2.3	2.5	.26	.29	.65	.72
I felt depressed.	34.9	35.4	4.6	4.2	.53	.53	.78	.73
I felt lonely.	33.6	32.1	7.8	4.6*	.56	.55	.66	.66
I had crying spells.	11.7	14.3	1.0	1.7	.16	.22	.56	.57
I felt sad.	34.5	35.9	5.5	5.1	.53	.55	.70	.69
I felt fearful.	18.9	19.4	1.3	3.4	.27	.32	.50	.56
I thought my life had been a failure.	11.7	9.7	2.3	3.0	.19	.17	.51	.56
Positive affect symptoms								
I felt that I was just as good as other people.	19.2	20.3	4.2	5.1	.32	.36	.33	.36
I felt hopeful about the future.	27.4	34.6	4.6	8.9	.42	.62*	.38	.43
I was happy.	32.9	27.4	3.6	3.4	.48	.41	.67	.73
I enjoyed life.	25.1	25.3	4.6	3.8	.40	.39	.62	.59
Somatic & retarded activity symptoms								
I was bothered by things that usually don't bother me.	32.2	31.2	3.3	3.0	.48	.47	.44	.48
I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.	20.5	21.9	4.9	5.5	.34	.40	.55	.41*
I felt that everything I did was an effort.	35.8	39.7	7.8	11.8	.59	.73	.46	.57
My sleep was restless.	42.3	39.7	9.1	8.4	.71	.68	.49	.44
I could not get "going."	33.2	44.7	3.3	7.2*	.48	.68**	.51	.63*
I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.	32.6	28.3	5.5	4.2	.50	.43	.54	.56
I talked less than usual.	19.5	16.0	3.3	.8	.30	.22	.43	.52
Interpersonal								
People were unfriendly.	14.7	19.0	2.3	1.7	.22	.27	.24	.32
I felt that people disliked me.	15.6	14.8	2.3	2.1	.23	.24	.50	.53

NOTE: Telephone interviews denoted as *T*; in-person interviews denoted as *P*. One respondent in each interview method has been omitted due to excessive missing CES-D: telephone $N = 307$, in-person $N = 237$. Presence denotes the % scoring 1, 2, or 3. Persistence denotes the % scoring 3. Significance tests for presence and persistence were conducted jointly across the entire range of four response categories using the χ^2 statistic with 3 degrees of freedom. Significance tests for item means are *t*-tests with 542 degrees of freedom. Significance tests for corrected item-total correlations are Fisher *Z* transformations for Pearson correlation coefficients.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

INDIVIDUAL CES-D ITEMS

Comparison of responses to the 20 symptom items which comprise the CES-D for the two interview methods are presented in Table 2. The first four columns contrast the percent in each interview method

reporting the *presence* of the symptom (response codes 1,2,3) and the percent reporting the *persistence* of the symptom for most of the prior week (response code 3). Scoring for the positive affect items has been reversed so that presence and persistence refer to a *lack* of positive affect.

There is little apparent difference between the two interview methods for the percent reporting either the presence of individual symptoms or their persistence over time. As shown in Table 2, only 2 of the 20 item distributions significantly differed. Correcting for the fact that 20 tests have been made using a Bonferroni-type procedure (Dunn, 1961), however, we find that neither test is significant. The same overall comparability between interview methods is apparent in the item means shown in Table 2. Only 2 of the 20 item mean differences reach conventional levels of statistical significance, but neither exceeds the critical t-value of 3.03 for the Bonferroni-type correction for multiple significance tests.

As shown in Table 2, the corrected item-total correlations in the two interview methods are comparable, although they tend to be somewhat higher for the in-person method. None of the differences exceed the critical z-value of 3.02 for the Bonferroni-type correction for multiple tests. The internal consistency reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) is virtually identical: 0.91 in-person and 0.90 telephone.

CES-D SCALE

The overall lack of interview method differences for the individual items is reflected in the total scale distributions shown in Figure 1. The two distributions are virtually identical, although the range of response for the in-person method (0–50) is slightly greater than for the telephone method (0–45).

Scale means are slightly, but not significantly higher for the in-person than telephone interview (8.5 versus 8.0; $t(542) = 0.70$; ns). Similarly, the proportion classified as depressed (CES-D $\geq$ 16) is somewhat higher for the in-person than telephone method (17.3 percent versus 16.3 percent; $\chi^2(1) = 0.10$; ns). Method effects were also compared for two subscales of the CES-D: 16 negative symptoms (all symptoms except positive affect, see Table 2), and 4 positive affect symptoms. No significant differences were found between the in-person and telephone groups for either the negative symptoms subscale (6.8 versus 6.4; $t(542) = .62$; ns), or the positive affect subscale (1.8 versus 1.6; $t(542) = .76$; ns).



Figure 1. Frequency of CES-D Score by Type of Interview Among Adults Aged 18 Years and Older, Los Angeles, 1980

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC-METHOD INTERACTIONS

The overall lack of differences between the two interview methods may reflect counteracting differences among the various subgroups of the population which tend to offset one another. To assess this possibility, CES-D scores among various sociodemographic groups were compared as shown in Table 3.

For each sociodemographic characteristic, two-way analysis of variance indicated a significant main effect for the characteristic and no significant method effect. A differential method effect among subgroups may be assessed by the characteristic-method interaction term: in none of the comparisons is this term statistically significant. Of the 22 comparisons of subgroup mean differences by interview method, the one difference indicated in Table 3 is not statistically significant after making the Bonferroni-type adjustment.

The magnitude and direction of mean differences between the two interview methods, however, show considerable variation among groups. Specifically, mean differences between methods are large for

Table 3. Mean CES-D Scores for Selected Characteristics and Interview Method

	Method of Interview				*Mean Difference (T-H)*
	Telephone		*In-Person*		
	Mean	*N*	*Mean*	*N*	
Total	7.97	307	8.52	237	−.55
Sex					
Male	7.23	135	6.98*	103	.25
Female	8.55	172	9.71	134	−1.16
Age					
18–24	10.97	37	10.41**	41	.56
25–44	7.50	135	8.21	99	−.71
45–64	7.69	91	7.38	55	.31
65 and over	7.45	44	8.90	42	−1.45
Race/ethnicity					
White, non-Spanish	8.26	200	7.35**	132	.91
Hispanic	6.16	67	8.92	52	−2.76
Black	9.26	27	13.47	32	−4.21†
Other	10.08	13	7.38	21	2.70
Marital status					
Married	6.74	157	6.97**	125	−.23
Unmarried	9.25	150	10.26	112	−1.01
Employment status					
Employed	6.64	202	7.07**	150	−.43
Not employed	10.52	105	11.03	87	−.51
Education					
Less than high school	8.17	76	9.81*	62	−1.64
High school	9.50	121	9.29	95	.21
Some college or more	6.14	110	6.61	80	−.47
Income					
Less than $8,500	11.38	58	12.07**	45	−.69
$8,500–$13,999	9.08	61	8.93	44	.15
$14,000–$24,999	7.46	70	6.35	62	1.11
$25,000 or more	5.45	69	7.48	66	−2.03
Missing	6.82	49	9.80	20	−2.98

NOTE: Since the CES-D scale is highly skewed with a minimum value of zero, significance tests were performed on a logarithmic transformation of the scale score plus one. Raw score means are presented to facilitate the comparison to other data. Significance tests are F ratios from 2-way ANOVA. In no instance was the method main effect or method-characteristic interaction significant. For the main effect for the sociodemographic characteristics * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

† The mean difference between methods was significant at $p = .05$.

blacks and Hispanics: both score lower in the telephone than in-person interview. Additionally, the mean CES-D differential between the sexes is considerably larger among in-person than telephone respondents, with the difference between methods greater for women than for men.

RESPONSE CARD FOR TELEPHONE RESPONDENTS

Despite self-selection in the retention of the response card, a comparison of those with and without the list of response categories at the

time of the interview is instructive concerning the need for such aids in the administration of the CES-D in telephone interviews. No statistically significant differences in depression levels were found between those telephone respondents who had kept the response card and those who had not. Mean CES-D scores, the proportion classified as depressed, and the distribution of responses to the 20 individual items were comparable among the two groups. A comparison across the entire set of items, however, suggests that respondents without the list had a slight tendency to use the extreme response categories more often than those who had the response card.

Discussion

There appears to be little difference in responses to the CES-D between the telephone and in-person interview methods. The few statistically significant differences did not form a consistent pattern and were exceeded by the large number of nonsignificant results. Generally, there appears to be no difference between the two methods in nonresponse to symptom items, preference for specific response categories, reliability, mean level of depression, or proportion classified as depressed. No significant interactions of mode of interview with sociodemographic characteristics were found.

Although nonresponse to symptom items was slightly greater among telephone respondents, nonresponse does not seem to constitute a major problem in either interview method. The level of item nonresponse is comparable with that previously reported for the CES-D scale (Radloff, 1977; Roberts, 1980). The results are also consistent with other research reporting a tendency for nonresponse to specific questions to be greater in telephone than in-person interviews (Jordan et al., 1980; Groves and Kahn, 1979).

Some studies have reported a tendency for telephone respondents to give more extreme responses than in-person respondents (cf. Jordan et al., 1980), but this pattern was not found for the CES-D scale. This may result from the marked tendency for both sets of respondents to give extreme responses to the symptom items. Telephone respondents without the response card exhibited a slight tendency to give more extreme responses than those with the card, but the difference was not of sufficient magnitude to indicate that the use of the visual stimulus is necessary. However, for other checklist items where responses are typically less skewed, a response card may make a greater difference.

These results contrast with those of the one other study comparing depression by these two methods of interview. Henson et al. (1977)

report that telephone respondents scored significantly lower on the Lubin Depression Adjective Checklist than personal interview respondents and that the difference was attributable to the positive rather than the negative symptom subscale. In the present analysis of the CES-D scale, no significant mean differences were found between interview methods either for the total scale or for the positive or negative symptom subscales. The dependent variable in the previous study differs considerably from the CES-D both in the time frame (present day versus past week) and response categories which elicit the presence of the symptom (yes/no) rather than duration over time. While differences in response format may account for the divergent findings, the dichotomy of presence/absence of symptoms reported in Table 2 does not show major differences between the two interview methods.

Reported racial/ethnic group differences suggest the need for caution when conducting telephone interviews with minorities, particularly Hispanics. The mean level of depression among black and Hispanic telephone respondents was considerably lower than those of in-person respondents. This is potentially related to differential sample attrition after assignment to the interview method, since most nonrespondents without telephones were Hispanic (61.1 percent), and blacks were somewhat more likely to refuse the telephone interview. It might therefore be desirable to follow up such nonrespondents with either personal interviews or mail questionnaires.

The use of telephone interviews, either as the main or supplemental method of data collection, could substantially reduce the cost limitations of conducting large-scale, community-based epidemiologic studies of psychiatric disorder. This is particularly true of longitudinal surveys designed to estimate the incidence of disorder and to assess the impact of risk factors over time. Telephone reinterviews capitalize on the advantages of telephone interviews without introducing sample bias, since individuals without telephones can be reinterviewed with other methods. The comparability of the results between the telephone and in-person interviews should facilitate the use of the CES-D in community-based surveys of depression which utilize the telephone.

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A0610-1 6/22/82

POPQAE 46 (2) 143–300 (1982)
ISSN 0033–326X

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The Academic Mind at the Top: The Political Behavior and Values of Faculty Elites

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

This is the fourth of the Paul F. Lazarsfeld Lectures, presented annually under the auspices of the Center for the Social Sciences of Columbia University. It was delivered, in slightly different form, on February 12, 1982.

PAUL LAZARSFELD, who taught me almost everything I know about formulating research problems and analyzing empirical data, was the initiator of serious sociological study of the politics of academe, a topic that became the focus of renewed interest following the crisis of

Abstract Comparison of the findings from a 1979 sample of faculty members of the honorific academies and a 1977 national survey of American professors indicates that the former are more liberal politically than the latter, including those at the most distinguished institutions. This result is in line with a body of theory which suggests that intellectual creativity is associated with critical social views, and with earlier research which found that scholarly status among faculty generally is correlated with liberal political orientations. The relationship inverts, however, for questions bearing on the self-interest of academic achievers both within and outside of the university.

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The author is indebted to Everett Carll Ladd, with whom he has collaborated on a number of surveys of American faculty. Ladd and Lipset gathered data in 1977 and 1979, which provide the empirical basis for this article. Carl Kaysen, Chairperson of the Sloan Commission on Government and Higher Education, helped supply intellectual advice and funding for the project. James Scaminaci III served as research assistant for the article and contributed much to the analysis. Asoke Basu, Gary Marks, and Brenda McLean subjected the various drafts to critical evaluations which greatly informed the final version.

Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:143–168 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-143/$2.50

the university in the sixties and early seventies. His work on the subject came as a response to an earlier political crisis that affected the campus, attacks by Senator Joseph McCarthy and others on the integrity and loyalty of the professoriate. In characteristic fashion, Paul Lazarsfeld dropped his other activities in order to analyze how McCarthyism was affecting academic freedom. His major book on the topic (with Wagner Thielens, Jr.), *The Academic Mind*, published in 1958, greatly influenced my own work in the field, as attested to by the kind of quantitative evidence of which he would have approved: in *The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics*, written by Everett Ladd and myself, he is by far the most cited author.

My interest in the politics of intellectuals, particularly in their role as agents of change, began with studies of the political behavior of students and faculty which I published in the form of articles between 1957 and 1964 (Lipset, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1964). These were elaborated on during the 1970s in various writings (Lipset, 1970, 1972, 1976; Lipset and Dobson, 1972; Lipset and Basu, 1975) and in collaborative research with Everett Ladd (Ladd and Lipset, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1976a; and Lipset and Ladd, 1971, 1972).

The Politics of the Professoriate

In looking at the politics of the professoriate, a number of characteristics stand out: faculty members have been disproportionately critical of society, and more disposed than other strata to support forces that reject the status quo. A number of surveys of American professorial opinion, taken since World War II, have shown that, as a group, academics are more likely than any other occupational group, including manual workers, to identify their views as left or liberal, to support a wide variety of egalitarian social and economic policies, and to back small leftist third parties and/or vote Democratic. In American presidential elections of the last 30 years for which data on faculty opinion exist, the Democrats and left third parties received support from 63 percent of the professoriate, compared to 54.5 percent from the second most Democratic occupational stratum, the manual workers.[1]

Within the universities, two variables stand out as most predictive of faculty political orientation: discipline and status. Faculty in the liberal arts are more liberal politically than those in most professional schools. Professors in the social sciences and humanities stand to the left, followed by those in the biological and physical sciences. Busi-

[1] No surveys of academic opinion deal with the way faculty voted in 1960 and 1980.

ness, engineering, and agricultural school faculties form the conservative end of the profession. Status is also a powerful variable differentiating political views. Whatever indicator of academic position is employed—position of one's school in the pecking order of higher education, receipt of honors or research grants, or the number of publications to the academic's credit—the higher the achievement, the more liberal faculty members are politically.

Given the counterintuitive character of the finding that the more successful and privileged within academe hold the most liberal political views—a relationship that contradicts some of the most cherished views of those on the left and on the right—I would like to explore this association further by introducing preliminary results of a survey Ladd and I conducted among the academic elite, the elected members of the honorific societies. Before doing so, however, a summary of earlier research and efforts at theoretical explanations of the political orientations of faculty is in order.

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

In their 1955 national survey of reactions of social scientists to issues raised by McCarthyism, Lazarsfeld and Thielens found clear relationships between high scholarly achievement, liberal-left leanings, and activist politics. Those who ranked highest on various measures of accomplishment—such as rate of publication or office in professional associations—were more supportive of the civil liberties of Communists and other political minorities than the less prestigious professors. They also proved to be more inclined to activism, had a more liberal voting history, and were more likely to describe themselves as among the more liberal in academe (Lazarsfeld and Thielens, 1958: 16–17, 144–45, 161–63).[2]

The findings presented in *The Academic Mind* were reiterated for all faculty in a 1966 study by Edward Noll and Peter Rossi (1956:21), who found professors at major universities to be more liberal than their counterparts at institutions of lower scholarly standing. Their

[2] Although the Lazarsfeld and Thielens data were the first to demonstrate a relationship between academic achievements and political views and activities, earlier studies of faculty religious beliefs, conducted in 1913–1914 and again in 1933 by psychologist James Lueba—among members of the American Sociological Society and the American Psychological Association, along with physicists and biologists—revealed that the more distinguished professors, in both natural and social sciences, were much more irreligious than their less eminent colleagues. Not only did this relationship hold among broad categories, but when Lueba sought to separate out variations in opinion between the eminent and the tiny group of the most eminent he found even greater differences than between the eminent and the less prestigious scholars. In 1933, 5 percent of the most eminent were believers, compared to 20 percent of the eminent (Lueba, 1921, 1934, 1950).

results were supported by four national surveys of faculty opinions taken in 1969 by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, and in 1972, 1975, and 1977 by Everett Ladd and myself. Using a variety of indicators, these surveys also demonstrated that the more research-involved and high-achieving faculty were the most disposed to liberal-left views (Ladd and Lipset, 1976a).[3]

The findings that the most successful are the most left-inclined may seem even more counterintuitive when placed in the context of consulting activities and social origins. Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958: 151) reported that the most liberal scholars "furnished . . . the most men and women called in as consultants to business." Ladd and I (1976a:142–143) found a similar pattern among faculty at large with respect to consulting for government. Ironically, the more prestigious scholars, consulted because of their academic status, are also the most liberal. And their roles as consultants do not appear to affect their liberal views.

The more successful and more liberal academics also come from more privileged social backgrounds. Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958: 10, 26–27) reported that research "productivity and social origin are related. . . . professors who came from professional and managerial families were somewhat more successful than those who came from a lower economic and social stratum." Subsequent studies conducted by Ladd and myself (Lipset and Ladd 1979:324–25) revealed similar patterns 20 years later.

The relationships between scholarly status and political orientations reported by Lazarsfeld, Noll and Rossi, Ladd and myself, and Basu (1981) within a comparative context stand in sharp contrast to the assumptions of many radical critics of academe, both within and outside of the university, that a class theory of politics is as relevant for academe as it is for the larger society, where the successful and powerful are also the more conservative.

INTELLECTUALITY AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The data support an alternative theory of the politics of intellectuals, namely, that emphasis on creativity and originality is a concomitant of a reformist or radical approach to the established order. The function of the intellectual, as Carl Becker (1936: 3) noted, "is to increase rather than preserve knowledge, to undermine rather than to stabilize custom and social authority." Or, as Joseph

[3] Ladd and I presented reports on our 1975 and 1977 national faculty surveys in two series in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 35 articles published weekly between September 15, 1975 and May 24, 1976, and 7 published monthly between October 3, 1977 and April 24, 1978.

Schumpeter (1947:148) put it in commenting on the critical role of the humanists, "they quickly expanded into the fields of manners, politics, religion and philosophy . . . from the criticism of a text to the criticism of a society, the way is shorter than it seems." According to Thorstein Veblen (1934:226–27),

> The first requisite for constructive work in modern science, and indeed for any work of inquiry that shall bring enduring results, is a skeptical frame of mind. The enterprising skeptic alone can be counted on to further the increase of knowledge in any substantial fashion . . . [and] the skepticism that goes to make him an effectual factor in the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men involves a loss of that peace of mind that is the birthright of the safe and sane quietist.

More recently, C. P. Snow (1954:176) has stressed the criterion of innovation in distinguishing between natural sciences and engineering.

> The engineers . . . the people who made the hardware, who used existing knowledge to make something go, were in nine cases out of ten, conservatives in politics . . . interested in making their machine work, indifferent to long term social guesses. . . . Whereas, physicists, whose whole intellectual life was spent in seeking new truths, found it uncongenial to stop seeking when they had a look at society. They were rebellious, protestant, curious for the future and unstable to resist shaping it. The engineers buckled to their jobs and gave no trouble, in America, in Russia, in Germany; it was not from them but from the scientists, that came heretics, forerunners, martyrs, traitors.

A comparable thesis was put forth by Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958:161–63) in their effort to explain why faculty at high quality American schools hold the most liberal and left-wing views. Pointing out that such institutions house the more distinguished scholars, they said: "The original and creative minority among them will often have analytical minds which do not automatically accept current beliefs, minds willing to entertain unorthodox ideas as to how a modern society can best function."

Although conservatives, and in particular the academics among them, should be reluctant to accept the existence of an association between intellectual creativity and a liberal-to-left political orientation, one leading conservative, F. A. Hayek (1949:426–27), noted that "the more active, intelligent and original men among [American] intellectuals . . . most frequently incline toward socialism, while its opponents are often of an inferior calibre. . . ."

In seeking to explain the phenomenon, Hayek understandably rejected the hypothesis that the more creative and more intelligent are disposed to be leftists. Instead, he suggested that the more intelligent among the young who support the status quo seek out nonintellectual

occupations, while the "disaffected and dissatisfied" reject positions linked to the business system and are more inclined to find a career in the intellectual realm.

These hypotheses, advanced to account for the link between intellectual achievement and the propensity to "disturb the peace" of society, are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. Both Veblen and Hayek suggest that attributes of the mind that lead people to reject the established order are closely tied to those that foster scholarly or artistic activity.[4]

Some who find the assertion of a relationship between intellectual achievement and liberal political views disturbing have questioned the methodology of the research on faculty politics. Such critics have pointed out that national samples of academics or other occupational groups do not contain enough cases to permit an analysis of the elite of the profession, the small number at the very top who tend to be regarded by the media and by other elite groups as the spokespersons for their fields. Proponents of this argument suggest that such elite groups are part of the establishment and therefore more conservative than lower rank academics, that the correlation between academic achievement and political orientation is not linear but forms an inverted J curve in which the relationship is reversed at the upper levels. Ladd and I decided to deal directly with this question by surveying the opinions of the academic elite.

The Academies

The existence of major honorific societies—the National Academy of Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the National Academy of Education—provides an identifiable population of about 2,500 people, recognized as the intellectual leaders of academe. The study of the members of these groups was conducted in 1979, two years after our last general faculty survey.[5]

[4] It is doubtful, however, that the relationship between academic creativity and critical social views is solely a function of self-selection. Such a hypothesis cannot explain why the more conservative scholars are less successful than the more liberal ones.

[5] For reasons the details of which are not relevant, Ladd and I were forced to postpone the study of members of the academies until 1979, two years after our sampling of a national cross section of faculty. The 158 schools in the 1977 Ladd-Lipset survey were selected systematically from a list of 2,406 institutions of higher education. Individuals who were then sampled randomly within them received mail questionnaires. The response rate was 51.7 percent. The 1979 questionnaire was distributed to a random sample of the members of the five honorific societies. The response rate was 50 percent of those in the adjusted sample.

The professorial members of the academies are distinguishable from their colleagues in higher education generally, as well as from those in the most prestigious Tier 1 institutions that emphasize research and graduate training, along the same lines that differentiated the more achieving from the less achieving faculty in previous surveys.[6] They are more liberal on broad social and political issues, and more conservative on intramural issues. Those elected to the academies have also been much more involved than other faculty in the research culture, and have published a great deal more than professors in Tier 1 institutions.[7] Their background indicates a continuation of the re-

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The fact that the response rate to questionnaire surveys of faculty has been around 50 percent constitutes an obvious limitation. To estimate the bias, we held telephone interviews with a sample of 500, selected randomly from those who had not responded to the questionnaire in the 1975 study. To our surprise and pleasure, there was almost no difference between the replies of those who filled out the long questionnaires and the 95 percent of the sample of nonrespondents who answered a few queries on the telephone (Ladd and Lipset, 1981: 27). But we cannot be certain that the same pattern held true for the 1977 sample or for the members of the honorific societies in 1979.

[6] An index of institutional status was created for the schools from data drawn from the American Council on Education's 1973 Institutional Data File. The index encompasses three separate variables: *selectivity*—the average SAT scores of incoming freshmen; *affluence*—total institutional revenue adjusted to a per student basis; and *research*—expenditures for research, also adjusted for the number of students. Each college or university received a rating of between 1 and 9 on the three individual items. The raw score scale running from 3 to 27 was then collapsed for data analysis into four tiers, running from Tier 1 (highest) to Tier 4 (lowest).

[7] One-fourth of faculty in the academies (26 percent) say their interests lie "very heavily in research," 52 percent report an interest in both, but "leaning toward research," while only 10 percent state, "in both, but leaning toward teaching." A scant two percent indicate that their interests are "very heavily in teaching." Only 16 percent of Tier 1 faculty state their interests are "very heavily in research," although 45 percent are concerned with both, but lean towards research. Six percent report their primary concern as "very heavily in teaching." These relationships hold up when age and discipline groups are held constant. (The data for both groups are for ages 36–69.)

Two-thirds (67 percent) of the academic elite have written more than 50 articles over their total career; the comparable figure for Tier 1 faculty is 24 percent. Forty-four percent of the members of the academies have over a hundred articles to their credit, while 16 percent can list over 200.

The demonstrated linkage between quantity of publication and perceived quality (Cole and Cole, 1973: 92, 110–16; Cole, 1979: 115–30) is sustained by the relationship between self-reports on scholarly status provided by the members of the academies and their publication record. These self-descriptions correlate strongly with scholarly output. Among those who report that they are regarded as among the "few top-ranking people" in their fields, 56 percent had over 100 articles in print, compared to 44 percent of those who saw themselves as "far above average," and 28 percent of those who report a lesser status. The same pattern holds for number of writings accepted for publication during the previous two years. Only 34 percent of the self-described least prestigious had five or more accepted, compared to 55 percent of the "far above average" and 70 percent of the "few top-ranking people." The higher the recognition the members of the academies feel they receive from others in their "field of scholarship or scientific research," the more likely they are to say that they expect to make yet greater contributions in the future. This relationship holds up within age categories, even among those 60 or more years of age.

lationship, found among faculty generally, between scholarly status and higher social origins.[8]

The assumption of the radical critics that the achievers in academe are involved with the political and economic establishments is borne out by the data. They have participated much more than other professors in the decision-making levels of society—advising policy makers in national government and major corporations. One-fourth (25 percent) of the academic elite report having advised either the president or cabinet and subcabinet officers, or both. Over two-thirds (72 percent) of the members of the honorific societies, under 70 years of age, have served as consultants to federal government agencies. Close to half of them (47 percent) have advised large national corporations (see Table 1).

THE POLITICS OF THE ACADEMIC ELITE

A comparison of the politics of members of the academies and Tier 1 professors, based on five indicators of political orientation included in the 1979 and the 1977 surveys, indicates that the elite scholars are more liberal than others in the university world.[9] The members of the academies are more likely than Tier 1 faculty to identify themselves as left or liberal, to describe themselves as Democrats, to have voted for McGovern and Carter or left third-party candidates in 1972 and 1976, and to disagree with the statement that "the private business system in the United States works better than any other system

Table 1. Consultation Record[a]

	Faculty in the Academies	*Tier 1 Faculty*	*Tier 2 Faculty*	*Tier 3–4 Faculty*
National corporations	47%	26%	21%	16%
Federal government	72	35	24	17
Local business	16	17	18	21
Local government	11	14	16	18
(*N*)	(375)	(737)	(795)	(867)

[a] 36–69 years of age.

[8] Controlling for age, members of the academies are of higher class origins, more likely to be of professional family backgrounds, and less prone to be of manual worker origin than the 1977 faculty in Tier 1 schools. Faculty offspring do best of all. Among the members of the academies, aged 36 to 69, 9 percent had college teacher fathers, compared to 6 percent among Tier 1 faculty of corresponding age.

[9] When comparing findings from the two samples, the data are restricted to those 36–69 years of age. None of the members of the academies are younger than 36, while 19 percent of the faculty sampled in 1977 are under 34. Conversely, 24 percent of those in the honorific societies are over 70, while almost none of the 1977 faculty are. The 30 percent of those in the academies who do not teach at universities are not included in the analysis.

devised for advanced industrial societies." The relationships hold up when age is held constant (see Table 2).

These differences are congruent with the earlier evidence of a relationship between academic accomplishment and liberal political views. The findings do not yield comfort to those who argue that academics in the establishment are more conservative than the rest of the profession, that for the tiny group at the very top the relationship between intellectual achievement and political orientation is inverted because of their direct ties to those who run the economy and polity of the country.

The academic elite is liberal rather than radical, although it includes a larger proportion of people than in the general population willing to identify themselves as left of center or to entertain radical proposals. Those in the academies are much more likely to describe their political ideology as "left" or "liberal" than adult Americans generally.[10]

Table 2. The Politics of the Professoriate

	Faculty in the Academies			*Tier I Faculty*		
	Age			*Age*		
Political Indicators	*36–49*	*50–59*	*60–69*	*36–49*	*50–59*	*60–69*
Liberal or left[a]	56%	49%	46%	51%	41%	42%
Democrat	74.5	76	70.5	61	59	56
McGovern or left candidate 1972[b]	67	67	61	59	50	45.5
Carter or left candidate 1976[b]	76	73	68	61	60	54
Disagree: "The private business system in the U.S. works better than any other system devised for advanced industrial society."	26	27	17	20	13	7
Average liberal response	60	58	52.5	50	45	41
(*N*)	(58)	(143)	(138)	(500)	(225)	(121)

[a] "Would you describe your overall political inclinations as (seven choices from "far left" to "far right"). Liberal or left are those who responded "far left," "very liberal," or "somewhat liberal."

[b] One of the options was "'Left' third party candidate."

[10] Forty-five percent of the faculty members of the academies classified themselves as left or liberal. Surveys of the general population conducted about the same time by Gallup and NORC and other polling agencies reported percentages in the high teens identifying themselves as left, very liberal, or liberal.

The comparison between the members of the honorific societies and Americans generally reduces the difference between them, since those in the academies are much older on average than a sample of adults, and older faculty tend to be more conservative than younger. As indicated in Table 2, 56 percent of members of the academies under 50 years of age identify their political orientation as left or liberal, a proportion that is about three times as great as among those of the same age in the population at large.

Sixteen percent of the faculty members of the academies agreed with the statement: "The United States would be better off if it moved toward socialism."

Perhaps the strongest evidence of a linear correlation between scholarly accomplishments and political opinion is the finding that the relationship holds true *within* the small group of scholars who have been elected to the academies. A comparison based on varying self-perceptions of scholarly recognition reveals that 47 percent of those who see their status as among the "few top-ranking people" or as "far above average" are liberals, as opposed to 37 percent of the members of the academies with lower self-evaluations, "above average" or "average." The latter group also includes a much larger proportion of people than the self-perceived more prestigious, who voted for Nixon in 1972 or Ford in 1976. The relationship between academic status and liberal views also holds when recent publication record is taken as the indicator of achievement. The percentage of self-identified conservatives declines from 27, among those who have had less than five writings accepted for publication in the last two years, to 18, for those who have had five or more prospective or actual publications in this period.

An examination of the political views of those who consult for national corporations and the federal government is in line with earlier findings. As a group they are liberals rather than conservatives, and Democrats rather than Republicans. Among those who voted in 1972 and 1976, the majority were for McGovern, Carter, or a left third-party candidate. The small group (7 percent) that only consulted for national corporations includes the same proportion of conservatives as liberals (33 percent). Yet even these voted overwhelmingly for McGovern and for Carter rather than for Nixon and Ford, respectively (see Table 3).

It is impossible to tell from these data precisely how links to business or government affect the basic political orientations of scholars involved with them. Perhaps the more conservative faculty choose to work with business, while the more liberal opt for government, or refuse to become involved with either institution. In any case, business largely draws for advice upon those in fields whose members are more conservative.[11] Fully 69 percent of those who only consult for

[11] Discipline is a major factor differentiating the political views of the academic elite as well as those of the faculty generally. A comparison of the responses to the five political indicators, presented in Table 3, indicates that the variations correspond to those reported in the various faculty surveys. The rank-order running from most liberal to most conservative has been: the social sciences, the humanities, the life sciences, including medicine, the physical sciences, and lastly, engineering and business, who are the most conservative by far. Ladd and I (1976a: 55–124) have discussed the relationship between discipline and politics in some detail.

Table 3. Relationship Between Political Views and Consultant Activities Among Members of the Academies[a]

	Consultant To:			
Political Views	*Federal Gov't and National Corp.*	*National Corp. Only*	*Federal Gov't Only*	*Neither*
Political inclinations				
Liberal or left	40%	33%	48%	46%
Moderate	27.5	28	21	23
Conservative	24	33	21	13
Party identification				
Democrat	61	58	66	60
Republican	22	22	16	14
1972 vote				
McGovern	55	58	63	54
Nixon	30	28	19	15
1976 vote				
Carter	63	61	67.5	61
Ford	27	31	19	14
"The private business system in the U.S. works better than any other system yet devised for advanced societies."				
Strongly agree	32	33	20	16
Disagree	17	8	28	21
"The U.S. would be better off if it moved toward socialism."				
Agree	14	17	24	17
Strongly disagree	47	56	29	24
"Overall, there is too much government regulation in the U.S. of private business."				
Strongly agree	24	25	14	10
Strongly disagree	2	3	12	10
(*N*)	(182)	(36)	(154)	(119)

[a] All members of the academies who report faculty positions.

national corporations come from engineering, business schools, and the natural sciences. Conversely, 76 percent of members of the academies who only advise the federal government are in the humanities and the social and life sciences. Not surprisingly, humanists are the least likely by far to serve as consultants to either institution.

The perception that academe leans to the left is not only a function of the most distinguished faculty being the most liberal. Those who identify themselves as left-of-center are more likely than other scholars to try to influence public policy. Thus, among the scholarly elite, 54 percent of the self-identified liberals, 43 percent of the moderates, and 33 percent of the conservatives responded "yes" to the question: "Have there been occasions when *you have sought*, as an 'outsider,'

to influence some aspect of public policy, rather than your being sought out for advice and counsel?"

ISSUES OF SELF-INTEREST

Although the top-ranked scholars are more liberal than other faculty on questions of political ideology, party identification, voting record, and attitudes toward business, their privileged and successful status affects their opinions in a conservative direction on issues that touch on their own self-interest both outside of and within the university. Those in the academies are less likely than faculty in Tier 1 schools (20 to 29 percent) to agree with the statement: "There should be a top limit on incomes so that no one can earn very much more than others." The same tendency holds for answers to a question which asks respondents to rank themselves on a seven-point scale running from "*Equality of opportunity:* giving each person an equal chance for a good education and to develop his or her ability" at one end, to "*Equality of results:* giving each person a relatively equal share of income and status regardless of education and ability" at the other. Those who have reached the top in the race for intellectual prestige are more likely than Tier 1 professors to opt for the extreme end point of equality of opportunity (35 to 30 percent).

This pattern of greater conservatism of the academic elite on questions that deal with income inequality also shows up in their reactions to campus unionism. Earlier research on faculty attitudes and behavior indicated that although a left-liberal political orientation is strongly related to support for campus unionism, status in academe is more decisive on such matters. Faculty at the less prestigious schools, those with the highest teaching loads, have been most disposed to support unions, while scholars at major centers of research have opposed collective bargaining with its potential limitations on their ability to bargain individually (Ladd and Lipset, 1973; 1976b; 1976c; 1976d; 1978a; 1978b). Given this background, it is not surprising that faculty elected to the academies are more opposed to unionism on campus than Tier 1 professors.[12]

A direct comparison between attitudes toward intramural and ex-

[12] Among respondents 36–69 years of age, 30 percent of the members of the academies feel that "collective bargaining by faculty" has a "place in a college or university," compared to 46 percent of Tier 1 faculty and 55 percent of those in Tier 3 and 4 institutions. Thirty-two percent of the scholarly elite agree that "union grievance procedures serve to protect the faculty against arbitrary action by administration officials," as contrasted to 55 percent of Tier 1 professors and 67 percent of those in Tiers 3 and 4. Within each level of academe, the more liberal are more disposed to give pro-union answers than the more conservative. (For a discussion of the factors associated with support of campus unionism, see Ladd and Lipset, 1973.)

tramural issues is made possible by questions on government regulation of academic and business institutions. Since most regulations have been designed to foster liberal social objectives—affirmative action for women and minorities, job safety, elimination of pollution—while limiting the freedom of those who dominate major institutions, the debate over the utility of these social policies has tended to divide liberals from conservatives. Higher education has not only been subject to many of the same regulations that affect business, it has also been exposed to a variety of rules bearing on research activities and has been required to devote considerable resources to ensure that it is conforming to government policies. These requirements have occasioned a great deal of criticism from within the university. Researchers have been particularly sensitive to, and critical of, regulations that they feel limit their freedom.

The academic elite opposes regulation both within and outside the university (Table 4). But, as expected, there are many more who endorse government control of business than favor regulation of the

Table 4. Attitudes of Members of the Academies Toward Government Regulation (N = 491)

Attitudes	*Agree*	*Disagree*
I. *Toward business*		
1. "Overall, there is too much government regulation in the U.S. of private business."	52[a]	36
2. "Current federal and state regulation in such areas as product safety and environmental protection achieves social benefits that outweigh their financial costs."	56	31[a]
3. "Current federal and state regulation in such areas as product safety and environmental protection imposes an excessive burden on consumers."	40.5[a]	41
II. *Toward universities*		
4. "Overall, there is too much governmental regulation in the U.S. of higher education."	67[a]	21
5. "Current federal regulations [dealing with the university] make positive contributions toward legitimate social goals, i.e., they produce real social benefits through regulation of research."	20	51[a]
6. "The costs of the current federal regulations—in terms of the financial burden on institutions of higher education, harm to education itself, or harm to academic research—are outweighed by the social benefits which are produced [by regulation of research]."	16	56[a]
7. "Independent of any financial burden they may produce, current federal regulations are harming the educational process of colleges and universities, or are harming academic research [through regulation of research]."	55[a]	18
8. "The cost, in terms of dollars and man-hours, of current federal regulations constitutes a burden on institutions of higher education [due to regulation of research]."	67[a]	8.5

[a] Antiregulation response.

universities. The only item in the survey to elicit a majority favorable to regulation was: "Current federal and state regulation in such areas as product safety and environmental protection achieve social benefits that outweigh their financial cost."

Ideology linked to academic status has a strong influence on the way members of the academies react to regulation. The liberal and more achieving tend disproportionately to favor regulation of business while opposing government controls of the university. Just under two-thirds (66 percent) of those who take this position classify themselves as liberals. Liberals also figure heavily among persons who favor regulation of both institutions (72 percent). Conversely, moderates and conservatives constitute a considerable majority among the large group that opposes regulation of both (64 percent), or the small one that supports regulation of the university, but not of business (69 percent).

The upper range of academe may be the most liberal when it comes to opinions about social institutions generally, but as with other groups in the population, ideology has its limitations when it affects self-interest. As Clark Kerr once noted: "Few institutions are so conservative as the universities about their own affairs while their members are so liberal about the affairs of others . . ." (Kerr, 1966: 99).

RESSENTIMENT IN ACADEME

Although faculty at lower levels of academe are more conservative in their reactions to extramural political issues than those at higher status institutions, the less achieving faculty exhibit a great deal of *ressentiment* toward scholars who have been more successful than themselves. Those who are much more involved in teaching than research, who have published less, and who earn less, are more prone to explain success within their profession in invidious terms, to see the cards stacked unfairly in favor of those at the top.

Both the 1979 survey of members of the academies and the 1977 study of a national cross section of faculty posed a series of questions dealing with the reasons why "top people in my field are successful" (see Table 5).

Among the faculty at large, the higher the status of their institution and the more they have published, the more likely they are to accept noninvidious explanations of academic achievement. The "top people," those elected to the academies, are disposed to see their success primarily as a function of intellectual ability (see Table 5). They are much less likely than other faculty to identify high scholarly status with being "more effective operators" or "more effective pro-

Table 5. Reasons for Success in Academe[a]

The Top People in My Field Are Successful Because:	*Agree with Statement*			
	Faculty in the Academies	*Tier 1 Faculty*	*Tier 2 Faculty*	*Tier 3–4 Faculty*
"They are more effective 'operators' than others."	43.5%	60%	65%	68%
"They have had many advantages."	49	49	53	58
"They are brighter than most others."	87	75	68	57
"They are more effective promoters of their careers."	71	88	88	90
"They have done more important research."	91	78	69	60
"They have had sponsors who helped them."	64	72	71	74
(*N*)	(375)	(846)	(988)	(1186)

[a]36–69 years of age.

moters of their careers." Conversely, they are more prone to see the academically successful as being "brighter than most others" and having "done more important research."

In spite of the correlations between status and attitudes toward sources of success, there is a considerable degree of consensus in the responses to most of the items. An overwhelming number of those in the lower tier institutions accept the proposition that "the top people are successful" because "they are brighter" and "have done more important research." And a large majority of the scholarly elite recognize the importance of sponsorship and effective career promotion in attaining high academic status.

But the *ressentiment* of the nonelite against the successful, evident in their responses to the "effective 'operators' " item, shows up even more dramatically in the answers to three questions dealing with the system of awarding research grants. The less achieving tend to attribute their own lack of success to a system of research grants in which the rich get richer and the poor stay poor. The relationship between academic status and opinion is among the highest in these data. Only 12 percent of members of the academies agree that the " 'peer review' system . . . is unfair," that it "favors members of the 'old boy' network," compared to 42.5 percent of those at Tier 1 universities and 70 percent of faculty at Tier 3 and 4 schools. A similar small proportion of elite scholars (11 percent) feel that "past work" should not count in evaluating applications for funds, a position taken by 30 percent of Tier 1 faculty and 57 percent of those in the two bottom tiers (see Table 6).[13]

[13] Three researchers who evaluated the National Science Foundation's peer review

Table 6. Attitudes to the Research Granting System[a]

Attitudes	*Faculty in the Academies*	*Tier 1 Faculty*	*Tier 2 Faculty*	*Tier 3–4 Faculty*
I. "Eminent scientists and scholars are more likely to receive research grants than others who submit proposals of about the same quality."				
Strongly agree	34%	53%	64%	68%
Agree with reservations	47	36.5	28	24.5
Disagree with reservations	9	6	3	2
Strongly disagree	2	2	0.4	0.7
II. "The past work ('track record') of scholars and scientists should *not* count in appraising their applications for funds, only the quality of the proposals should be considered."				
Strongly agree	1	12	19	27
Agree with reservations	10	18	24	30
Disagree with reservations	33	39	38	29
Strongly disagree	50	29	15	9
III. "The 'peer review' system of evaluating proposals for research grants is, by and large, unfair; it greatly favors members of the 'old boy' network."				
Strongly agree	2	12.5	21	29
Agree with reservations	10	30	39	41
Disagree with reservations	34	34	28	20
Strongly disagree	46	21	8	5
(*N*)	(375)	(846)	(988)	(1,186)

[a] 36–69 years of age.

The only surprising aspect of the association between academic status and attitudes toward the equity of the research granting system is its strength. Even more startling is the finding that similar relationships hold up among the members of the honorific societies. Those lower in productivity are more likely to think the system is unfair. Forty-one percent of those who have published less than 100 articles strongly agree that eminent scientists are more likely to get research grants for applications of comparable quality; only 30 percent of the academic elite who have published more agree to this. And 49 percent of scholars high in article output strongly disagree that the "peer review" system is unfair, that it "favors members of the 'old boy network,' " while 38 percent of those who have less than 100 articles

system, through an examination of the outcomes of research proposals, report that because "proposals from eminent scientists do not have substantially higher probabilities of receiving favorable ratings than proposals from scientists who are not eminent, we concluded that the peer review system employed by NSF was essentially free of systematic bias" (Cole et al., 1981: 881).

in print feel this way.[14] These patterns also hold up with respect to variations in grant-obtaining record.[15]

NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES

The reactions of the members of the academies to nuclear power permit a case study of the way in which political values affect opinions on a controversial science-based policy issue. To examine how scholars react to an issue in which the scientific consensus differs from the liberal consensus, the survey of the academic elite included questions on nuclear power. Scientific research appears to conclude that nuclear reactors are safe, while liberal fears about the dangers let loose on the world by splitting the atom have fostered a strong suspicion of, if not antagonism toward, efforts to use nuclear energy for any purpose.

The controversy over the effects of low-level ionizing radiation has brought biologists, chemists, physicists, engineers, and other scientists directly into the nuclear regulatory process. The antinuclear power movement has charged that nuclear power plants are inherently dangerous; that societal risks of a nuclear catastrophe, such as a meltdown, outweigh any potential energy gains from the use of nuclear reactors. The list of charges against nuclear power plants is nearly endless and encompasses the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from mining to storage/disposal of post-fission waste products.

The National Academy of Sciences accepts the assumption that there are no safe dose levels. But its reports have concluded that the dangers of low-level radiation have been exaggerated by opponents of nuclear power (Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Reactions, 1980). A 1978 American Physical Society study indicates that safe and efficient methods of storing and/or disposing of waste products are technically feasible (Hebel, 1978).

The 1979 survey posed two questions related to the possible risks of nuclear reactors and their value as an energy source:

1. The risk of nuclear accidents outweighs the potential advantage to be gained from building nuclear power plants.

[14] Publication record differentiates attitudes on these items within each level as well. Within each tier, the more faculty have published, the more they perceive the granting system to be equitable. And the lower the tier, the more critical the response among those with similar rates of scholarly output.

[15] Scholars in the academies who have received grants from federal agencies are less likely (32 percent) than those who have never secured government funding (41.5 percent) to strongly agree that the eminent have a better chance than others to receive research grants for proposals of comparable quality. Similarly, 45 percent of those with federal funding strongly disagree that the peer review system is unfair, compared to 19.5 percent among those in the academic elite who have not received government grants.

II. Building nuclear power plants is the best means of increasing U.S. energy resources.

The members of the academies overwhelmingly disagreed with the first statement; only 22 percent accepted the view that the risk outweighs the gains from nuclear power, while 67.5 percent rejected it. They were more divided as to whether nuclear power is the best way to secure more energy resources: 49 percent thought so, compared to 41 percent opposed.

One would expect opinions on nuclear power plants to be related to political inclinations and subject area. On the basis of survey data and the body of literature relating political ideology to environmental concerns among the general public, it should follow that the more liberal the scholar, the greater his or her opposition to nuclear power. The assumption holds up among the scholarly elite generally. Just under three quarters (73 percent) of the conservatives believe that nuclear power is the best available source of increased energy, compared to 46.5 percent of the liberals. More liberals than conservatives (33 to 13.5 percent) say that the risks outweigh the potential gains.

Because of the more direct working knowledge they possess, natural scientists and engineers are better able than social scientists and humanists to draw reliable and valid inferences from the available evidence in this sphere. Ideology, therefore, should have less effect on their judgments than on the opinions of those working in the latter disciplines.[16] Given the scientific consensus in favor of nuclear power, one would expect that the more committed scholars are to research rather than to teaching, the greater the likelihood that their views will reflect the judgment of the research community.

The differences in the views of the discipline groups correspond to the hypotheses that those more linked to scientific inquiry and committed to research will be more supportive of nuclear power (see

[16] The assumption that the impact of researchers' values on their work differs by the "hardness" or "softness" of the disciplines is borne out by the reports of faculty themselves. Social scientists, at every level of academe, are much more likely to agree with the statement "My choice of research problems has been strongly affected by my social values" than are natural scientists. Among those in the academies, only 18 percent of the humanists and 20 percent of the social scientists replied "definitely no," compared to 76 percent of physical scientists, 69 percent of life scientists, and 47 percent of engineers. Scholars in every discipline are less disposed to agree that "my research findings have been strongly affected by my social values." But even this statement finds a sizable minority of social scientists (34 percent) and of humanists (20 percent) in partial or full agreement that their values affect their results. The corresponding percentages for physical scientists are 4, for life scientists, 5.5, and for engineers, 16. It is noteworthy that 53–54 percent of the humanists did not answer these questions, while no answers constituted 5 percent or less for the other discipline categories.

Table 7). There is, however, some variation with respect to the degree of endorsement to the two questions. Social scientists resemble natural scientists in overwhelmingly rejecting the statement that the risks involved in nuclear power outweigh the advantages. The social scientists appear much more disposed than the humanists to accept what appears to be scientific consensus.

The second statement, however, which notes that building nuclear plants is the *best* way to increase energy resources, has much less publicized scientific prestige behind it. Some feel nuclear power is reasonably, but not absolutely, safe, and therefore favor increasing alternative energy sources: solar, windmills, coal, etc. On this issue, social scientists, though still more favorable to nuclear power than humanists, are much closer to the latter in their response patterns, while the life scientists are nearer to the physical scientists.

Among the members of the academies, regardless of discipline, the greater the commitment to research, the more favorable the attitude toward nuclear power on both questions. Even within the sciences and engineering, those who report a strong preference for research rather than teaching are more pronuclear than individuals with greater teaching interests.

Ideological orientation correlates with opinion on these issues much more highly among those in the life and social sciences and the humanities than it does for those in the physical sciences and engineering. On the whole, political inclinations account for much less of the variance in attitudes toward nuclear power than does academic discipline. Those who have firsthand familiarity with the topic—engineers or physical scientists—are most supportive. Those with the least familiarity—humanists and social scientists—are least posi-

Table 7. Discipline Groups and Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power[a]

Attitudes	*Engineering*	*Physical Sciences*	*Life Sciences*	*Social Sciences*	*Humanities*
I. "The risk of nuclear accidents outweighs the potential advantage to be gained from building nuclear power plants."					
Agree	14	14	23	18	45
Disagree	82.5	76	69	73	43
II. "Building nuclear power plants is the best means of increasing U.S. energy resources."					
Agree	75	59	57	38	24
Disagree	21	32	35	52	62
(*N*)	(57)	(105)	(108)	(71)	(76)

[a] All members of the academies who report faculty positions.

tive, more disposed to reflect their general ideological orientations. The life sciences fall between these two clusters.

Conclusion

In a letter to the New Left at the beginning of the 1960s, C. Wright Mills (1963:259) emphasized the role of the intellectuals as agents of radical change. Lionel Trilling (1965:xii–xiii) also called attention to their "adversary" role, to the effort of the modern intellectual "to judge and condemn, and perhaps revise, the culture that has produced him." The emphasis on intellectual creativity as a source of anti-establishment views, stressed in this paper, does not, of course, completely account for the disproportionate number of intellectuals in most Western countries who are on the left politically. Some students of the subject have suggested there is an inherent conflict between the market values of the business classes and the emphasis placed by intellectuals on meeting the standards of their fields. Others point to a concern by scholars over the discrepancy between their professional self-esteem and the economic rewards they secure, which are significantly smaller than those received by persons in the upper levels of business (Lazarsfeld and Thielens, 1958:12–13; Lipset, 1960:318–19, 322–23).

The antagonism to business may help to explain why, as Richard Hofstadter (1963:39) noted, the political weight of American intellectuals, including leading academics, had been disproportionately on the progressive and liberal side for almost all of the preceding 75 years. And although leftist radical parties have not secured more than 2 percent of the vote since 1920, or more than one percent since 1932, professors have been much more likely than other occupational groups to support them. Even today, sociologist Bogdan Denitch, a leader of the largest socialist group in the United States, the Democratic Socialists, reports that about a sixth of the membership of his organization are college professors, including one Nobel Prize winner in economics, three former presidents of the American Political Science Association, and three former heads of the American Sociological Association. Two of the three social scientists at the Institute for Advanced Study are socialists. In economics, the most conservative field within the social sciences, the Union of Radical Political Economists reports 2,000 members, which is equivalent to 10 percent of the membership of the American Economic Association. And though most faculty are not socialists, a highly disproportionate number of them continue to figure among the left-of-center forces, largely liberal Democrats, who are the equivalent, within the Ameri-

can political spectrum, of the European social democratic or socialist parties.

The focus here on the presence of reformist orientations among faculty does not mean that they reject the norms of American society. Rather, as I have emphasized in various writings, the dominant national values are liberal rather than conservative (Lipset, 1979:74–90, 96–98). American socialist intellectual Leon Samson (1933:1–90) and Polish sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski (1963:114) have even argued that the basic assumptions of Americanism, economic relationships apart, are highly similar to those of socialism: the stress on the inherent dignity and the right to respect of all individuals regardless of class position and the belief in equality of opportunity. Michael Harrington (1972:118), the leader of the Democratic Socialists, who agrees with Samson that Americanism as an ideology is a surrogate socialism, has pointed out that "in the United States equality, and even classlessness, the creation of wealth for all and political liberty were extolled in the public schools."

The academic elite and the professoriate in general are strongly committed to this constellation of values. However, there is an inherent tension within academia between the commitment to a society's values and the role of the intellectual as social conscience and social critic. While professing support for equality of opportunity, academics have been highly critical of the distribution of power, authority, and status in the United States.

The political behavior of the American academic elite is in harmony with the expectations of Veblen, Hayek, Lazarsfeld, Snow, Schumpeter, and others, that the most distinguished scholars should be more socially critical than those of lesser achievement. At the same time, however, the highly successful professors behave like most other people when it comes to issues of immediate self-interest (although even on these, the more liberal are least likely to do so).

How does this pattern, one may rightfully ask, fit in with the fact that some well-known professors have become neo-conservatives and that a number of important academics give support and advice to the Reagan administration (Lipset, 1981)?

Milton Friedman, an unabashed conservative (classical liberal) and advocate of laissez-faire free market economics, has proposed an explanation for the seeming growth of conservatism within the academic elite that does not challenge the underlying argument presented here. He suggests that New Deal liberalism, or in his own field of economics, Keynesian theory, became the conventional wisdom of the intellectuals, the establishment position, following World War II. Friedman contends that given the assumption, with which he agrees,

that the more creative scholars tend to reject dominant views, the innovators in contemporary America should be conservatives, opponents of the welfare-planning state.[17]

Although in line with Friedman's assumptions, many of the most influential younger scholars in his own discipline, economics, are supporters of varying forms of antistatist free-market doctrines, there is no quantitative evidence to demonstrate that there are more conservatives among prominent scholars today than there were in the past. Leftist critics of an assumed right-wing trend within the professoriate have suggested that it is a function of recent threats to the self-interests of academe, particularly of its elite, such as the challenge to authority and status by student radicals and younger leftist faculty, the impact of the regulatory state on the freedom to do research, the threat posed by affirmative action programs to the position of white males and of Jews, and the growth of faculty unionism, which could be used to constrain the power of senior professors.

Those scholars who have moved in a more conservative direction, on the other hand, see their behavior as a response to larger social and political developments that undermined their faith in traditional left doctrines. These include a concern with the way turmoil on the campus in the sixties and early seventies appeared to challenge democratic norms and academic values, the failure of the economy to conform to Keynesian expectations, and the apparent malfunctioning of statist interventionist policies in democratic welfare societies.

These varying interpretations are, of course, linked to ideology. It is doubtful that the political shift to the right they purport to explain actually has occurred, except among a small number of intellectuals whose activities are highly publicized. The same can be said for assertions about growth of conservatism among Jews (Fisher, 1981). Both academics and Jews, like most groups, move right and left in tandem with fluctuations in the population generally. But opinion surveys have consistently shown that Jews are more liberal than any other white ethnic groups. A disproportionate number of those who are labeled neo-conservative are intellectuals and Jews, but this is also true for New and Old Leftists. And among both the faculty generally and the scholarly elite, Jews show up much more than non-Jews on the left side of the spectrum. Similarly, recent studies of

[17] Scholars have contributed disproportionately to the ranks of the opposition to socialism in countries such as Israel and Sweden, governed until recently by Social Democrats, as well as in various Communist nations. In pre-Nazi Germany, many professors and university students supported the extreme right.

faculty, including of their elite, reveal they have remained much more left-of-center than other occupational strata.

Whatever the sources of the anti-establishment views of intellectuals, the academic community in America and in most other developed democratic societies has been on the left (Basu, 1981). And both in the American university world generally, and for the members of the elite honorific societies in particular, the relationship between scholarly productivity and recognition and liberal-left political positions is linear. Older professors may be more conservative than younger ones, but the relationship between achievement and liberal opinions holds within each age category.

The persistence of a left-liberal orientation among American intellectuals and professors suggests that we may be dealing with a cultural trait, the understanding of which requires a more comprehensive analysis than exists at present. Andrew Greeley (1970) has proposed that intellectuals be viewed as a minority ethnic group, one which has a fully developed subculture and which sees itself as different from, and somewhat at odds with, the dominant society.

Paul Lazarsfeld once discussed this phenomenon. In a conversation we had in 1955, he commented on a visit he had just made to a minor state university in the mountain states. He had been surprised to find that the general political atmosphere was quite similar to that of Columbia University. I suggested that this was less extraordinary than appears at first sight, if one regarded the campus in the same light as the East European Jewish *shtetl*. Before World War I, one could travel over a thousand miles from a *shtetl* in Galicia to one in the Ukraine and still be in the same place. Similarly, it is possible to go from university to university across the American continent and take up the same conversation with an interchangeable group of colleagues, although the atmosphere would be somewhat more conservative at the less prestigious institutions. But moving a half mile away from the *shtetl* or the campus brings the traveler to a totally different world.

The *shtetl* and the campus are complex differentiated societies. But each has a basic culture that does not change easily. To understand fully the nature of academic society we need to articulate its internal structure and values, its relations with external forces, the ways newcomers are recruited and socialized, and the varying mechanisms which enable the culture to persist while adjusting to changes in its environment.

Paul Lazarsfeld engaged in this type of analysis as well. He and Thielens (1958: 14) noted that "professors . . . seem to consider themselves as an occupational minority toward which significant

sectors of the community hold relatively contemptuous attitudes."[18] They (1958: 31) reported that the "main social contacts [of most faculty] are confined to the university." And they (1958: 163) went on to describe the process by which "a competent teacher" or a "productive research scholar," outside of "the original and creative minority," comes to be more liberal than those outside of academe. "Even if he might be by nature more amenable to the general currents of public opinion, he is more directly in communication with the leaders of his profession, and his thinking is shaped by the process of mutual interaction. . . . Thus, he too will add to a . . . liberal climate."

As Ladd and I wrote in the dedication to our book, *The Divided Academy:* "Paul F. Lazarsfeld . . . showed the way in studying the academic mind."

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[18] Melvin Seeman (1958: 27) reporting on a study based on intensive and unstructured interviews with 40 social scientists and humanists notes that they "use the language and mechanisms of minority status to describe themselves and their situation."

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Public Attitudes Toward Freedom of the Press

JOHN IMMERWAHR AND JOHN DOBLE

OVER the past several years, a number of court cases and other controversies have focused national attention on the rights and responsibilities of the media as defined by the First Amendment. However, despite the importance of freedom of the press, and the attention drawn to it by questions ranging from the Pentagon papers to the publication of H-bomb secrets to the rights of reporters to protect their sources, there has been relatively little work on public attitudes in this area. In this article we attempt to spell out a picture of public opinion about the media's rights and responsibilities. Our findings are part of a project on communications policy conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy organization founded by Daniel Yankelovich and Cyrus Vance.

Abstract This article presents findings on a study of public attitudes toward the rights and responsibilities of the media. Public thinking about freedom of the press appears to be dominated by a principle of fairness. Specifically, people want and expect the communications media to provide equal coverage to opposing political candidates and to present both sides of controversial issues. Despite other studies showing a lack of political tolerance, the public is willing to permit considerable diversity in the points of view that are presented in the media. Although the public rejects many proposals for censorship laws, it does support "fairness-enhancing" laws. The authors hypothesize that the public's perspective on freedom of the press grows out of its role as listeners rather than as speakers.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:177–194 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-177/$2.50

Methodology

The project employed three different types of research.

1. *Elite interviews.* Between June 15, 1979 and February 29, 1980, staff members conducted 57 open-ended interviews with nationally prominent journalists, editors, publishers, interest group leaders, corporate executives and government officials. Since the purpose of the project was to assist policy makers in decision making, these interviews were used to narrow the research focus into areas with the greatest relevance to contemporary policy debates.

2. *Qualitative interviews.* During August and September of 1979, and again in March of 1980, a series of open-ended, qualitative interviews were conducted with members of the general public; these interviews consisted of 6 focus group sessions with about 10 persons in each, and 25 depth interviews with individuals selected to meet certain specified demographic criteria. The qualitative research was conducted in five cities: New York, Des Moines, Memphis, San Diego, and Minneapolis, and its primary purpose was to generate hypotheses to be tested in a national random sample survey.

3. *National probability sample.* Between December 8 and December 23, 1979, the Public Agenda Foundation conducted a random sample survey of 1,000 respondents. The sampling procedure involved random digit dialing after an initial geographic stratification. Respondents had to be at least 18 years of age, and a male-female quota was employed. It is estimated that a completed interview was obtained from between 65 to 70 percent of telephone households with a qualified respondent available within the time constraints of the study. The questionnaire was pretested for length and workability in September and again in November, 1979. Because the final instrument was so long, selected questions were administered to partial samples of 481 and 519 respondents. The sample was weighted according to age, education, and race to bring it in line with the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data, and the analysis in this article is based on weighted data.

In addition to quantitative data, we have included in this article some material from the qualitative interviews. While these quotations cannot of course support generalizations about the public as a whole, we do feel that they are helpful both in illustrating some of our conclusions and in suggesting hypotheses about what the data may mean.

Fairness

The public wants and expects the communications media to be fair. In the public's mind, fairness means, first of all, the presentation of

diverse points of view. In terms of election coverage, nearly 80 percent of the public believe that Republican and Democratic party candidates should receive the same amount of coverage. Further, people do not distinguish between newspaper and television coverage; both are expected to treat candidates equally. Nor is the public's commitment to equal coverage limited to the two major parties. Large majorities believe that major third parties—George Wallace's American party was the example given—should get as much coverage as the two major parties on television (69 percent–22 percent), and in newspapers (59 percent–29 percent). (See Table 1.)

The public applies the same principle to controversial issues such as the SALT treaty. By a margin of three to one, people disagree that a newspaper has the right to give opponents of a controversial policy less coverage than proponents get. And here again, people make little distinction between what they expect from newspapers and television. Further, the public's commitment to fairness transcends demographic and ideological categories. Fairness is important to the best and least educated, to men and women, to young and old, to liberals and conservatives, and to people from all parts of the country. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

However, while we found that the public's desire for fairness in

Table 1. The Public's View That Fairness Is an Essential Component of Free Expression (N = 1,000)

Q. Freedom of expression means different things to different people; now I'm interested in what it means to you. I'll read you some statements about the right of freedom of expression, about what it protects and how far it goes. For each one, tell me whether you agree if this is a freedom of expression right or not. If you're not sure, just say so.

	Agree %	*Dis-agree* %	*Not Sure* %
1. Major party candidates have a right to get as much *coverage in newspapers* as their opponents get. Agree or disagree?	91	6	4
2. Television news has the right to give candidates of one of the major political parties more coverage than it gives to candidates of the other party. Agree or disagree?	13	79	7
3. *Television news* has the right to give less coverage to third parties such as George Wallace's American party than it gives to Republicans and Democrats. Agree or disagree?	22	69	9
4. A newspaper has the right to refuse to cover third parites such as George Wallace's American party, even though they give lots of coverage to the two major parties. Agree of disagree?	29	59	12
5. A *newspaper* has the right to give opponents of a controversial policy such as the SALT treaty less coverage than those in favor of the treaty get. Agree or disagree?	22	65	13
6. Opponents of a controversial policy such as the SALT treaty have a right to get as much *coverage on television* as those in favor of the treaty get. Agree of disagree?	86	4	10

Table 2. The Public's View That Fairness Is An Essential Component of Free Expression (Demographic Breakdown, N = 1,000)

Q. A newspaper has the right to give opponents of a controversial policy such as the SALT treaty less coverage than those in favor of the treaty get.[a]

	Agree %	*Disagree* %
Total	22	65
Male	23	66
Female	21	63
White	20	68
Black or Hispanic	33	49
Professional/executive	19	69
White collar	22	65
Blue collar	23	65
Student	22	61
Housewife	30	64
Labor union household	19	70
Not a labor union household	23	64
Northeast	24	60
North Central	20	70
South	22	64
West	22	66
18 to 30	27	62
31 to 45	19	68
46 to 60	21	69
61 and over	20	61
Some high school or less	26	52
High school graduate	19	69
Some college	25	72
College graduate of more	20	72
Democrat	22	65
Republican	20	68
Independent	28	68
Liberal	22	66
Moderate	24	64
Conservative	23	64
Annual family income		
Less than $10,000	24	57
$10,000 to $15,000	21	67
$15,000 to $25,000	24	68
$25,000 and over	17	77

[a] Of the six questions shown in Table 1, this particular question produced the greatest differences among the various demographic and geographic groups.

general is unqualified, our results do not necessarily show that the public expects a rigid or mechanistic fairness standard. In the qualitative interviews, for example, many respondents used what might be called a common sense standard to decide whether a third-party

presidential candidate should receive equal coverage. For most people in the focus groups, George Wallace clearly qualified and Barry Commoner clearly did not. Further, focus group respondents felt that there should be different standards for different size newspapers. For example, an administrative assistant in New York made the following distinction in a comparison of newspapers to books. "In a textbook, I expect a balanced presentation of all points of view. But I don't want or expect that from every book on the library shelf. That's the way I feel about newspapers too. The *Times* is like a textbook; its coverage should be objective. But the *Village Voice* is like a book on the shelf. It can say anything it wants to."

Fairness and Tolerance

Much of the research on political tolerance suggests that the American public is generally unsympathetic to the expression of basic civil liberties by unpopular or extremist groups (cf. Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1979). And many of the communications professionals we interviewed expressed a similar view. However, our findings indicate that especially within the context of fairness, most Americans agree that diverse points of views, even unpopular views, should have a chance to be heard.

There is, of course, a segment of the public (between 15 percent and 30 percent depending on the question) that rejects even the most minimal conception of civil liberties. For example, 18 percent disagree that a person has the right to peacefully picket the construction of a nuclear power plant, 19 percent feel that the government has the right to arrest a reporter who constantly criticizes the president, and 30 percent disagree that members of the Nazi party have the right to publish their own newspaper. (See Table 3.)

In a number of other controversial areas, the public's positions could be interpreted as evidence of intolerance, given the classic perspective on civil liberties. By a margin of 63 percent to 26 percent, for example, people said that Nazis do not have the right to stage a march in a Jewish neighborhood, and by a margin of 77 percent to 14 percent, people said that newspapers do not have the right to print a story about how to make an H-bomb. But these cases caused problems for elites as well. Many members of the American Civil Liberties Union resigned over ACLU support of the Nazis in the Skokie case, and several prominent newspapers questioned the right of the *Progressive* to print its story on the H-bomb. To interpret these results as proof of public intolerance seems to us problematic.

On the other hand, when questioned about the rights of fringe

Table 3. Public Attitudes About the Expression of Diverse Points of View

Q. . . . Tell me whether you agree if this is a freedom of expression right or not. If you're not sure, just say so.

	Agree %	*Dis-agree* %	*Not Sure* %
1. A person has the right to peacefully picket the construction of a nuclear power plant. Agree or disagree?	73	18	9
2. The government has a right to arrest a reporter who is constantly criticizing the president. Agree or disagree?	19	72	9
3. Members of the Nazi party have a right to publish their own newspaper. Agree or disagree?	59	30	11
4. A group of Nazis has a right to stage a march through a Jewish neighborhood. Agree or disagree?	26	63	11
5. A newspaper has the right to print a story about how to make an H-bomb, even when the government says this story might help other countries make such weapons. Agree or disagree?	14	77	9
6. A Communist has a right to say what he thinks on a television talk show. Agree or disagree?	61	29	11
7. A group of homosexuals has a right to get coverage in a newspaper to argue against laws that they feel discriminate against them. Agree or disagree?	57	31	12
8. Members of the Nazi party have the right to get coverage in a newspaper. Agree or disagree?	49	39	11
9. The president has a right to close down a newspaper that prints stories that he feels are biased or inaccurate. Agree or disagree?	22	69	10

groups to express their views in the mass media, substantial majorities agree that presumably unpopular views should be heard:

1. By a margin of 61 percent to 29 percent, people believe that a Communist has a right to say what he thinks on a television talk show.

2. By a margin of 57 percent to 31 percent, the public feels that a group of homosexuals has a right to get coverage in a newspaper to argue against laws that they feel are discriminatory.

3. By a margin of 59 percent to 30 percent, people feel that members of the Nazi party have a right to publish their own newspaper.

4. By a margin of 49 percent to 39 percent, the public feels that members of the Nazi party have the right to get coverage in a newspaper. (See Table 3.)

Our hypothesis is that people are more supportive of the rights of unpopular groups when the objectionable views will be presented as part of a spectrum of diverse points of view. In the focus groups, for example, some respondents believed that while a Communist should not be allowed to teach in a school, he/she should be allowed to express his/her views on a nationally televised talk show. Respondents explained this apparent contradiction by pointing out that

schoolteacher might be in a position to "brainwash" students or to exclude other points of view. However, they said, the views of the Communist on a talk show would only be part of a range of opinions that television could, and should be expected to present.

Censorship and Regulation of the Media

Many of the views expressed by the public are consistent with traditional thinking about freedom of the press. Specifically, the public opposes laws that would permit direct censorship of the media. By margins of about two to one, the public opposes laws prohibiting news stories that "embarrass the president, the government, or the country." By about the same margin, the public opposes laws prohibiting news stories that "many people feel are biased or unfairly criticize a prominent person." In addition, large majorities reject the right of the government "to arrest a reporter who is constantly criticizing the president" (72% to 19%), or the right of the president "to close down a newspaper that prints stories he feels are biased and inaccurate" (69% to 22%). (See Table 4.)

However, although people reject laws that call for direct censorship, they do support what might be called "fairness-enhancing" laws, laws requiring the media to present additional materials that might not be selected by editorial choice. By margins of about five to one, the public favors laws requiring television and newspapers to give major party candidates the same amount of election coverage. By about four to one, the public favors laws requiring television and newspapers to give opponents of a controversial policy as much coverage as proponents get. By a margin of 63 percent to 24 percent, the public favors a law requiring newspapers to give coverage to third parties such as George Wallace's American party. And 42 percent favor and 43 percent oppose a law requiring newspapers to give coverage to "groups such as homosexuals who feel that certain laws discriminate against them." (See Table 4.)

Many communications experts reject the notion of government regulation to achieve fairness. They see freedom of the press as a laissez-faire doctrine: by protecting the rights of speakers, an invisible hand will insure a "robust debate" among freely competing voices, thereby creating a marketplace of ideas where fairness is achieved through diversity. They also see a number of problems with laws requiring fairness. To get an initial reading on public thinking about some of these problems, we asked people to react to the tradeoffs most frequently mentioned by the communications professionals. For a majority of Americans, some tradeoffs were acceptable:

1. Sixty-two percent said they would favor laws requiring equal coverage even if popular TV programs had to be canceled to give time to fringe candidates.

2. Fifty-five percent said they would favor laws requiring both sides of an issue to be covered even if this meant the news would avoid many controversial issues.

3. And 55 percent said they would favor equal time laws even if major party candidates received less coverage as a result.

Under certain conditions, however, people seemed to back away from their support for fairness laws. For example, when we posed a

Table 4. Public Attitudes Toward Fairness Laws and Other Proposed Laws[a] (N = 1,000)

Q. Next I'd like to ask about a few proposals some people say would make the media more responsive to the public interest. Some of these proposals are already law but right now, the Congress is reconsidering this entire area, so I'd like you to pretend all of them are equally possible. For each proposal I read, tell me if you favor or oppose it or if you're not sure.

	Favor %	*Oppose* %	*Not Sure* %
1. A law requiring television news to give major party candidates such as Democrats and Republicans the same amount of coverage. Favor or oppose?	81	15	5
2. A law requiring newspapers to give major party candidates such as Republicans and Democrats the same amount of coverage. Favor or oppose?	82	12	6
3. A law requiring newspapers to give coverage to third parties such as George Wallace's American party. Favor or oppose?	63	24	13
4. A law requiring newspapers to give opponents of a controversial policy as much coverage as those in favor of the policy get. Favor or oppose?	73	17	10
5. A law requiring television news to give opponents of a controversial policy as much coverage as those in favor of the policy get. Favor or oppose?	74	18	9
6. A law requiring newspapers to give coverage to groups such as homosexuals who feel that certain laws discriminate against them. Favor or oppose?	42	43	15
7. A law prohibiting newspaper stories that embarrass the president, the government or the country. Favor or oppose?	26	67	8
8. A law prohibiting television news stories that embarrass the president, the government or the country. Favor or oppose?	29	62	9
9. A law prohibiting newspaper stories that many people feel are biased or unfairly criticize a prominent person. Favor or oppose?	24	60	16
10. A law prohibiting television news stories that many people feel are biased or unfairly criticize a prominent person. Favor or oppose?	27	56	17

[a] Questionnaire order for these items was 2,10,6,7,9,1,4,8,3,5.

tradeoff involving the extreme prospect of the government closing down a newspaper or TV station for bias, 50 percent said they would *not* favor a law requiring the news media to cover both sides of an issue, and 33 percent said they would. This apparent change in attitudes, was also evident in the following result. Respondents were asked which of two statements came closer to their own view: (1) "Rules requiring fairness and equal time really increase freedom of expression," or (2) "Rules requiring fairness and equal time are a threat to freedom of expression because they give the government too much power." Early in the questionnaire, fairness laws were endorsed with near unanimity (74 percent for newspapers, 73 percent for television). However, a much smaller percentage (42 percent) said that Statement (1) was closer to their view, nearly the same number (39 percent) said fairness laws were a threat, and a high percentage (20 percent) said they weren't sure. We believe the explanation for these apparently inconsistent results lies in the fact that the second statement, like the rejected tradeoff above, introduces a new element that respondents found troublesome—too much government power—and that large numbers of respondents reconsidered or became unsure of their earlier answer.

This conflict was also apparent in the qualitative interviews. Respondents frequently became confused or frustrated when they were asked to wrestle with the most extreme enforcement implications of fairness laws, such as the government closing down a newspaper for bias. "I hadn't even considered that!" said a printer who had earlier called for the enactment of fairness laws. A homemaker said, "Is that America? That's dictatorship! That's not news the way America does it."

Clearly, most Americans believe that the major news media should present all sides of an issue; at the same time, they are concerned about heavy-handed government intervention. Our interpretation is that people have not worked through the complexities of resolving these two principles, and that the shifts observed above involve respondents' attempts to reconcile two important social goals—freedom of the press and a fair, objective presentation of the news.

The Listener's Perspective

Virtually all of the communications professionals we interviewed defined freedom of the press from the perspective of a speaker. For them, freedom was measured by the ability of a communicator to express his views without fear of censorship. It is our hypothesis,

however, that the public defines freedom of the press from a different frame of reference.

Most Americans do not publish newspapers, produce television programs or make speeches before groups; they are receivers of information, not deliverers. Our hypothesis is that most Americans define freedom of the press from a listener's perspective. According to this view, freedom of expression is maximized when the receivers of information get what they feel they need. The test of when the media are working most effectively is not whether publishers or broadcasters can say whatever they want, but whether the public gets what it needs—a broad spectrum of information and opinions.

This notion of a listener's definition of freedom of the press is consistent with our findings about the importance of fairness. Further, as part of our survey, we presented respondents with an inventory of items that might be considered freedom of expression rights. Some were virtual truisms, others were highly controversial. It came as no surprise to us that 92 percent said that freedom of expression includes "the right of a citizen to criticize the president in the privacy of his own home." But an even larger number (98 percent) said that freedom of expression includes "the right of a citizen to hear both sides of an issue." There is, of course, no constitutional right to hear anything, and it is our interpretation that this result lends support to our hypotheses.

The concept of a listener's definition is also consistent with respondents' attitudes toward laws. Censorship laws, which decrease the listener's ability to obtain information, were rejected; however, fairness enhancing laws, which could be perceived as a way to increase information by guaranteeing that all points of view will be presented, were supported by large majorities, at least initially.

If it is the case that leaders and the public define freedom of the press from two different perspectives, this fact may have implications for debates on public policy. Many of the elites interviewed for the project were disturbed by public complaints about the media, and by public calls for regulation of the press. They regarded these attitudes as evidence that the public does not understand or accept basic democratic principles, and concluded, therefore, that the public has no legitimate role to play in freedom of the press debates. For many of them, public opinion is simply a great beast to be either neutralized or ignored.

If our hypothesis is correct, however, many leaders may be underestimating the complexity of the public's views. If the public is calling for an increase in press freedom *as defined from the listener's perspective*, if the public's support for fairness laws stems from a belief

in the importance of a "marketplace of ideas," then the tendency among elites to dismiss calls for fairness as calls for censorship and repression represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the public's position, a misunderstanding that could have potentially serious consequences for a democratic society.

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Comments on "Public Attitudes Toward Freedom of the Press"

LEO BOGART:

Q. How is your wife? A. Compared to what?

With the advent of two-way interactive home communications systems, we may be entering a new era of boundless opportunity for pernicious mischief by public opinion polls. The masters of Qube have heralded the arrival of the Instant Poll, through which self-selected samples of the viewing public can "vote" their preferences on any subject from thermonuclear warfare to the color of pantyhose. When the results of such surveys are topical, they draw attention and are used to bolster the barricades of already entrenched factions.

What's wrong with this is that asking a question and recording the answers does not in itself give us an understanding of public opinion. On complex matters, what people think and what they say are always a matter of context. When we make an important decision about something, individually or collectively, we try to think it through. We acquire as much information as we can, we consider alternatives and consequences, and we generally end up taking actions that we believe to be the best under the circumstances, usually with a lot of second thoughts.

A legislative body *deliberates* before it pronounces its views. But the very nature of survey research precludes deliberation. As pollsters, we need our questions answered when we ask them. A great

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deal of our ingenuity must be expended in seeking ways of digging below the surface of what respondents tell us, ways of fathoming the subterranean cross-currents of contradictions and confusion that work their way to the surface when the same people engage in conversation, discussion, or argument.

It is hard to imagine a political subject that is more highly charged and more susceptible to internal inconsistency than the domain of the First Amendment. It has produced whole libraries of judicial proceedings and decisions. It continues to offer scope for lively and often passionate debate as the number of competitive newspaper markets shrinks, as new technology transforms news gathering and dissemination, as new dilemmas are raised in reconciling freedom of expression with the individual's right to a fair trial, the child's right to remain uncorrupted, the nation's right to safeguard deadly secrets.

Perhaps the most urgent issue that currently comes up under this heading concerns the distinction that has existed between the virtually unrestricted freedom of expression granted "the press" by Article I of the Bill of Rights (as a natural accompaniment of freedom of speech) and the regulated conditions of broadcasting, with its congressionally legislated "equal time" requirement for major political candidates, extended into the "fairness doctrine" by the Federal Communications Commission. This doctrine, requiring even-handed treatment of controversial issues, was originally applicable to a then limited number of stations operating by public franchise and carrying a relatively small amount of news and public affairs programming. Should the doctrine still apply to cable systems offering up to 100 TV channels, including an increasing number of "public access" channels? To raise this question is merely to hint at the array of items one would want to lay on the public agenda for a town meeting on freedom of the press. But the Public Agenda Foundation appears to believe that any such preliminaries are unnecessary and that it is possible to get a perfectly adequate "top of the head" reading of public attitudes.

Any reasoned discussion of the subject (in a classroom, for instance) would probably have to begin by reviewing the historical reasons why print and broadcast journalists operate under somewhat different ground rules, though they generally share the same ethos. But the survey instrument disregards this crucial distinction. It moves back and forth from questions about newspapers to questions about television. (It goes from the "equal time" principle for Republicans and Democrats on TV to "the same amount of coverage" in newspapers.) It does not take extraordinary sophistication in the art of questionnaire construction to realize that a respondent can be led in one direction by a question sequence that suggests (as in the present study) that he is being asked about his right to enjoy full access to

information and in a very different direction by a sequence that relates freedom of the press to his own freedom to speak whatever is on his mind, right or wrong.

Amazingly, the authors offer as a "hypothesis" the tautology that journalists view freedom of the press from the viewpoint of producers and the mass public from that of consumers. The foundation of civil liberties is in the recognition that the alternative is tyranny, that the restriction of anyone else's freedom is a threat to one's own. The authors apparently conclude from their study that a real threat now exists, and the publicity that attended its original release reflected this. *Editor & Publisher*'s headline on the story was, "Public favors fairness law to regulate newspapers." Daniel Yankelovich, in his foreword to the published report, took the findings to mean that "freedom of expression will face a serious challenge in the decade ahead . . . and the First Amendment itself may well be subjected to reexamination."

The First Amendment, as far as I know, has been under reexamination for nearly two centuries, at some times, to be sure, more relentlessly than at others. The present study has no prior benchmark. However, a Gallup survey in December 1979 found that only one person in four knows what the First Amendment is and that 37 percent think that "the present curbs placed on the press" (not further identified or explained) are "not strict enough." (Seventeen percent said they were "too strict" and 32 percent "about right.") In 1958, answering a somewhat similar question, 21 percent wanted "greater curbs on what *newspapers* print" (my italics). With the help of Spiro T. Agnew and others, the last two decades have seen "the media" become a much more visible and controversial force in American political life. Undoubtedly this reflects a recognition of the distinctive role that television has come to play in electing and unseating presidents. Does this really suggest that the First Amendment is in trouble?

Surely there is no cause for complacency in a nation where both the Klan and the Weather Underground can strike some resonant chords. Whether the answers reflect intolerance, yea-saying response style, or stupidity, it is disturbing when polls persistently turn up a minority that take anti-libertarian positions—disturbing, though not altogether surprising. But the public's uneasiness about the power of the media does not at all imply growing intolerance. We can take heart from the evidence turned up by other surveys that show a steady increase in support for free speech.[1]

[1] For instance, Nunn et al. have found that the percentage of people favoring the right of Communists to make a speech increased from 27 percent to 53 percent between

To say that "people make little distinction between what they expect from newspapers and television" is to state only half the case. Surely the public has expectations of integrity and professionalism from all news media, and at first crack they seem to readily agree that "there ought to be a law" to guarantee the "fairness" that they prize. But give them a hint that there might have to be some tradeoffs, as the authors acknowledge, and "large numbers reconsidered or became unsure of their earlier answer." Perhaps a few more hints might have wrought even further transformations: suggestions, for instance, as to who should determine what was fair or who should be licensed to publish or how controversy was to be defined. Had they followed this tack, however, the authors might no longer have been running a poll whose findings would be headlined with alarm; they might have been analyzing the dynamics of public opinion.

A final quibble: At the outset, the authors tell us that their 6 group interviews and 25 depth interviews "cannot of course support generalizations," and are to be cited only for illustrations and hypotheses. This does not inhibit them from reporting that "focus group respondents felt that there should be different standards for different size newspapers." This is followed by a particularly idiotic quotation which does not illustrate this point at all, but rather the point that if someone spends more than a few seconds thinking about the subject, he will force himself into a recognition of the fundamental cross-pressures of media freedom and responsibility. The observation would not warrant commentary except for the fact that this kind of nonevidentiary nonsense is increasingly encountered in commercial research reports.

JAMIE KALVEN:

The First Amendment is, above all, a prohibition of government censorship. Yet it has also been interpreted in some situations to mandate affirmative government action to insure that freedom of speech is not denied by private action. There is thus a sense in which we ask the government to administer the forum created by the First Amendment so as to maximize freedom of speech, while at the same

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1954 and 1973. A NORC survey in 1980 shows 55 percent in favor. (Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett, Jr., and J. Allen Williams, Jr., *Tolerance for Nonconformity*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978).

Jamie Kalven, an editor for the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, is preparing for publication a manuscript on the First Amendment by his father, the late Harry Kalven, Jr., who was a constitutional scholar at the University of Chicago Law School.

time barring it from interfering with the exchange of ideas within that forum.

The interaction between these demands gives rise to the perplexing issue with which this study is concerned: May the government, in the interest of fairness, intervene in the editorial processes of the media? Both sides ground their arguments on the First Amendment: one argues that such regulation is necessary to create access to the media for those whose voices would not otherwise be heard; the other argues that giving the government the power to tell editors what views to disseminate is but a small step away from giving it the power to dictate what views *not* to disseminate.

From a legal perspective, one of the most interesting aspects of the study—a point noted in passing but not discussed by the authors—is the finding that in considering the merits of fairness regulation, "people do not distinguish between newspaper and television coverage." The law, by contrast, distinguishes sharply between the two, rejecting such regulation in the case of newspapers and allowing it in the case of television.[2]

The primary rationale for the legal distinction is that broadcast frequencies are a scarce resource subject to government licensing and hence that the government may properly require those to whom it grants use of this resource to provide access to others. The finding that the public does not distinguish between print and broadcast media can perhaps be seen as a comment on the artificiality of this distinction. At a time when technological developments are increasing the number of broadcast outlets and economic pressures are reducing the number of newspapers, it is not surprising that many see little basis for distinguishing between the two on grounds of scarcity. What is somewhat more surprising, when viewed in light of the First Amendment tradition, is the apparent extent of support for fairness laws that would have the effect of assimilating newspapers to the regulated condition of broadcasting.

Just how much support is there for such government regulation of television and newspapers in the interest of fairness? Because the authors do not distinguish as sharply as they might between expressions of discontent with the quality of journalism and expressions

[2] The difference in the treatment of the two media is dramatically illustrated by two Supreme Court decisions. In *Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court unanimously upheld fairness regulations requiring broadcasters to provide an opportunity to reply to personal attacks and an opportunity to reply to editorials. In sharp contrast, in *Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo*, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court—in another unanimous decision—found unconstitutional under the First Amendment a state law compelling newspapers to publish replies by political candidates whom they had criticized.

of support for fairness laws, their article may leave the impression that support for such laws is more extensive than their findings indicate.

Asked whether they favored laws requiring the news media "to give opponents of a controversial policy as much coverage as those in favor of the policy," 73 percent said yes, 17 percent said no, and 10 percent were unsure with respect to newspapers, and 74 percent said yes, 18 percent said no, and 9 percent were unsure with respect to television. Asked whether they would favor such laws, were the government given the power to close down a newspaper or television station for bias, only 33 percent said yes, while 50 percent said no.

Arguably, this latter finding reflects something more than a recoiling from the severity of the legal sanction posited. It appears also to record the moment at which respondents apprehended for the first time an essential feature of fairness laws: *the assumption by the government of a degree of power over the editorial process.*

This interpretation is corroborated by the finding that 43 percent agreed with the statement that fairness rules "increase freedom of expression," 39 percent agreed with the statement that such rules are "a threat to freedom of expression because they give the government too much power," and 19 percent said they were not sure. This is a far cry from the 4 to 1 margin favoring fairness laws in response to the initial question.

The authors write: "We believe the explanation for these apparently inconsistent results lies in the fact that the second statement . . . introduces a new element that respondents found troublesome—too much government power—and that large numbers of respondents reconsidered or became unsure of their earlier answers." In other words, respondents perceived *the issue* posed by fairness laws—the issue that confronts courts and policy makers, the issue that concerns elites. One does not opt for fairness laws in a vacuum. Such laws by their nature allocate to the government a degree of power over the editorial process; they involve a choice between competing values, competing risks. Having seen this, one might still conclude that such laws are warranted, but until one sees it, one has not engaged the issue.

Viewed from what the authors call "the classic perspective on civil liberties," their findings are thus more reassuring than they at first appear. The massive support for fairness laws in response to the initial question clearly reflects discontent with the quality of press coverage. It is questionable, however, in light of the responses to subsequent questions, whether this support represents a considered judgment as to the merits of the First Amendment issue posed by such laws. Indeed,

when the issue is properly framed—that is, when the question is a matter of choosing between competing values rather than expressing a preference in a vacuum—the views of the public and those of the elite prove a good deal less divergent.

The authors' interpretation of this sequence of findings is that "most people have not worked through the complexities" of reconciling "two important social goals—freedom of the press and a fair, objective presentation of the news." This is, it seems to me, the central conclusion yielded by the study. And I cannot resist noting that it stands in an odd relationship to the authors' closing warning to elites not to underestimate "the complexity of the public's view." In effect, the elites are admonished to attend to "the complexity of the . . . view" of those who "have not worked through the complexities" of the issue!

This awkwardness is, I suspect, more than an accident of phrasing; rather, it appears to be symptomatic of a tension that informs—and slightly skews—the study. The authors appear to have been disturbed by the attitudes they encountered among the elites they interviewed. Perhaps as a result, they tend to exaggerate—as if in rejoinder to the elites—the complexity and subtlety of the public attitudes they have discerned.

Also, the authors are not as attentive as they might be to evidence provided by their study that tends to support elite fears about fairness laws. They are rightly concerned lest their findings be glibly interpreted as "evidence of intolerance." Not every proposal for the regulation of First Amendment activity is a benighted call for censorship; and to the extent that the elites behave as if this were the case, they deserve the authors' criticism. But the case against fairness regulation does not finally hinge on demonstrating that the motive for such regulation is overtly censorial; rather, it rests on concerns about how such a regime would work in practice. And this study provides evidence—unremarked by the authors—that tends to corroborate those concerns:

• In the course of arguing that support for fairness laws is an expression of the "listener's perspective," the authors state that "censorship laws which decrease the listener's ability to obtain information were rejected." This assertion is questionable. "Censorship laws" may have been rejected, but "laws which decrease the listener's ability to obtain information" cannot be said to have been rejected in light of this striking datum: "55 percent said they would favor laws requiring both sides of an issue to be covered even if it meant the news would avoid many controversial issues." Can such a situation—censorship in effect, if not intent—be said to serve the

interests of the listener in maximizing the flow of information and opinon?

• By what criteria are "fairness" determinations to be made? The authors report that interviewees used "what might be called a common sense standard." Just how such a standard might operate is suggested by the following findings: "By about 4 to 1, the public favors laws requiring television and newspapers to give opponents of a controversial policy as much coverage as proponents get. . . . And 42 percent favor and 43 percent oppose a law requiring newspapers to give coverage to 'groups such as homosexuals who feel that certain laws discriminate against them.' " Can the disparity between these findings be explained by the different phrasings of the two questions or is it perhaps an illustration of the censorial possibilities residing in "fairness" regulation?

Finally, I would like to offer a hunch. The authors sharply distinguish their study from earlier studies which suggested that "the American public is generally unsympathetic to the expression of basic civil liberties by unpopular or extremist groups"; and they emphasize that "when questioned about the rights of fringe groups to express their views in the mass media, substantial majorities agree that presumably unpopular views should be heard." Is it possible that hostility toward the media has displaced—or, at any rate, obscured—hostility toward "fringe groups"? Is it perhaps the case that everyone feels himself an underrepresented outsider—a member of a fringe group—in relation to the mass media?

The authors close by warning of "a fundamental misunderstanding of the public's position" on the part of the elites, "a misunderstanding that could have potentially serious consequences for a democratic society." This may well be true. Their study, however, provides no concrete documentation of *this* "misunderstanding." What it does provide is evidence of the extent of *the public's* lack of understanding of the issue that fairness laws pose under the First Amendment. More reassuringly, it suggests that once the issue has been properly framed, the views of the public are not so dissimilar from those of the elites after all. The key point—the urgent point—that emerges from the study is thus the importance of educating the public as to the nature of this issue.

Continuities in Support for Racial Equality, 1972 to 1976

DONALD R. KINDER AND LAURIE A. RHODEBECK

FROM constitutional arguments over extension of the suffrage to contemporary conflicts over affirmative action, race has never strayed far from the center of American political debate. Of special consequence over the last quarter century has been the white majority's reaction to an increasingly assertive black minority. The political effects are easy to see. Public opinion on racial policy influences who holds power and makes policy—in the Congress (Achen, 1976; Burstein, 1979); in the mayor's offices of central cities (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Pettigrew, 1972; Sears and Kinder, 1971); and in the White House (Boyd, 1972; Converse et al., 1965; Converse et al., 1969; Nie et al., 1976:188; Rosenstone, 1982). Dissatisfaction with the national administration's policies and performance on racial matters contributes to growing cynicism about government in general (Miller, 1974). And insofar as the long-awaited partisan realignment is at last upon us, it is one precipitated by the politics of race (Carmines and Stimson, 1980; Converse, 1976; Markus, 1979; Sundquist, 1973).

Abstract Capitalizing upon the panel component of the 1972–1976 National Election Study, we explore change in white Americans' support for racial equality. Two general propositions regarding individual change are examined: frustration-aggression theory, which attributes change to the stresses and strains of private life; and realistic group conflict theory, which attributes change to the tangible threats blacks pose to whites' private interests. We find intermittent support for the first and virtually no support for the second. Much more impressive is the durability of opinion on racial equality, the insulation of racial opinion from the ostensibly powerful predicaments of private life.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:195–215 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-195/$2.50

For all its political significance, public opinion on racial matters remains mysterious. Why do some whites grow more sympathetic toward racial equality while others become more hostile? What sorts of experiences enhance or relieve interracial tensions? By rummaging through the sprawling literature, it is easy to find answers—but answers backed by persuasive evidence are hard to come by. These days especially, benign neglect applies rather well to theories of racial opinion.

In a modest way, our paper begins to redress this neglect. Here we test a pair of eminently plausible and quite general theories: *frustration-aggression theory*, which ascribes change in whites' support for racial equality to the stresses and strains of their private lives; and *realistic group conflict theory*, which ascribes change to the threats blacks seem to pose to whites' tangible self-interests. Data well suited to test these two explanations we take from the panel component of the 1972–1976 National Election Study. Estimation proceeds via a maximum likelihood procedure, as described in detail below. The implications of our results—for an adequate social psychology of racial opinion and for an understanding of the political entanglements of race—are the business of the paper's final section.

Two Theories of Opinion Change

Frustration-aggression theory has its roots in Freud's familiar assertion that the frustrations of modern life lead inexorably to hostility. In *Frustration and Aggression* (1939), Dollard and his colleagues develop this point. According to their treatment of displacement, the frustrations whites experience in their private lives, though they have no manifest racial content, nevertheless take a racial form. In particular, we assume here that private frustrations feed political resistance. The trials and tribulations of whites' modern lives undermine the support they would otherwise lend to policies designed to bring about racial equality. Such indirect expressions of aggression serve, as Allport (1954:325) put it, "to soften the disappointments . . . of life."

Research on displacement has concentrated on the frustrations associated with downward social mobility, with uneven results. Some researchers find the downwardly mobile to be disproportionately prejudiced (e.g., Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1964); others do not (e.g., Hodge and Treiman, 1966). The evidence is no better for the more general proposition that discontent in personal life contributes to racial hostility. Alienation and social isolation, economic grievances, worries over safety, concern for the quality of children's schooling—

none of these personal frustrations appears to drive racial prejudice (Campbell, 1971; Kinder and Sears, 1979; Sears and Kinder, 1971).

So the empirical record of the displacement hypothesis is checkered. However, all of the evidence cited above is drawn from cross-sectional comparisons.[1] A better test of displacement requires panel evidence of the kind we marshal below. If the displacement hypothesis is correct, then whites who have run into serious difficulties in their private lives should grow increasingly hostile toward racial equality. In the panel tests that follow, we concentrate on two ostensibly powerful sources of frustration: economic adversity and vulnerability to crime and violence. We will see whether whites who have suffered economic dislocation or who feel increasingly unsafe on the streets of their own neighborhoods become less willing to support policies promoting racial equality.

Realistic group conflict theory (Cummings, 1980; LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Rothbart, 1976), the second perspective on racial opinion examined here, locates the causes of racial prejudice in the competition between blacks and whites for scarce resources. Competitive interdependence produces the realistic perception of threat, which in turn leads to hostility directed at members of the threatening group. Thus whites develop antagonistic attitudes toward blacks to the extent that blacks are seen to threaten their private interests.

Plausible as realistic group theory may seem, its empirical support turns out to be anemic. There is not much evidence one way or the other, and what there is often runs counter to expectation. Moreover, tests of realistic group conflict theory are almost always indirect, usually invite alternative interpretations, and in any case are of dubious generality (this literature is reviewed in Ashmore and DelBoca, 1976). Here we try to avoid these shortcomings. Again using panel evidence, we examine the responsiveness of opinion toward racial equality to the tangible threats that blacks seem to pose to whites' private interests. In particular, we will see whether whites who think themselves besieged by black street crime, or menanced by neighborhood desegregation, or personally implicated in racial busing schemes, become less enthusiastic about racial equality.

Model Specification and Estimation Procedure

Tests of social psychological propositions regarding change in an individual's support for racial equality require individual-level evi-

[1] Some support for the displacement hypothesis has been furnished by experimental research. However, such experiments have proven difficult to replicate. For a capable review of this research, see Ashmore and DelBoca, 1976.

dence, preferably longitudinal. With panel evidence provided by the 1972–1976 National Election Study we will assess the stability of whites' racial opinions and, of greater interest, appraise how adequately the frustration-aggression and realistic group conflict theories account for deviations from stability.

In schematic form, the model that expresses both these interests appears in Figure 1. Stability in racial opinions at the individual level is represented by the arrow from Racial Equality$_{72}$ to Racial Equality$_{76}$. Tests of the displacement and the realistic group conflict theories are represented in the diagram by the arrow running from Personal Experience to Racial Equality$_{76}$. Together, the two theories suggest three types of personal experience that should prompt whites to reduce their support for racial equality: economic dislocation, vulnerability to crime and violence, and exposure to racial threats. In the analysis that follows, we will examine each separately.[2]

We will also treat separately the various components of support for racial equality. Table 1 presents the questions used to measure such



Figure 1. The Impact of Personal Experience on Support for Racial Equality

[2] The reader may legitimately object to this procedure. Taking up these three types of experience one at a time raises the specter of specification error: that because we ignore the *simultaneous* effects of the three, our estimates of each taken separately are necessarily biased. In principle, we agree completely. But in our case, estimates based on separate analyses do not differ from those based on a more elaborate analysis that takes into account simultaneous effects. Consequently, for the sake of presentational clarity, we have chosen to present the results in three parts.

Table 1. White Support for Racial Equality, 1972 and 1976

		1972 (N = 2,397)	*1976 (N = 1,065)*
1. Are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between?			
Strict segregation		13.9	9.7
Something in between		46.3	53.6
Desegregation		37.6	33.9
Don't know		2.2	2.8
2. Which of these statements would you agree with:			
White people have a right to keep black people out of their neighborhoods if they want to:		17.5	7.9
or			
Black people have a right to live wherever they can afford to, just like anybody else.		73.8	84.3
Don't know; Depends; Can't decide		8.7	7.8
3. There is much discussion about the best way to deal with racial problems. Some people think achieving racial integration of the schools is so important that it justifies busing children to schools out of their own neighborhoods. Others think that letting children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing. Where would you place yourself on this 7-pt. scale, or haven't you thought much about this?			
Haven't thought about it		6.3	10.1
Of those who have thought about it:			
Keep children in neighborhood schools	1	78.4	71.9
	2	6.8	8.8
	3	3.4	4.8
	4	4.5	6.9
	5	1.8	2.0
	6	1.5	2.0
Bus to achieve integration	7	2.6	2.7
Don't know		1.0	1.0
4. Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this 7-pt. scale, or haven't you thought much about this?			
Haven't thought about it		9.1	16.2
Of those who have thought about it:			
Minority groups should help themselves	1	18.3	22.8
	2	12.1	10.3
	3	11.3	11.0
	4	22.5	23.0
	5	12.7	13.5
	6	6.2	8.0
Government should help minority groups	7	7.4	9.7
Don't know		9.4	1.7

Table 1. *(continued)*

	1972 (N = 2,397)	*1976 (N = 1,065)*
5. Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. How about you: do you think that civil rights leaders are trying to push *too fast*, are going *too slowly*, or are they moving at *about* the *right* speed?		
Too fast	50.1	42.2
About right	39.3	46.7
Too slowly	5.7	5.3
Don't know	4.9	5.7
6. Blacks influence in American life and politics:		
Too much	29.9	30.9
About right	35.1	40.0
Too little	27.4	20.0
Don't know	7.5	9.1
7. Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that this is not the government's business. Have you been concerned enough about this question to favor one side over the other?		
Yes	89.5	72.1
If YES: Do you think the government in Washington should see to it that black and white children go to the same schools *or* should it stay out of this as it is not its business?		
Not government's business	54.3	57.7
Depends	7.9	11.0
Ensure integration	36.4	29.6
Don't know	1.6	1.7
8. Feeling thermometer rating of civil rights leaders		
0	21.2	6.7
1–25	13.1	6.0
26–49	17.5	16.7
50	16.0	30.6
51–74	21.4	26.5
75–96	4.0	4.3
97–100	2.0	1.3
Don't know	4.8	7.9
9. Feeling thermometer rating of black militants		
0	50.7	30.8
1–25	17.4	18.4
26–49	16.9	24.5
50	7.1	14.9
51–74	2.8	4.2
75–96	.4	.6
97–100	.2	.1
Don't know	4.5	6.5

SOURCE: CPS National Election Studies, 1972 and 1976. 1976 sample is weighted.

support, drawn from the 1972 and 1976 National Election Studies. The table provides further testimony to the ambivalence that has long

characterized white Americans' thinking on race. Whites appear to endorse racial equality in principle, but oppose efforts to realize it in practice (Jackman, 1979; Kinder and Sears, 1981).

That there are *three* components to support for racial equality, and not just one, is made clear in Table 2, which summarizes the results of factor-analyzing responses to the racial equality questions (pooled from the 1972 and 1976 surveys). The first component reflects whites' enthusiam for, or more commonly, their opposition to, changes in the racial status quo. Disparaging civil rights leaders and black militants, and believing that the civil rights movement has been too pushy in its demands, that blacks wield too much power in American society, and that blacks should get ahead on their own without assistance from government, all reflect sentiment toward change in the racial status quo. A second component concerns race and housing. The relatively few who opposed the idea of open housing and who favored segregation anchored the conservative end of this component.[3] The third centers on the propriety of busing children

Table 2. Structure of Support for Racial Equality, 1972 and 1976: Factor Analysis with Oblique Rotation

	I	*II*	*III*
Civil rights leaders$_{72}$	.66	.15	−.03
Civil rights leaders$_{76}$	.74	.02	−.05
Black militants$_{72}$	.55	.02	−.03
Black militants$_{76}$	.62	−.11	−.03
Pace of civil rights movement$_{72}$	.26	.17	.29
Pace of civil rights movement$_{76}$	.36	.15	.18
Blacks' influence$_{72}$	.41	.14	.08
Blacks' influence$_{76}$	.35	.11	.18
Government intervention for blacks$_{72}$	.47	.01	.20
Government intervention for blacks$_{76}$	.42	.01	.23
Residential desegregation$_{72}$	−.02	.66	−.02
Residential desegregation$_{76}$	.02	.67	−.10
Segregation$_{72}$	−.00	.63	.09
Segregation$_{76}$	.08	.60	.11
Racial busing$_{72}$	−.07	−.03	.80
Racial busing$_{76}$	.11	−.09	.69
School desegregation$_{72}$	.09	.18	.39
School desegregation$_{76}$	.04	.07	.47

Factor correlations:	II	III
I	.54	.67
II	—	.41

NOTE: For exact question wordings, see Table 1. $N = 616$.

[3] One interpretation of the clustering of opinions on open housing and segregation is that people apparently understood the question about segregation, which was introduced without reference to any particular domain, to mean *neighborhood* segregation. Perhaps that is the tacit meaning of segregation in the 1970s. Another and related

to achieve school integration, including both opposition to racial busing and the more general judgment that the government has no business ensuring the integration of schools.[4] Although correlated, opinions toward change in the racial status quo, open housing, and school busing are conceptually and empirically separable, and we will make full use of these distinctions in the analysis that follows. When we speak of individual change in opinion on racial equality, we will mean change in one of the three components.

To estimate the model illustrated in Figure 1, maximum likelihood methods were applied to a restricted factor analysis model (Joreskog, 1973, and 1977). In particular, we employed the program LISREL to generate the appropriate coefficients (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1978). This procedure confers two special advantages. First, LISREL produces estimates of the stability of support for racial equality uncontaminated by measurement error. Second and more central to our purpose, the LISREL procedure solves the estimation problem associated with the simultaneous presence of autocorrelation and a lagged dependent variable. In such circumstances, standard techniques (such as OLS regression) generate biased and inconsistent estimates; LISREL does not.

When estimating the model shown in Figure 1, the error term associated with an observed indicator of one of the three latent racial opinion factors was allowed to correlate with its matched indicator over the two surveys. This is represented in Figure 1 by the curved arrows across the top of the diagram. To identify the model, the loading of one of the observed indicators on a particular racial opinion factor was set to 1.0. Because each personal experience variable (described in detail below) has just one indicator, its loading was set to 1.0, its error term to 0. All variables were treated as deviations from their means. Finally, each LISREL analysis was based on the unstandardized covariance matrix.

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possibility is that people were led to define segregation in these terms because the neighborhood segregation question closely preceded the general segregation question in both surveys.

[4] The three-factor solution shown in Table 2 also emerged when the analysis was undertaken within each study separately. Moreover, the structure is indifferent to alternative coding schemes. In the analysis summarized in Table 2, responses to each question were coded in the following manner: extreme liberal = 1; don't know, uncertain = 4; extreme conservative = 7; respondents who said they hadn't thought about the policy were excluded. When the procedure was changed to include this latter group (coding them into the middle, or as "4's"), and the factor analysis repeated, the resulting structure was indistinguishable in all important respects from that presented in Table 2.

Testing the Displacement Hypothesis

According to the displacement hypothesis, change in racial opinion at the individual level can be attributed to the stresses and strains of private life. In our first test of displacement, we operationalize personal tribulations in terms of economic adversity, represented by three variables, all of which appear in the 1976 survey. The first two assess whites' subjective appraisals of their own economic predicaments. Family Progress reflects whites' appraisals of recent trends in their family's economic condition; Family Expectations indicates their hopes for the future. The third variable captures personal economic dislocation in more objective terms. Impact of Recession on Family is an additive index based on replies to questions that summarize the family's recent unemployment (and underemployment) experiences.[5] If displacement occurs, then people whose economic circumstances have deteriorated, or who express pessimistic predictions about their financial futures, or who have recently run into employment difficulties, other things equal, should become more opposed to policies promoting racial equality.

The relevant coefficients are displayed in Table 3. They give no support to this particular version of the displacment hypothesis. Of the nine coefficients representing the effects of personal economic adversity on change in support for racial equality, none reaches statistical significance; only five are in the predicted direction.

[5] The exact questions and marginals are:

Family Progress: Would you say that you (and your family) are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?

Better	35.4%
Same	37.3
Worse	27.3

Family Expectations: Now looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you (and your family living here) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?

Better	30.9%
Same	57.5
Worse	11.5

Impact of Recession on Family: Looking at this list tell me if any of these things happened to you personally *or* to anyone in your family living here during the last few years (% yes):

Had work hours reduced	9.0
Had to work a different shift	5.0
Took a cut in pay	8.7
Had to take a job below qualifications	6.3
Was temporarily laid off	9.8
Was unemployed or lost a job	12.1
Had to rely on government assistance	4.2

To form an overall additive index, "was unemployed or lost a job" was weighted 2; all others were weighted 1.

Table 3. Accounting for Change in Support for Racial Equality: The Impact of Personal Economic Adversity

	Fair Housing$_{76}$ (N = 719)	*Change in Racial Status Quo*$_{76}$ (N = 533)	*Busing*$_{76}$ (N = 534)
Opinion in 1972	.465*	.772*	.869*
	(.076)	(.079)	(.120)
Family Progress	−.053	.009	.051
	(.032)	(.023)	(.073)
Family Expectations	−.026	−.019	.046
	(.039)	(.029)	(.092)
Impact of Recession	.004	.029	−.048
	(.033)	(.027)	(.076)
χ^2/df	1.0	1.2	.4

* $p < .01$.

NOTE. Entries are the unstandardized LISREL coefficients, with standard errors of the estimates given in parentheses. A positive coefficient means that personal economic adversity is associated with conservative change.

The overall fits of the models that produced these coefficients (here and in all succeeding analysis) are quite good: the chi-square per degrees of freedom are 1.2 (racial change), 1.0 (fair housing), and .4 (busing).[6] Deleting the economic experience variables (accomplished by fixing to zero the parameters that represent the effects of personal economic adversity), had no discernible effect on the models' fit. The values of chi-square per degrees of freedom for the streamlined models are 1.2 (racial change), 1.2 (fair housing), and .4 (busing); none differs significantly from that achieved by the original models with the economic variables included.

In contrast to the uniformly negligible coefficients for economic adversity displayed in Table 3 are the large coefficients associated with the stability of racial opinion. Reading across the top row of the table discloses that whites' support for racial equality in 1976 had very much to do with the opinions they had expressed four years before. Opposition to racial busing was particularly tenacious; feelings about change in the racial status quo somewhat less so; opinions on fair housing were much less stable.

These stability coefficients carry a mixed message to the wide-

[6] In these analyses and in others reported later, we always free the correlation between the errors associated with a 1972 indicator and its 1976 duplicate. In each case, the improvement in fit that results surpasses statistical significance under the test for differences in chi-square values. Here and elsewhere we also permit the error associated with evaluation of civil rights leaders (in 1976) to correlate with the error associated with evaluation of black militants (also in 1976). This procedure also yields a statistically significant improvement in overall fit.

spread asumption that racial socialization is complete by the onset of adulthood (see, e.g., Harding et al., 1969). They imply both that racial beliefs are comparatively durable (cf., Converse and Markus), and that they are far from fixed. Racial socialization does not end with adolescence. The impermanence of racial opinion documented in Table 3 suggests that there are opportunities for adult experience to affect opinions on racial equality—especially opinions on fair housing. Table 3 also makes clear that this promise need not be realized. Contrary to the displacement hypothesis, the frustrations of whites' economic experiences appear to be quite irrelevant to their support for racial equality.

Of course, there is no reason to demand that displacement operate exclusively through economic frustration. As a second test of the hypothesis, we examine the racial repercussions provoked by intrusions of crime and violence on private life. As in the economic domain, frustration associated with personal safety was assessed with both subjective and objective indicators taken from the 1976 interview. Subjective concern over safety was measured by a single question, Neighborhood Safety, which reflects whites' appraisals of the safety of their own neighborhoods. Crime experiences were also assessed: whether or not the respondent or someone in the respondent's family had recently witnessed a crime, had a car stolen, a home broken into, or been personally assaulted. Responses across these questions were summed to form an overall index, Victimization.[7] To estimate the effects of personal safety on whites' support for racial equality, the same maximum likelihood estimation procedure was followed, this time with Neighborhood Safety and Victimization replacing economic adversity variables.

The resulting coefficients, presented in Table 4, show checkered support for the displacement hypothesis. Of the three types of racial equality beliefs, opinions on fair housing were the most affected.

[7] The exact questions are:

Neighborhood Safety: Would you say that it is safe to go out walking around here alone at night?

Yes	65.1%
No	35.9

Victimization: Please tell me if any of the following things have happened to you or anyone in your immediate family within the last year (% yes).

Witnessed a crime	6.1%
Had your home or apartment broken into	10.8
Had your car broken into or stolen	11.7
Was physically attacked or had something taken from by force	3.8

To form an overall index of experience with crime, witnessing was weighted 1, physical attack was weighted 3, the other two were weighted 2.

Table 4. Accounting for Change in Support for Racial Equality: The Impact of Crime and Violence

	Fair Housing$_{76}$ ($N = 752$)	*Change in Racial Status Quo*$_{76}$ ($N = 569$)	*Busing*$_{76}$ ($N = 577$)
Opinion in 1972	.428*	.795*	.911*
	(.063)	(.078)	(.121)
Neighborhood Safety	.064**	.031	−.013
	(.025)	(.020)	(.051)
Victimization	.070**	.072**	−.062
	(.035)	(.030)	(.081)
χ^2/df	1.4	1.0	.4

* $p < .01$. ** $p < .05$.

NOTE. Entries are the unstandardized LISREL coefficients, with standard errors of the estimates given in parentheses. A positive coefficient means that discontent over personal safety is associated with conservative change.

Whites who believed their own neighborhoods unsafe, or who were unlucky enough to be criminally victimized, became less supportive of neighborhood desegregation. These effects, though statistically reliable, are quite modest. For instance, pervasive victimization (witnessing crime and suffering burglary, theft, and personal assault) was sufficient only to nudge whites who were exactly ambivalent about fair housing in 1972 to slightly oppose it in 1976 (a shift of less than one along a seven-point scale).

Confrontations with crime—real and imagined—affected opinions toward change in the racial status quo somewhat less. Neighborhood safety was completely irrelevant to whites' enthusiasm for alterations in the racial status quo. Actual encounters with crime and violence dampened that enthusiasm only slightly.

Finally, the relevant coefficients for opinions on racial busing are uniformly feeble. As Table 4 indicates, neither worries about victimization nor victimization itself had anything to do with hardening whites' opposition to racial busing. As before, whites' opinions on busing seem insulated from the circumstances of private life.

Insofar as displacement occurs, then, it is energized by the intrusions of crime and violence on private life, not by personal economic adversity. The consequences of such displacement for racial equality beliefs are likewise contingent, confined chiefly to opinions on neighborhood desegregation. Such contingencies increase in Figure 2, which portrays the results of reestimating the three statistically significant coefficients reported in Table 4 separately within each of three age groups. As indicated there, apprehension about safety and experiences with crime took on racial significance mainly for the



Figure 2. Impact of Crime and Violence on Support for Racial Equality, Within Age Groups

elderly. For young and middle-aged whites, neither the belief that the neighborhood was unsafe nor direct encounters with crime had anything to do with changes in their advocacy of racial equality. But among the elderly—perhaps because of their greater vulnerability—support for racial equality declined as crime and violence loomed large.[8]

Our tests of the displacement hypothesis thus leave behind an uneven empirical record. Racial resentments do seem to "soften the disappointments of life"—under some circumstances (provoked by apprehensions over personal safety), taking some forms (expressed principally in terms of opposition to neighborhood desegregation), and for some people (the especially vulnerable). This contingent pattern is, moreover, open to alternative interpretation. For the connections whites do draw between crime and violence in their own lives and their opposition to racial equality may be understood not as corroborating the displacement hypothesis, as we have maintained here, but rather as supporting realistic group conflict theory, to which we now turn.

[8] We also explored the possibility that the consequences for opinion on racial policy of crime and violence might be greater for women than for men. In one sense this turned out to be true. Women reported greater vulnerability than did men: 47.6 percent of the women thought their neighborhood was unsafe, while only 19.4 percent of the men did so (Tau-Beta = .29, $p < .01$). But the consequences of such judgments for opinion on race were essentially identical for men and women. Thus women more than men grew conservative in their racial opinions due to feelings of vulnerability to crime—not because feelings of vulnerability acted more powerfully on women, but because more women felt at risk.

Testing Realistic Group Conflict Theory

Realistic group conflict theory predicts that to the extent blacks threaten whites' tangible interests, whites should oppose movement toward racial equality. Threats to personal safety, to the sanctity of home and neighborhood, and to children's schooling are three vivid examples, each of which is considered here. We begin by examining the possibility, suggested in the preceding paragraph, that reactions to crime and violence affect opinions on race only when these experiences take on a racial cast.

To do this in an entirely satisfactory way we would need to know more about whites' experiences with crime. Who makes them feel uneasy about the safety of their neighborhoods? Who are the perpetrators of the crimes they report? Unfortunately, such information can only be approximated. The 1976 survey included a question that asked respondents to report on the racial composition of their own neighborhoods. Their answers enable us to see whether, in keeping with the spirit of realistic group conflict theory, the effects of crime and violence on whites' support for racial equality are heightened among whites living near blacks. Does the *racial* impact of crime and violence increase for whites who reside in racially mixed neighborhoods?

Figure 3 presents the statistically significant coefficients representing the impact of crime and violence on support for racial equality (from Table 4) reestimated separately for whites living in two types of neighborhoods: all white (59 percent) and racially mixed (41 percent).



Figure 3. Impact of Crime and Violence on Support for Racial Equality, Within Racial Composition of Neighborhood

If realistic group conflict theory provides the appropriate theoretical framework for understanding the racial consequences of crime and violence, the coefficients should increase among respondents living in racially mixed environments. As Figure 3 indicates, they do not; if anything, the coefficients decrease. This suggests that those changes in support for racial equality traceable to whites' reactions to crime and violence should be understood in terms of displacement, not group conflict.

What of other manifestations of racial threat? Our next analysis concentrates on two potentially explosive conflicts: the threats blacks seem to pose to the sanctity and property value of the neighborhood and to the quality and safety of children's schooling. The first of these was operationalized with the variable Neighborhood Racial Composition, described above. Whites' racial vulnerabilities with respect to their children's education were assessed with a pair of variables. Likelihood of Busing sorts whites into one of three categories: those in school districts currently experiencing busing (25 percent in 1976), those in districts where busing is likely to occur in the future (8 percent), and those in districts where busing in the future is improbable (67 percent). Grade School Racial Composition represents the racial mix of the area's grade school (again, as reported by the respondent), and ranges from all white (35 percent in 1976) to predominantly white (50 percent) to racially mixed (15 percent).[9] Ac-

[9] The exact questions plus marginals are:

Neighborhood Racial Composition: Is this neighborhood you live in all white, mostly white, about half and half, mostly black or all black?

All white	58.6%
Mostly white	36.2
About half and half, Mostly black, All black	5.2

Likelihood of Busing: In some places, school boards are taking some children out of their closest neighborhood schools and sending them by bus to other schools farther away. Has anything like this happened around here?
(If "No" or "Don't Know"): Have you heard any talk that this might happen around here in the future?

Busing happening now	25.2%
Busing likely in the future	7.5
Busing *un*likely in the future	67.3

Racial Composition of Grade Schools: Is the grade school nearest you all white, mostly white, about half and half, mostly black or all black?

All white	35.3%
Mostly white	49.7
About half and half, Mostly black, All black	15.1

The racial composition of the neighborhood and that of nearby grade schools, both as reported by the respondent, correlated .48.

Table 5. Accounting for Change in Opinion on Racial Policy: The Impact of Vulnerability to Racial Threat

	Fair Housing$_{76}$ *(N = 690)*	*Change in Racial Status Quo*$_{76}$ *(N = 521)*	*Busing*$_{76}$ *(N = 526)*
Opinion in 1972	.439*	.751*	.898*
	(.069)	(.080)	(.138)
Neighborhood Racial Composition	−.042	.035	−.204
	(.093)	(.072)	(.192)
Likelihood of Busing	−.011	.075	−.141
	(.057)	(.045)	(.127)
Grade School Racial Composition	.143	.042	.355**
	(.083)	(.067)	(.176)
χ^2/df	2.0	1.0	.9

* $p < .01$. ** $p < .05$.

NOTE. Entries are the unstandardized LISREL coefficients, with standard errors of the estimates given in parentheses. A positive coefficient means that vulnerability to racial threat is associated with conservative change.

cording to realistic group conflict theory, vulnerability to racial threat, expressed in these terms, should diminish whites' support for racial equality.

The evidence, presented in Table 5, runs strongly counter to this prediction. Of the nine coefficients representing the effects of racial vulnerability, just one attains statistical significance (and that barely); four have a sign opposite to that predicted. In the sole confirmation of realistic group conflict theory, whites living near desegregated grade schools became somewhat more opposed to racial busing.

Elsewhere in Table 5, realistic group conflict theory encounters nothing but trouble. In particular, whites' feelings about alterations in the racial status quo were irrelevant to the tangible threats blacks seemed to pose to their neighborhoods or to their children. Similarly, whites' support for fair housing had nothing to do with whether their own neighborhoods were racially mixed or lily white. This conclusion applies just as strongly to homeowners, who presumably have the most invested in their neighborhoods. When a separate estimate was generated for homeowners alone, opinions on housing desegregation continued to be independent of the racial composition of the nieghborhood.[10] Finally, Table 5 also reveals that opposition to racial busing was no more intense among whites actually faced with the tangible consequences of busing than among whites personally un-

[10] For the sample as a whole, the appropriate coefficient, shown in Table 5, is −.042, with a standard error of .093. For homeowners alone ($N = 521$), it is −.079, with a standard error of .125.

touched. (For similar results, based on cross-sectional comparisons, consult Gatlin et al. 1978; Kinder and Sears, 1981; McConahay and Hawley, 1977; Raffel, 1980; Sears et al., 1979.) If anything, the effect runs slightly in the opposite direction, growing more pronounced among those with the most at stake. Parents with children enrolled in public schools tended to *support* busing the more probable it became.[11]

Summary and Conclusions

Guided first by the displacement hypothesis, we examined whether change in support for racial equality could be traced to the stresses and strains of private life, and obtained mixed results. Opinions on public policy regarding race appear untouched by economic frustration. Contrary to conventional thinking, and contrary to the displacement hypothesis, resistance to racial change, to fair housing, and to integrated schools had little to do with the economic deprivations of private life.

Support for racial equality *was* affected by a second kind of frustration, however: that provided by personal exposure to crime and violence. In keeping with the displacement hypothesis, encounters with crime and feelings of vulnerability (particularly among the elderly) stiffened opposition to racial equality (particularly to neighborhood desegregation). Insofar as whites' personal frustrations find racial expression, they are those that stem from exposure to crime and violence, not from economic decline.

An explanation for this difference may lie in the distinction between *intropunitive* styles of blame, in which individuals hold themselves accountable for their unhappy experiences, and *extrapunitive* styles, in which frustrated individuals blame external forces and agents for their troubles (Allport, 1954: chap. 20). Encounters with crime and violence would seem to invite extrapunitive explanations. One of the most unsettling features of street crime is its unpredictability. This no doubt discourages self-blame, and personal frustrations for which the self is blameless are ready material for displacement. Hence crime and violence may represent a source of racial antagonism with few equals. In this light, the modesty of effects associated with the personal intrusions of crime and violence is striking.

[11] The impact of busing likelihood on opposition to racial busing for the entire sample is given by a maximum likelihood coefficient of −.141, with a standard error of .127, as shown in Table 5. For parents with children in the public schools alone (N = 219), it is given by −.591, with a standard error of .260.

Equally striking is the collapse, in these data, of realistic group conflict theory. We found little support for the proposition that whites oppose racial equality to the degree that blacks are perceived to threaten their private interests. The menace blacks appeared to pose to whites' safety, to their neighborhoods, and to their children's education had little to do with the support they expressed for racial equality.[12]

Throughout, our most impressive result is the durability of racial opinion, its recalcitrance in the face of ostensibly powerful personal experiences. Support for racial equality seems largely autonomous from the stresses and strains of private life, and from tangible racial threats.

Taken together, our results seem to carry implications for politicians. To some extent, of course, politicians are captured by events and policies not of their own making. But at the margins, they can influence the public's interpretation of contemporary issues. The considerable independence of racial opinion from the circumstances and predicaments of adult life we have discovered here, along with the ambivalence of that opinion, augments the power of political leaders to shape the character of racial politics, in two ways. Leaders can, in some degree, control the public prominence of racial questions. More important, they can mold the public's understanding of racial problems once they emerge.

One measure of this influence can be seen in presidential campaigns. In 1964, Goldwater chose to emphasize his conservative position on civil rights. As a consequence, the southern electorate polarized sharply along racial lines, and racial equality became an important ingredient in the electorate's selection of a president (Converse et al., 1965; Converse, 1972). A similar dynamic may be at work in the moderation of racial opinion that took place between 1972 and 1976, a point documented in Table 1. Although racial equality became no more popular across this four-year stretch, it did provoke less polarization. Registered either as a decline in the proportion taking extreme

[12] The streamlined models have fits of 1.1 (racial change), 1.6 (fair housing), and 1.2 (racial busing). In addition to the analyses described in the text, we undertook two further tests of realistic group conflict theory. In the first, we estimated the effects of racial threat on changes in the polarization of whites' support for racial equality. Whites exposed to racial threat did *not* become more extreme in their opinions on racial equality. In the second test, we estimated the effects due to *change* in vulnerability to racial threat on change in opinion on racial policy. To accomplish this, we included measures of potential racial threat taken from the 1972 survey. This procedure generated estimates comparable to those reported in Table 5. In short, our further probings of realistic group conflict theory failed to turn up any additional support.

positions or as an increase in the proportion willing to hazard any opinion at all, this tendency to moderation appeared on 8 of the 9 measures. Such moderation in the public mood may have resulted, at least in part, from a corresponding moderation in campaign rhetoric. By most accounts, racial policy was both substantially more prominent and more passionately debated in the McGovern-Nixon campaign than it was four years later, in the Carter-Ford contest (see, for example, Page, 1978).

Race shows no signs of losing its potency as a source of political conflict. As racial inequalities persist, debate over the proper role of government in reducing inequality will no doubt continue. Our last point is simply that the character of American politics with regard to race hinges not just on the public's racial sentiments or on events that cannot now be foreseen, but also on the choices made by public leaders.

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From Parties to Candidates: Examining the Role of the Media

MARTIN P. WATTENBERG

PERHAPS the most important factor in reshaping the American electoral scene in recent years has been the tremendous growth of the media. Whereas once candidates for public office had to rely on mustering organizational strength to communicate with voters, it is now increasingly possible for them to establish direct contact through the media. As a result, what Agranoff (1976) has labeled "the candidate-centered campaign" has come into prominence. Once a major theme of most campaigns was the candidate's party affiliation, while now candidates often run campaigns which deemphasize party ties whenever possible. As Fiorina (1980: 33) has written, "Candidates would have little incentive to operate campaigns independent of parties if there were no means to apprise the citizenry of their independence. *The media provide the means* [emphasis added]."

Concurrently with the rise of the candidate-centered media campaign, the salience of political parties in the electorate has declined markedly (see Wattenberg, 1981). That the new style of campaigning has been one of the primary forces responsible for this trend is

Abstract This article examines the relationship between campaign media expenditures and the saliency of attitudes about parties and candidates in the electorate using data from the 1978 National Election Study and the Traugott/Goldenberg study of campaign managers. A negative relationship is found between media spending and party saliency. In contrast, a strong positive correlation is shown to exist between media expenditures and candidate saliency. These relationships are found to be accentuated when the party organizations in the congressional district are weak and where political action committees contribute a large proportion of the total campaign expenses.

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The author wishes to thank Michael Traugott and Edie Goldenberg for making the data from their 1978 survey of congressional campaign managers available for this analysis. They, of course, bear no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. Data from the 1958 and 1978 National Election Studies were provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:216–227 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-216/$2.50

frequently stated in the literature (e.g., Sorauf, 1980: 255). Yet the evidence for such an important assertion has remained almost entirely impressionistic. The goal of this paper is to remedy this deficiency by describing the extent of the relationship and the conditions which foster it.

The Data Base

In absence of time series data concerning the use of media in campaigns, this inquiry relies on data from 78 campaigns for the House of Representatives in 1978. Information about media expenditures and other aspects of the campaign were gathered by Michael Traugott and Edie Goldenberg in their survey of Democratic and Republican congressional campaign managers. Because the interviews with the campaign managers were conducted in the same districts as the 1978 CPS Election Study, it is possible to see whether the districts with heavy media campaigns are also those where the saliency of political parties in the electorate is lowest.

Such a cross-sectional correlation does not, however, provide evidence from which to infer a definitive causal relationship. In fact, the causality probably operates to some degree in both directions, with reliance on the media weakening the salience of partisan attitudes in the electorate and with low levels of party salience increasing the probability of waging a more candidate-centered media campaign. However, regardless of the causality underlying the relationship, its existence indicates that the media are playing a role in the process of transforming the public's focus on politics from parties to candidates.

Media Expenditures and Party Saliency

For many years it was a point of conventional wisdom of political science that congressional elections are primarily partisan affairs in which voters cast their ballots for the candidate of their party with little or no knowledge of the candidates (Stokes and Miller, 1962). To be sure, some deviations from the normal vote were to be expected, but by and large national forces rather than individual candidates were thought to be at the root of such deviations (e.g., Tufte, 1975). However, over the last several years many researchers have come to question whether such an interpretation of congressional elections remains valid. The percentage of party-line votes cast in congressional elections has fallen steadily from 84 percent in 1958 to only 69 percent in 1978. In fact, in 1976 more votes were actually cast according to party lines in the presidential race than for the House

(Mann and Wolfinger, 1980). Furthermore, such a change cannot be traced solely to the growth of Independents—there is evidence that a good portion of the change has resulted from the fact that party identifiers less frequently use party labels as a cue in congressional races (Ferejohn, 1977).

That parties are far less salient to the electorate than in the past during congressional elections—even controlling for strength of party identification—is shown clearly in Figure 1. In both the 1958 and 1978 Congressional Election Studies respondents were asked what they liked and disliked about the Democratic and Republican parties. The mean number of responses citizens made to these questions was 3.4 in 1958 compared to only 1.9 in 1978—a decline of close to 50 percent in the space of 20 years. In addition, within levels of strength of party identification, similar patterns can be seen in Figure 1, indicating that for many people the partisan labels may remain intact even though the parties apparently mean much less to the public than previously. Certainly such a change cannot be attributed to any greater difficulty in articulation, for education has risen sharply in the electorate during this period.[1]

Through the media, congressional candidates now have the capability of making themselves far more visible than in the past, and to



Figure 1. Decline in the Number of Likes and Dislikes About the Political Parties: 1958 and 1978 Compared

[1] Differences in education, however, do probably account for why independent leaners in both 1958 and 1978 offered more responses about parties than the less-educated weak partisans.

the degree that their campaigns are run independently of party one would expect a decline in the saliency of political parties in the electorate and the intensity with which they are viewed. In order to test this hypothesis, two methodologically different measures were created from the 1978 Election Study data, one representing the salience of the parties and the House candidates, the other the intensity of the respondents' feelings. The first involves simply counting the number of responses made to the likes/dislikes questions about both parties and candidates, as with the data in Figure 1. The second measure makes use of the respondents' feeling thermometer ratings of the two parties and candidates. Feeling thermometers are now a standard CPS interview technique in which citizens are asked to express their opinion about a person or group on a scale from zero degrees, indicating "very cool" feelings, to 100 degrees, indicating "very warm" feelings. Since the 50-degree mark is explicitly labeled "neutral," the distance from 50 degrees can be said to represent the intensity with which the respondent regards the object.[2] Thus, a person who rates the Democratic party at 100 degrees and the Republican party at zero was given an intensity score of 100 with regard to parties, while someone who gave ratings of 60 and 40 was given an intensity score of only 20. In each case the ratings of the two parties add up to 100, but in the former they represent a far greater intensity because of the greater distance each is from the neutral point.

In addition to being methodologically different, these two indices also tap somewhat different dimensions of the public's attitudes about the candidates and parties. The likes/dislikes questions are more cognitively oriented, measuring the degree to which respondents have learned about candidates and parties. In contrast, feeling thermometers are more affectively oriented, indicating how intensely individuals feel about the object being rated. Thus one could theoretically express many likes and dislikes about an object but score very low on the feeling thermometer index because of either a balance of likes and dislikes or a simple lack of concern about them. Alternatively, one could also score high on the feeling thermometer index but not be able to express any likes and dislikes because of problems of articulation or because affect is present without cognition.

For the purposes of this analysis, campaigns are best specified as interactive events in which voters can learn about specific candidates and parties from the efforts of both sides. For example, the salience of the Democratic party may be just as much due to the negative

[2] Those respondents who say they "don't know" or that they don't recognize the candidate or party are also placed at the 50-degree point.

advertising undertaken by the Republicans as the positive appeals by the Democrats. Therefore, the candidate and party salience and intensity measures are calculated on the basis of respondents' attitudes in each district toward both the Democrats and Republicans. Similarly, the major independent variable of this analysis, the amount of money spent on media advertising, involves adding together what the two campaign managers estimated their campaign expenses to be in this area.

Table 1 shows the relationship between the amount of money spent in the campaign on media (both mass media and other media, such as billboards and buttons) and candidate and party salience and intensity.[3] It is hardly surprising to find that as the two candidates advertise more they become more salient to the general public—after all, that is part of the purpose of their doing so. However, it is not self-evident that a higher level of campaign media expenses should be associated with a lower degree of party salience in the electorate as is shown by the negative correlations in Table 1. If partisanship were stressed in campaigns, one might expect these correlations to be positive. But apparently the effect of candidates' media advertising is solely the projection of candidate images, and not that of parties.

The Mediating Effect of Local Party Organizations

One of the factors that may affect the relationship between media advertising and party saliency is the strength of the local party organizations in the district. Although party machines capable of single-

Table 1. Correlations Between Amount of Advertising/Media Expenses of Congressional Campaigns in Each District with Levels of Party and Candidate Salience and Intensity

	Candidates	*Parties*	
Feeling thermometers[a]	.31	−.19	(N = 78)
Likes/dislikes[b]	.39	−.12	(N = 78)

[a] This measure represents the average distance from 50 degrees which respondents rate the candidates or parties.

[b] This measure represents the mean number of likes and dislikes expressed by the respondents in each district concerning the candidates or parties.

[3] Although these correlations have been calculated on the basis of data about only 78 congressional districts, it should be kept in mind that the mass level data from each district consists of approximately 20 interviews, for a total of roughly 1,600 One could thus match the campaign managers' data to each respondent in the appropriate district and then perform the same correlations on a sample size 20 times greater. However, the theoretical focus of this article is to explain variance between districts rather than variance within districts. Therefore, in order to eliminate variance within districts, mean scores have been used throughout this analysis.

handedly electing candidates have virtually disappeared, party organizations nevertheless still play a significant role in determining the electoral outcome in many areas of the country. Of all the campaign managers who were interviewed in 1978, 12 percent said that they thought their party organization would be very important in determining the outcome of the general election for Congress in their district, 15 percent stated it was quite important, 30 percent fairly important, 29 percent not very important, and 14 percent stated that it was not at all important.[4]

Because the level of analysis for this inquiry is the congressional district, the responses from both managers in each race were combined in order to create a variable measuring the importance of local party organizations. In 26 districts both managers stated that the party organization would be at least fairly important in determining the electoral outcome, while in 35 others both said that their organization was not important, or else one said it was only fairly important and the other that it was not important. (Cases where one manager said the organization was very or quite important and the opponent said it was not important have been excluded from this section of analysis).

Table 2 demonstrates that when the party organizations are judged to be important in influencing the vote, the relationships between media expenses and candidate and party salience and intensity are quite different than when the organizations are not perceived as important. Correlations between media expenditures and the feeling thermometer and likes/dislikes measures are much more negative in districts where the organizations are unimportant than where they are important. It may be that candidates simply do not have any reason to orient their media strategy toward any sort of partisan appeal when the organization is not important, for such tactics are not likely to be beneficial to them.

Table 2. Correlations Between Amount of Advertising/Media Expenses of Congressional Campaigns in Each District with Levels of Party and Candidate Salience and Intensity, by Strength of Local Party Organizations

	Candidates	*Parties*	
Feeling thermometers			
Party organizations important	.18	−.09	(N = 26)
Party organizations not important	.50	−.42	(N = 35)
Likes/dislikes			
Party organizations important	.26	.02	(N = 26)
Party organizations not important	.64	−.21	(N = 35)

[4] In all but a few cases where no preelection interview was obtained this question was asked before the election. Therefore, the responses are not subject to rationalization based on the outcome of the election.

That party organizations do have the potential to be of substantial aid to candidates, however, is indirectly indicated by the much lower correlations between media expenditures and the candidate salience measures where the organizations are judged by the managers to be important. It is unlikely that money spent on the media in these districts is less effective. Rather, it is more plausible that where party organizations are strong, the amount of money spent on the media will have less effect on candidate salience because it represents a much smaller proportion of the total communications from the candidates to the voters. In these areas other activities—such as canvassing by the organizations—may be substantially responsible for levels of candidate salience, and this may reduce the correlations with the level of media advertising.

To summarize briefly, the strength of the local party organization is an important specifying variable in the relationship between media expenditures and the party and candidate salience and intensity measures. Where the parties are not thought to be important in determining the outcome by campaign managers, the degree of media advertising is more negatively related to party salience and intensity and more positively related to candidate salience and intensity measures.

Mass Media Versus Other Media

Yet all media are not alike. Thus far, a variety of types of media expenses—from TV ads to billboards—have been lumped together to represent all the efforts of the candidates to put themselves in touch with the voters. Fortunately, the managers were also asked to estimate how they allocated their advertising/media budgets. The most important distinction that can be made between types of media expenses is that between mass media (TV, radio, and newspapers) and other more indirect media (campaign literature, buttons, billboards, etc.). The latter are obviously more dependent on backing from a strong organization, since such advertising requires someone to pass out the literature and buttons and put up the yard signs. In contrast, money can easily buy all the skills necessary to make mass media advertisements effective.

Therefore, one would expect that in districts where the party organizations are important, a greater percentage of campaign advertising expenses will be devoted to media other than TV, radio, or newspapers, and this turns out to be the case. In districts where the local party organizations are not important, candidates allocate roughly 20 percent more of their budget to the mass media than in districts where

the organizations are perceived to be strong—73 percent versus 54 percent.

The consequences of this difference are illustrated in Table 3. Evidently, mass media advertising is negatively related to party salience regardless of whether or not the local party organizations are important—perhaps because the mass media orient advertising toward the projection of candidate images rather than party images. Even if a candidate should go out of his or her way to attempt to portray a partisan image through the mass media, the crucial fact is that the voters are looking at, listening to, and reading about the candidates.

The party salience measures, however, show a different pattern in areas with strong organizations compared to those with weak organizations. Where the party organizations are not important, spending on both types of media is negatively related to party saliency and intensity, but in areas with strong party organizations only the correlation with mass media expenditures is negative. The reason for this difference probably has to do with the way these other types of media advertising are disseminated. If autonomous candidate-centered organizations are completely responsible for distributing this material, then it is easy to see how party salience might suffer, but when party organizations participate in passing out leaflets and other material, then one should not expect to find such an effect.

In sum, in districts where party organizations are considered to be unimportant by the campaign managers, media expenditures are much more negatively related to party salience and intensity for two reasons. First, where the organizations are most important, a smaller percentage of the candidate's media budget is allocated to the mass media, and the mass media are particularly conducive to projecting candidate rather than party images. Second, when party organizations are important, the amount of money spent on other types of media is

Table 3. Correlations Between Salience and Intensity Measures and Amount of Different Types of Media Expenses by Strength of Local Party Organizations

	Candidates		*Parties*		
	Feeling Thermometers	*Likes/ Dislikes*	*Feeling Thermometers*	*Likes/ Dislikes*	
Party organizations important					
Mass media	.09	.27	−.27	−.22	(N = 26)
Other media	.00	−.06	.04	−.03	
Party organizations not important					
Mass media	.46	.61	−.37	−.15	(N = 35)
Other media	.29	.42	−.49	−.12	

not negatively correlated with party salience, for the organization participates at least to some degree in these activities.

However, the potential of local parties to reverse the decline of partisan attitudes in the electorate should not be exaggerated. Even if local parties were to become better organized and effective in the near future, there is little they can do to prevent the probable increase in direct candidate appeals through the mass media. Furthermore, it is likely that local parties will become even more dispensable to candidates as political action committees (PACs) continue to multiply and provide services that previously were often provided by the parties.

The Role of PAC Campaign Contributions

The post-Watergate campaign finance reforms have had a major effect on how political campaigns are run in the United States. One of the most notable changes involves the rapid growth of PACs, each of which represents a specific interest group rather than the aggregation of groups which parties represent. PAC contributions to congressional campaigns have grown steadily in recent years. In 1978 PAC contributions amounted to one-quarter of the funds raised by congressional candidates compared to only 7 percent for parties (Malbin, 1980:154). Some observers, such as Fred Wertheimer of Common Cause, have even speculated that soon PACs will virtually dominate congressional campaigns.

In the context of this article the growth of PACs is important for two reasons. First, PACs threaten to further displace the party organizations as a useful tool for political candidates. Not only are they contributing significant amounts of money to campaigns, they are also rapidly learning how to aid candidates in organizational tasks. Second, PAC money is interested money and therefore bound to have a major influence on how campaigns are conducted. It is increasingly difficult for candidates to make broad partisan appeals when their campaign treasuries become dependent on pleasing a variety of special interests.

Table 4 offers support for the first hypothesis stated above. The

Table 4. Relationship Between Strength of the Local Party Organizations in the District and Percentage of Campaign Expenditures Contributed by PACs (Row Percents)

Percent from PACs	*Party Organizations Important*	*Party Organizations Not Important*	
Low (0–16%)	56.3	43.7	(N = 16)
Medium (17–33%)	35.3	64.7	(N = 17)
High (Over 33%)	30.8	69.2	(N = 13)

Gamma = .34, r = .21.

greater the proportion of money contributed by PACs, the less likely the campaign managers were to say that the party organizations would be important in determining the electoral outcome, although because of the cross-sectional nature of the data, the causality of this relationship must remain somewhat uncertain.

In addition, as hypothesized above, PAC contributions are also likely to influence the nature of communication messages stressed by campaigns. Thus, the proportion of money contributed by PACs should have an effect on the relationship between party salience and campaign media expenditures. As demonstrated in Table 6, in districts where PACs contributed most heavily, the level of media expenses is far more negatively correlated with the party salience measures than in districts where PACs had least importance. Furthermore, this difference is independent of the strength of local party organizations, as indicated by the partial correlation coefficients.

Conclusion

While this article has documented the negative relationship between media advertising expenditures and party salience, it has probably understated the effect of the mass media in reducing the salience of parties to the electorate in that only controlled media messages have been taken into account. Uncontrolled media messages have probably also fostered the declining salience of political parties. Even newspapers, which were once one of the prime reinforcers of partisanship, now take a largely independent line, especially in the everyday reporting of the news. As James Sundquist (1973: 351) has noted, it is rare today to find a newspaper which endorses a straight party slate: "A self-respecting editor feels obliged to advise his readers to split

Table 5. Correlations Between Advertising/Media Expenses and Party and Candidate Salience/Intensity by Percentage of Total Expenditures Contributed by PACs

	Candidates	*Parties*	
Feeling thermometers			
Low (0–16%)	.41 [.43][a]	.02 [−.02]	(N = 19)[b]
Medium (17–33%)	.39 [.39]	.08 [−.14]	(N = 23)
High (over 33%)	.40 [.60]	−.35 [−.44]	(N = 17)
Likes/dislikes			
Low (0–16%)	.41 [.53]	−.12 [−.03]	(N = 19)
Medium (17–33%)	.34 [.44]	−.20 [−.30]	(N = 23)
High (over 33%)	.65 [.79]	−.25 [−.31]	(N = 17)

[a] Correlations in brackets represent partial correlations controlling for whether the party organizations in the district are judged to be important by the campaign managers.

[b] Case numbers are slightly less for the partial correlations because some districts cannot be categorized as having either strong or weak organizations.

their tickets." And television coverage of politics virtually ignores parties, as acquaintance with personalities is much easier to convey through the visual media than knowledge about abstractions such as political parties.

The ultimate question to consider is whether such changes have been beneficial to the functioning of American democracy. One might argue that the shift in the electoral salience of candidates and parties should foster better representation as the electorate becomes more informed about congressional candidates. However, what voters know about the candidates apparently has little to do with issues. Only 14 percent of the likes and dislikes expressed about the candidates for Congress in 1978 could be said to be references about matters of public policy, compared to 47 percent of the responses about political parties. As Miller and Stokes (1966: 371) concluded in their classic study of constituency influence in Congress during the late 1950s, the party symbol performs a crucial linkage in the representation process because "the constituency can infer the candidates' position with more than random accuracy even though what the constituency has learned directly about these stands is almost nothing." With parties becoming increasingly less likely to perform this linkage and without voter knowledge of congressional candidates' positions, the chances for faithful representation are clearly reduced.

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Jumping on the Bandwagon with the Underdog: The Impact of Attitude Polls on Polling Behavior

STEPHEN J. CECI AND EDWARD L. KAIN

As POLLS of political opinion continue to become more sophisticated and information concerning their results reaches wider and wider audiences, it is increasingly important that we understand how access to information from public opinion polls affects the behavior of individuals in subsequent attitude surveys. How, exactly, does previous information affect responses to items measuring the strength and direction of candidate preference? Are respondents more or less likely to support a political candidate who appears to be currently leading in national polls?

Several researchers have examined the impact of early election returns from the East Coast on voting behavior in western states during presidential elections. Research on both the 1964 race between Goldwater and Johnson (Fuchs, 1966; Mendelsohn, 1966) and the Nixon, Humphrey, Wallace contest in 1968 (Tuchman and Coffin, 1971) concluded that neither the voter turnout in the West nor the candidate preference was affected by the televised broadcasts of early election returns. If decision making is a *process*, however, it is

Abstract An experimental design was used to examine the effect which previous polling information about candidate preference had upon subsequent polling responses. Subjects were given one of three types of information (Carter commanding a lead, Reagan commanding a lead, no information about current poll results) at two different points in time. This yielded nine information conditions. The data clearly demonstrate that both strength of attitude and candidate preference are influenced by knowledge of previous polling results. The patterns of both *shift* in attitude and *switching* candidate preference are explained in terms of an oppositional reactivity hypothesis.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:228–242 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-228/$2.50

possible that the absence of any bandwagon or underdog effects is a result of the fact that candidate preference grows more stable as election day approaches. Thus, these studies of bandwagon effects sampled voter opinions at a point in time when the impact of information such as televised election returns would be minimal (Mendelsohn and Crespi, 1970; Navazio, 1977).

A further concern with these studies involves the response validity of self-reports of voting behavior. Although two of the studies examined precinct rosters to verify the self-reports of going to the voting booth (Fuchs, 1966, Mendelsohn, 1966) there was no way to validate the self-reports of candidate preference when those votes were cast. A long research tradition has examined response error in surveys of voting behavior (Clausen, 1968; Dinerman, 1948; Miller, 1952; Parry and Crossley, 1950; Traugott and Katosh, 1979). The recent research by Traugott and Katosh (1979) indicates that a fairly large number of respondents misreported their behavior in the 1976 CPS National Election Study. This error was large both in terms of reports of voter registration (15 percent) and reports of voting in the election (14 percent). The substantial majority of misreporting was in the direction of claiming to have voted or registered to vote when this was not, in fact, the case. It appears that some of this misreporting, therefore, was a result of feelings of pressure to give a socially appropriate response.

Two further findings of the Traugott and Katosh research are important to note. The authors suggest that for those whose vote could not be verified, there was a distinct preference for Carter, indicating a small postelection bandwagon effect. Also of interest is the finding that being interviewed prior to the election is clearly linked to levels of voter participation. Further, this effect is cumulative, so that respondents who were interviewed in more than one wave of the election study had successively higher rates of validated voter participation (Traugott and Kotosh, 1979: 370–71).

Navazio (1977) has suggested that research using an experimental design can help assess the impact of previous information upon polling responses. He used questionnaires including four opinion questions which were sent to both an experimental and control group. The experimental questionnaire differed only in the fact that the questions were preceded by the most recent national poll results on those questions. The response differences between the experimental and control groups did not indicate either an underdog or a bandwagon effect when examined as a whole. When occupational groups were compared, however, consistent differences appeared. The national poll results had been strongly negative in evaluating President Nixon.

Given this type of previous information, blue-collar workers were *more* favorable to Nixon than those in the control group, while clerical and white-collar workers were *less* favorable to Nixon than their counterparts in the control group. Thus, Navazio argued that the "opinion poll can play a role as a reference group in itself."

The traditional model of voter decision making has downplayed the role of the media and presidential campaigning in influencing voting behavior of the electorate (Chaffee and Choe, 1980). A dichotomous model of "precommitted voters" and "last-minute deciders" suggests a picture of two voting groups largely unaffected by media information. The precommitted voters do not sway from their stance, and the last-minute deciders lack interest and exposure to the media. Chaffee and Choe (1980) challenge this simplistic model, and argue that a significant number of "campaign deciders" carefully follow election campaigns and make their voting decisions on the basis of this information. Their data collected before, during, and after the Ford/Carter debates support this contention. They conclude that a dichotomous model may be adequate in landslide elections with less information flow, but not when elections are close and many voters are undecided.

The months preceding the Reagan/Carter election in 1980 are indicative of this latter situation. In polls of registered voters conducted by the Gallup organization, the lead moved back and forth from Carter to Reagan several times (Public Opinion, 1980). The closeness of the race, and the large number of undecided voters was highly publicized. We felt it would be informative, therefore, to examine the effects of attitude polls on voter preferences during this period of voter indecision and equivocation. A secondary interest of ours was to investigate the accuracy of self-report data in an experimentally sound and direct manner.

Method

In order to accomplish these dual aims, several hundred students attending a midwestern state university were randomly assigned to various experimental conditions during the week of March 19, 1980. These students were not scientifically selected to constitute a stratified sample of all registered voters in the region or even all registered student voters. However, their responses to items from a March 12 CBS News Survey conducted the week before this study indicated they held nearly identical beliefs and opinions to the national sample regarding the most important foreign, domestic, and economic issues facing America, as well as candidate preferences

(Public Opinion, 1980). Thus, we have reason to believe that our college sample was unremarkable, even though for the purposes of this study it is an unnecessary assumption.

SUBJECTS

Participants were recruited from nine discussion sections of courses in Introductory and Developmental Psychology at a Midwest state university. Several sections were comprised of an above average proportion of older than average students ($\overline{M}$ 27 years, 4 months, S.D. 3 years 3 months for developmental students vs. $\overline{M}$ 19 years 0 months, S.D. 8 months for introductory students).

PROCEDURE

The variable of interest was the relationship between perceived dominance in public opinion polls and stated voting preference. During three consecutive mornings the instructor solicited from students in each of the nine discussion sections of the two courses their presidential preference for either Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan. Students could indicate either candidate's name on a ballot that was provided which forced a choice between the two candidates and had no provision for "Other." The ballot read: "If the 1980 presidential election was held today between Carter and Reagan, who would you vote for?" Students were asked to indicate the strength of their opinions on a seven-point scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly for Carter	Moderately for Carter	Mildly for Carter	Undecided	Mildly for Reagan	Moderately for Reagan	Strongly for Reagan

These morning opinions are referred to as "A.M." throughout the discussion.

In order to manipulate the perceived dominance of the candidates, differential information was presented to the nine different discussion sections. Prior to marking ballots, students in three of the A.M. sections were informed by the instructor that the results of a recent public opinion survey of college-educated persons showed Carter "commanding a substantial lead over Reagan" (+C). The instructor expressed no personal opinion in making this statement. He requested students to perform the presidential rating as part of a research project examining presidential preference as a function of sex, college major, and age. No other information was provided at that time.

In three other morning sections, students were told by the same instructor that Ronald Reagan was "commanding a substantial lead over Carter" (+R). All other details were identical to those described to the (+C) sections.

In the final three A.M. sections neither man was said to be dominant (N). The instructor informed the students in these sections that a recent poll had been made but did not report results. All other details were the same as in the (+C) and (+R) sections.

Each student's presidential preferences ballot was secretly coded so that it was possible to ascertain his/her identity. Later, during the evenings of the same week, confederates posing as national pollsters telephoned the students and requested their presidential preference for either Carter and Reagan, if the election were held at that time. These evening opinions are referred to as "P.M." throughout the text. All confederates were rehearsed in their pronouncements prior to being given the actual names and telephone numbers of the students. Calls were usually made through the State Trunk Telephone System, which resulted in the caller's voice sounding "distant." Confederates were "blind" to the students' original preference ratings, though not to the purpose of the experiment.

Students were first asked by the confederate pollsters for their opinions as to what was the most serious problem facing America—inflation, energy, unemployment, or the Iranian hostage situation. Following their response, students were asked by the confederate pollsters to rate the strength of their presidential preference, but instead of using the original seven-point scale, which may have led to suspicion, they were given a similarly structured verbally anchored scale to rate the candidate of their choice:[1]

Very Favorable Favorable Kind of Favorable Not Sure/Undecided

Prior to requesting students' presidential preferences, the confederate pollsters supplied them with one of three types of information: (1) that a new Louis Harris Poll indicated Carter was far ahead of Reagan (+C), (2) that a new Louis Harris Poll showed that Reagan was far ahead of Carter (+R), or (3) that a new Louis Harris Poll had just been conducted but no dominance data was given (N).

The assignment of students to the P.M. (+C), (+R), and (N) conditions was completely random within the constraint that one-third of each of the original A.M. discussion sections were assigned to each of these polling conditions.

[1] During debriefing, no students professed an awareness of the bogus nature of the P.M. poll solicitation. Most claimed to be genuinely surprised to the point of disbelief when informed that the pollster was not really calling long-distance as part of a national public opinion survey. The A.M. solicitation, which occurred in their classrooms, was one of many such polls that were conducted by the instructor during the semester. Of course, the task demands were such that any suspicion on the students' part that the A.M. and P.M. polls were being conducted by the same individuals would probably bias the data toward stability (same professed A.M. and P.M. preferences) and work against the present hypothesis.

The number of subjects with completed data ($N = 304$) ranged from 30 to 39 in the nine possible combinations of rating conditions (i.e., the three original A.M. discussion section rating conditions *and* the three subsequent P.M. confederate pollster rating conditions). *Completed* data refers to subjects who performed the A.M. rating in class *and* who could be later contacted for P.M. rerating by the confederate pollster. The actual attrition between A.M. and P.M. was low and proportionately distributed across the nine cells. Between 68 percent and 78 percent of the total number of subjects assigned to each cell were contacted for P.M. reratings. There were no sex differences in the attrition levels nor was there any other evidence of selection bias within or across treatment groups. Finally, of the 304 subjects who could be reached for A.M. *and* P.M. ratings there were only two who refused to respond to the questions in a manner appropriate for assignment to one of our coding categories.

Results

Data were organized and analyzed in terms of two closely related measures, *shifting* of the strength of one's opinion (on a seven-point scale) and *switching* of one's candidate preference. It was possible for our subjects to *shift* from their A.M. levels of strength during the P.M. polling while remaining within the same candidate's camp. Shifting occurred when a subject's P.M. rating departed from the A.M. one either in the direction of the other candidate or further in the direction of the same candidate. For instance, going from "Strongly Support Carter" in the A.M. to "Mildly Support Carter" in the P.M. would constitute *shifting* toward Reagan, and going from mild support of Carter to a moderate or strong support of Carter would constitute *shifting* toward Carter.

Switching refers to a complete change of opinion, i.e., from support of one candidate (regardless of the strength of the support) either to the undecided position or to support of the other candidate. Hence, a change from "Mildly Support Carter" to "Undecided" would constitute a *switch*, as would changing from "Strongly Support Carter" to "Strongly Support Reagan." Thus, *shifting* is a measure of any type of movement in attitude, while *switching* only measures change between three positions: "Pro-Carter," "Undecided," and "Pro-Reagan."

PRELIMINARY ANALYSES OF BACKGROUND VARIABLES

Preliminary analysis indicated an absence of systematic or subtantial sex differences of responses in all conditions. Therefore, the

subsequent analyses were collapsed across sex. In addition to an absence of sex differences, preliminary analysis of the older students in the three sections containing a disproportionately large number of older than average students showed they were not significantly different from younger peers in these sections, both on their answers to the CBS New Survey questions and their actual ratings of candidates. Because of this lack of difference, the age distinction will not be treated separately in subsequent analyses. All the students in this analysis are old enough to vote. Thus, voting eligibility should not be a factor in the results which were obtained. However, no data were collected on how the students actually voted later in the year. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized from voter preference to actual voting behavior since the two are not necessarily synonymous.

Figure 1 illustrates the proportions of subjects who shifted from their announced A.M. candidate preferences, as a function of the type of information that was presented during the A.M. and P.M. solicitations. As can be seen there were substantial *shifts* of opinions, especially in the two inconsistent conditions (+C +R and +R +C). Sixty-seven percent of the subjects in the +C +R condition shifted in the direction of Carter. There was no shifting in the direction of Reagan. In the +R +C condition, of the 58 percent of subjects who exhibited some degree of shifting, nearly all did so in the direction of Reagan (i.e, away from Carter). The only exception was a modest 4



Figure 1. Percentage of Respondents Shifting Their Level of Preference

percent of the shifters who moved toward Carter, a chance phenomenon.

Two aspects of the data in Figure 1 are noteworthy: First, the absolute magnitudes of the shifts are quite large. If we exclude, for a moment, the data from the three consistent A.M. and P.M. conditions (+C +C, +R +R, and NN), then it is apparent that the introduction of discrepant A.M. and P.M. information produced sizeable shifting or softening in candidate support. This is most evident in the +C +R and +R +C conditions, wherein over half of our subjects shifted from their A.M. positions. Second, the systematic directional bias of the shifting is also apparent. Subjects typically shifted away from the candidate who was depicted as dominant in the P.M. polling, and this effect was just as strong for both candidates. In the +C +R and N+R conditions, the P.M. shift was away from Reagan, and in the +R +C and N+C conditions the P.M. shift was away from Carter. The +CN and +RN conditions display an opposite trend. Here, the shift is actually toward the candidate who was depicted as being dominant in the A.M. Any difference in the wording of the A.M. and P.M. scales could not be responsible for such dramatic, but opposite findings.

Chi-square tests (1 df) confirmed the following shifting results at the $p < .01$ level: there were significantly higher levels of shifting in the two inconsistent conditions (+C +R, +R +C) than in any of the other conditions. The levels of shifting in these two conditions were not significantly different from each other ($\chi^2 > 1$). The next highest levels of shifting were found in the P.M. only and A.M. only conditions, both being significantly greater than the observed shifting levels in the three consistent conditions (+C +C, +R +R, NN), but not reliably different from each other. Finally the levels of shifting in these consistent conditions were essentially equivalent to each other, all p's $>$ .10.

Table 1 contains the proportions of subjects who actually did and did not switch (diagonals in each cell) from their A.M. positions when polled in the P.M. For purposes of this analysis, three positions were specified, "Pro-Carter," "Undecided," and "Pro-Reagan."[2] The three consistent conditions (+C +C, +R +R, NN) are quite stable. Collapsing over these three conditions, 88 percent of subjects (84 out of 92) did not switch from their A.M. positions. In contrast, the level of switching in the two inconsistent conditions was massive: 59 percent

[2] It makes sense to view the switching data in terms of these three positions since the A.M. and P.M. scales were worded differently in order to keep subjects naive (e.g., A.M.—"Strongly Support Carter" *vs.* P.M.—"Very Favorable Toward Carter"). However, the A.M. and the P.M. scale each provided for clear "Pro-Carter," "Undecided," and "Pro-Reagan" positions.

Table 1. Proportion of Respondents Switching Their Support as a Function of Condition

Candidate Preference in P.M.	*C*	*U*	*R*
+C, +R condition[a]			
C	.206	0	0
U	.235	.118	0
R	.088	.265	.088
+R, +C condition[a]			
C	.200	.267	.133
U	0	.133	.067
R	.033	0	.167
+C, N condition[b]			
C	.303	.03	.03
U	.061	.121	0
R	0	.121	.333
+R, N condition[b]			
C	.316	.184	.053
U	0	.105	.132
R	0	0	.210
N, +C condition[c]			
C	.139	.194	.055
U	.028	.028	.194
R	.028	0	.333
N, +R condition[c]			
C	.308	0	0
U	.231	.026	0
R	.077	.077	.282
N, N condition[d]			
C	.382	0	0
U	.059	.265	0
R	0	.029	.265
+C, +C condition[d]			
C	.333	0	0
U	.033	.20	0
R	.033	.133	.267
+R, +R condition[d]			
C	.433	.033	0
U	0	.267	.033
R	0	0	.233

[a] Inconsistent A.M. and P.M. information.
[b] Information provided during A.M. only.
[c] Information provided during P.M. only.
[d] Consistent A.M. and P.M. information.

of subjects in the +C +R condition and 50 percent of subjects in the +R +C condition switched their positions. Univariate statistical tests demonstrated significantly higher levels of switching in the inconsistent conditions than in either the A.M. only or P.M. only conditions, $p < .01$, which did not differ from each other. However, all these yielded more switching than the consistent conditions (p's $< .10, .05$, respectively). There were no differences in switching levels between any of the consistent conditions.

In order to show the systematic directional bias in these switching data, they were collapsed over A.M. and P.M., separately (Tables 2 and 3). Looking at the first three cells of Table 2 we can see that when our subjects were told in the A.M. that Carter held a dominant lead over Reagan (+C +R, +CN, +C +C) roughly 44 percent declared themselves to be in Reagan's camp, versus roughly 30 percent in Carter's, and 25 percent undecided. When told Reagan enjoyed a dominant lead during the A.M. solicitations (+R +C, +RN, +R +R), only 21 percent declared themselves to be favoring him, versus approximately 53 percent for Carter.

Table 3 shows the same *oppositional* tendency when the data are collapsed over the A.M. Whoever was depicted as being dominant in the P.M. scored less favorably in subjects' P.M. ratings. The sole exceptions are the +RN and +CN cells where neither candidate was depicted as being dominant in the P.M.

CHANGE AS A FUNCTION OF STRENGTH OF INITIAL PREFERENCE

The final analysis was undertaken to determine whether the observed changes from A.M. to P.M. ratings were more likely among the undecided and weakly decided subjects than among subjects professing to be strongly or at least moderately committed to a given candidate. The data in Figure 2 illustrate the proportionate changes as



Figure 2. Percentage of Subjects Who Shifted from Their A.M. Ratings as a Function of Their Initial Level of Preference

Table 2. Candidate Preference in the A.M. (P.M. Categories Collapsed)

	+C, +R	*+C, N*	*+C, +C*	*+R, +C*	*+R, N*	*+R, +R*	*N, C*	*N, R*	*N, N*
C	.206	.364	.333	.60	.553	.467	.389	.308	.467
U	.353	.182	.233	.20	.237	.30	.25	.256	.30
R	.441	.454	.433	.20	.21	.233	.361	.436	.233
	A.M. information = *+C*			A.M. information = *+R*			A.M. information = *N*		

Table 3. Candidate Preference in the P.M. (A.M. Categories Collapsed)

	+R, +C	*N, +C*	*+C, +C*	*+C, +R*	*N, +R*	*+R, +R*	*+C, N*	*+R, N*	*N, N*
C	.233	.194	.40	.529	.615	.433	.364	.316	.433
U	.40	.222	.333	.382	.103	.30	.273	.289	.30
R	.367	.583	.267	.088	.282	.267	.364	.395	.267
	P.M. information = *+C*			P.M. information = *+R*			P.M. information = *N*		

a function of subjects' initial strength of support. It is clear from the overall data (solid line) that the greatest amount of change did, in fact, occur among the undecided and weak supporters of both candidates. For instance, 66 percent of those subjects who described themselves as "Undecided" in the A.M. changed their minds by the P.M. On the other hand, only 30 percent and 22 percent of those characterizing themselves in the A.M. as "Strong" supporters of Carter and Reagan, respectively, changed their minds in the P.M.

Figure 2 also shows the percentage of change among the three groups of subjects who received no biasing information in the P.M. (NN, +CN, and +RN). With the exception of the group of "Mild" supporters for Carter, there was no tendency for these subjects to change as a function of the strength of their initial support. This makes sense, since no new information had intervened to influence them away from their initial ratings. When these three groups are partialed out of the overall data, one witnesses an even more prominent central tendency in the remaining data, that is, the undecideds and weakly decideds were *far* more likely to change from their A.M. ratings than were the strongly decideds.

The significance of these changes was tested by means of separate single-tailed rank median tests on the median levels of shifting for each level of strength. The results were straightforward: the greatest amount of change took place among the undecideds, followed by the mild supporters of Carter and Reagan, followed by the moderate supporters of both men, and the smallest amount of change was seen among their strongest supporters, $T = 6.5$, $p < .005$. Semi-interquartiles were constructed to determine whether there was any asymmetry to this result across the two candidates. However, no significant skewness was apparent, indicating that the magnitude of the opinion changes across the various levels of strength (for the overall data) was similar for both candidates.

Discussion

Initially, our inclination was to try to account for the large amounts of switching in the inconsistent, A.M. only, and P.M. only conditions and the small amount of switching in the consistent conditions in terms of the proverbial "underdog" effect. However, unless a far different meaning is to be attached to this concept, it will mishandle the present data. The notion of "going for the underdog" involves moving from one's *initial* position to that of the person being depicted as nondominant. The presentation of the dominance information supposedly evokes a positive, affective response in the direction away

from one's initial position toward the underdog. However, the P.M. shifting was not really away from the initial position when viewed in terms of the least biased estimate of the group's initial position, i.e., NN, N+C, and N+R. If we take these three "no biasing information" A.M. conditions as the best estimate of our sample's initial position, then it becomes apparent that +C +R and +R +C subjects did not increase their support for the P.M. candidate being depicted as the underdog, vis à vis the group's initial position. The mean initial A.M. positions of the subjects in the NN, N+C and N+R were 3.94 and 3.83 for the males and females, respectively. The presentation of dominance information in the A.M. had the effect of significantly shifting subjects away from the group's initial position. Subsequent inconsistent dominance information in the P.M. resulted in significant departures from this A.M. level back toward the initial position, *but not actually past it*. In other words, dominance information caused our subjects to react oppositionally toward the dominant candidate without actually becoming more favorable toward the underdog even though superficially that is what appears to have happened. For example, females in the +R +C condition shifted from the initial estimate of 3.83 to 3.27 in the A.M. (opposite to + Reagan) and back to 3.90 in the P.M. (opposite to + Carter). This P.M. position was not significantly different from the group's initial estimate (3.83), hence, dominance information did not evoke a positive move toward the underdog, merely movement away from whoever was currently being touted as dominant.

As a test of this *oppositional reactivity hypothesis*, confidence limits were constructed around the mean initial positions for each sex, collapsed over the 140 subjects in the three nonbiased A.M. conditions (NN, N+C, N+R). P.M. positions in the +C +R and +R +C conditions were compared with these "protected" initial positions. In three of the four comparisons (the exception being females in the +C +R condition) subjects' P.M. ratings fell well within the range of the groups' estimated initial positions. This suggests that the seemingly large shifts between A.M. and P.M. in the inconsistent conditions were due to *oppositional reactivity*, not necessarily underdog feelings. A.M. dominance information biased subjects away from the initial group position as did P.M. information. Subjects shifting from this A.M. position in the opposite direction normally did not surpass the initial position, as would be expected if the presentation of dominance information actually increased subjects' "initial" support for the underdog. It will be useful for future investigators to determine whether this oppositional reactivity is primarily a characteristic of college-aged subjects from the Midwest or if it is a more general

tendency of undecided and weakly decided voters in a close contest. It is possible that this phenomenon is more likely to occur among college students who feel that they have little stake in the matter at hand. On the basis of the present findings we hesitate to press the concept terribly hard, though it seems to be the most parsimonious account of the results.

Another reason for constraining the generalizeability of the present findings has to do with the salience attached to the A.M. and P.M. poll results prior to asking subjects for their preferences. Account needs to be taken of the fact that in an experimental situation, such as the one in this study, poll reports may take on a greater salience and influence than they do in a natural context. Manipulating poll reports experimentally may yield the maximum possible effect of "total exposure"—which is probably more "exposure" than similar poll messages have when presented through more natural channels.

The last factor to consider in trying to generalize from these results concerns the issue of different measures in the A.M. and P.M. scales. There is always a potential for systematic differences to occur as a result of small changes in wording. However, in the present study it is not clear how such small changes in wording could account for the systematic, directional A.M. to P.M. changes. Any error or "noise" introduced by changing the wording (done to avoid arousing subjects' suspicion) would be expected to yield across-the-board differences in a single direction. The present data resulted from differential information in the A.M. and P.M. conditions, not from slight scale differences. When the results are shown only in terms of the three major distinctions "Pro-Carter," "Undecided," and "Pro-Reagan" it can be seen that the same directional switching occurred (Table 1). And insofar as both of the A.M. and P.M. scales contained clear provisions for these three choices, slight changes in their wording could not have been a causative factor in producing these results.

A final aspect of these data that requires comment is the allegation that polls are sensitive indicators of the public's attitudes *at a given point in time*. Yankelovich (1980) has argued that fluctuation in the Spring 1980 poll results were due to intervening information affecting those polled. He claimed that a voter's decision is a process that is gradually shaped by dissemination of information about the candidates. Poll results, according to this account, are accurate reflections of the public's feelings at any given point in time, but are susceptible to change as increasing information about the candidate is made known.

The present study, the only one to have examined this argument directly, fails to provide support for it. During a very brief time

interval, our subjects substantially modified their initial positions. It is argued that this shifting was not the product of increasing knowledge about candidates' positions and personalities but oppositional reactivity among weakly decided and undecided subjects. Naturally, this does not mean that intervening information about a candidate's personality or position was unimportant in helping our subjects make their ultimate decision in November 1980. What it means is simply that not all shifting of voter preferences should automatically be interpreted as reflecting *real* movement in voters' perceptions of a candidate's personality or position. The only type of intervening information systematically received by the subjects involved the status of the candidate in national public opinion polls. Our results indicate that this information significantly modified the voter preferences in a very short period of time. This oppositional reactivity has important implications for those who interpret the results of public opinion polls in this country.

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Conformity to AAPOR Standards in Newspaper Reporting of Public Opinion Polls

M. MARK MILLER AND ROBERT HURD

OVER the last decade public opinion polls have become a standard feature of American newspapers. Most newspapers buy syndicated polls from such organizations as Gallup and Harris and readily accept polls from external sources. Many metropolitan newspapers have begun conducting polls themselves, and Hicks and Dunne (1980) have described how a small daily conducts its own weekly public opinion surveys.

While many welcome this development, others have been quick to criticize. Von Hoffman (1980) condemned polls as a form of checkbook journalism. This "manufactured news," he charged, neither accurately reflects opinion nor impresses the public. Other critics have stated that polls are taken all too seriously, consequently altering public opinion and political processes.

The most fundamental criticism of polls is that they can deceive as well as inform. Pollsters know that survey results can be altered by subtle changes in question wording, by differences in interview method, or by sampling different populations. But the public might accept "scientific" survey results without asking if the questions were loaded or the samples biased.

In an effort to make certain that minimal information is made public, the American Association for Public Opinion Research

Abstract This study examines three newspapers' level of conformity to AAPOR standards of minimal disclosure in their reporting of public opinion polls. Analysis of 116 polls published in the period of 1972–79 indicates a dramatic increase in the number of polls reported, but not in the level of conformity to AAPOR standards. Conformity is higher when the polls concern elections rather than nonelection topics, and when newspapers themselves, rather than external sources, are the sources of the polls.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:243–249 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-243/$2.50

(AAPOR) adopted a code of standards of disclosure. To meet these standards, any report of survey results must include:

1. Sample size (the number of persons interviewed).
2. The sponsor (the organization responsible for the survey).
3. Wording (the complete wording of the questions asked).
4. Sampling error (percentage error at some statistical level of confidence).
5. Definition of the population sampled (e.g. adults over 18, registered voters).
6. The method of obtaining interviews (e.g. in person, telephone, mail).
7. Timing (dates when the interviews were conducted).
8. The basis for results that use less than the total sample.

The National Council on Public Polls (NCPP), which is composed of polling organizations, has the same standards as AAPOR's except that the council does not require reporting of sampling error.

The standards are primarily guidelines for pollsters releasing survey results. However, it is obvious that they also were meant to sensitize journalists. The standards and pollster-journalist relations were primary concerns of special symposiums of *Public Opinion Quarterly* in 1971 and 1980 and of a conference sponsored by the National Council of Public Polls and the Kettering Foundation in 1979 (proceedings published in Cantril, 1980).

Despite promulgation of the AAPOR standards in 1969, there has been little systematic research on conformity to them. Broh (1980) examined polls carried in the *New York Times* and by the national television networks. He concluded that journalists focus heavily on horserace aspects of elections and often distort or disregard findings. Paletz et al. (1980) examined polls published in the *New York Times* and broadcast by CBS and NBC. They found that sample size and sponsorship were reported by the *Times* 67 percent of the time, and sampling error, 7 percent. They reported no other data relevant to the AAPOR standards.

The study reported here uses the AAPOR standards as a yardstick for assessing newspaper sensitivity to the public's need for methodological information to interpret public opinion polls. It also examines factors that may be associated with variations in conformity.

Methods

The poll reports of three newspapers—the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Atlanta Constitution*—were selected for consideration because they were indexed back to 1972 under the heading "public opinion polls" or an appropriate synonym, while

other papers were not. The reports examined were indexed specifically as public opinion polls, and such materials as letters to the editor, ten-most-admired lists, and cartoons were not considered. All available reports were examined for the years of 1972–79. No polls were indexed for the years 1973–74; however, by 1978–79 the numbers had increased so greatly that a sampling method was used, taking 23 percent of the items. Even so, 65 percent of the reports examined were from the last two years.

A total of 116 reports were analyzed—58 from the *Chicago Tribune*, 47 from the *Los Angeles Times*, and 11 from the *Atlanta Constitution*. Each report was coded for: paper of publication, year of publication, whether it was an election poll or not, source of poll (syndicate, newspaper, wire service, or other), placement (news or editorial page), and conformity to AAPOR standards.

The AAPOR standard of reporting the basis for results when less than the whole sample is used was eliminated from consideration. Because it was rarely applicable, no valid inferences could be made concerning it.

Another standard that was problematic in coding was sponsorship. Syndicated polls were assumed to have an explicit sponsor despite the fact that it is apparently common practice for pollsters to "piggyback" public opinion questions onto externally funded surveys designed for other purposes. This practice cannot be discerned from manifest content, although the context and order in which questions are asked can alter survey results. Polls with newspapers as the primary source were deemed to have met the standard if the report explicitly stated the newspaper was the sponsor or named another sponsor. Sponsorship was analyzed as coded but excluded from the average conformity.

Analysis of variance was used for the various statistical comparisons. The data were coded zero for nonconformity with a standard and 1 for conformity. Therefore the cell means for comparisons concerning individual standards are percentages. The F-test is not strictly appropriate for dichotomous dependent variables; however, it is robust. Also, tests were conducted on average conformity across six selected standards. The average is approximately normally distributed. The tests of the individual standards and the average are not statistically independent because the individual standards are included in the average.

After the analysis, telephone interviews were conducted with a representative of each of the three papers and the Harris and Gallup organizations to supplement interpretation of the findings.[1]

[1] Telephone interviews were conducted with the person designated as being "the

Results and Discussion

Conformity was highest for sample size and sponsorship, which were reported 85 and 82 percent of the time, respectively. Sampling error, a far more sensitive indicator of poll accuracy, was the least often reported, at 16 percent. These figures are higher than those reported by Paletz et al., perhaps because these authors excluded election year polls. The three newspapers did not differ significantly in conformity to any single stand or in the average conformity across standards.

A central question of this research concerned the possibility that newspaper sensitivity to the standards has increased with the frequency of publishing polls and the promotional efforts of organizations such as AAPOR and NCPP. Analysis of conformity to the standards by year revealed some significant differences. However, conformity was highest in presidential election years, 1972 and 1976, and lowest in nonelection years. Analysis controlling for election reports eliminates the significant effects between years. Newspaper conformity to the standards apparently has not increased despite efforts to promote them, nor has it kept pace with the frequency of publishing poll results.

Whether the survey report dealt with an election or not proved to be the most potent predictor of conformity (see Table 1). Conformity was significantly higher in election polls than nonelection polls for all standards except sample size and sponsorship. Spokesmen for the three papers studied agreed that this finding reflects editorial practice

Table 1. Percentage of Conformity with AAPOR Standards: Election vs. Nonelection

	Nonelection	*Election*	*F Value df, 1,114*
Size	81	89	1.69
Sponsor	87	80	1.01
Wording	34	71	17.47*
Error	2	31	22.19*
Population	66	91	11.56*
Method	38	62	7.02*
Timing	48	76	10.89*
Average	45	70	31.26*
N	55	61	

* $p < .01$.

most knowledgeable on public opinion polling" at each newspaper. These were: I. A. Lewis, Director of the *Los Angeles Times* Poll; Richard Ciccone, Metropolitan Editor of the *Chicago Tribune*; and Jim Rankin, Assistant Executive Editor of the *Atlanta Constitution*. Andrew Kohut, President of the Gallup Organization, and Humphrey Taylor, President of Lou Harris and Associates, were also interviewed. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of these gentlemen.

and stated that election polls are handled more conscientiously because they are more important than other polls. For example, the failure of several polls to predict election outcomes has been attributed to the fact that interviewing was stopped too soon. Timing of interviews is therefore substantially more likely to be reported in election polls than in nonelection polls. Whether or not the poll concerned an election was the only significant predictor of conformity to this standard.

Election polls accounted for 97 percent of the times that sampling error was reported. Sampling error is a relatively complex standard, which requires at least a full sentence to explain. Although spokesmen for the newspapers studied agreed that sampling error should be reported, apparently editors do not deem it worthy of the required space except in election polls.

To test for differences in conformity by source of poll, four categories were considered: (1) syndicated polls, including the Harris, Gallup, and Field Polls; (2) wire service polls, including those from Associated Press and United Press International; (3) newspaper-sponsored polls, including those by the newspapers considered and those from the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* news services, and (4) other miscellaneous polls (see Table 2).

Significant differences were found for wording, error, and method; conformity to these standards was consistently highest for newspaper-sponsored polls.

The spokesman for the *Los Angeles Times* said this difference does not reflect a conscious policy of his paper, but added that in-house polls are probably considered more trustworthy than polls from external sources. The spokesman for the *Chicago Tribune* said that in-house polls were of substantially greater local interest and therefore were reported more fully.

Table 2. Percentage of Conformity with AAPOR Standards by Source of Poll

	Syndicate	*Wire Service*	*Newspaper*	*Other*	*F Value df, 3,111*
Size	91	82	84	67	1.33
Sponsor	100	73	78	84	3.38
Wording	52	18	65	50	5.02*
Error	3	9	28	0	4.24*
Population	79	64	84	85	1.21
Method	28	37	69	34	6.18*
Timing	67	45	67	34	1.79
Average	53	42	65	44	4.93*
N	33	23	54	6	

* $p < .01$.

The fact that polls from outside sources conform less to AAPOR standards could occur either because the required information was never provided, or the material was provided but was edited out. Spokemen for the papers studied indicated that there is substantial variability in the information provided. On the other hand, examination of the reports from Harris and Gallup, the major providers of external polls, indicates that information relevant to the standards is often edited out. Under current practice, Harris generally conforms to NCPP standards, reporting everything but sampling error, and Gallup generally conforms to all AAPOR standards. However, the two organizations differ markedly in their mode of presenting this information. Gallup usually includes methodological details in the text and appends a paragraph on sampling error at the end of reports. Harris generally includes such details as question wording, interview method, sample size, and timing in tabular material following the text. Editors often delete the trailing materials, leaving Gallup with a relatively high average conformity (.75) and Harris with a relatively low average conformity (.35).

Surveys presented as objective fact on the news pages may conform more to reporting standards than those that serve as a basis for opinion on the editorial pages. This proposition is supported for question wording, sampling error, interview method, and average conformity. However, these findings appeared to be largely due to the fact that the *Chicago Tribune* puts the Harris Poll on its op ed page, and only nonsignificant trends remained with Harris polls removed from the analysis. This proposition may warrant further testing with a larger sample of newspapers.

Clearly, newspaper editors do not see the methodological details required for conformity to AAPOR reporting standards as automatically worthy of highly valued news space. Rather, they exercise judgment in deciding when such information should be provided. The results reported above indicate higher conformity to reporting standards in election polls as opposed to nonelection polls, and when the newspaper is the source of the poll. Each of these factors makes a significant ($p < .01$) independent contribution, and there is no interaction between the factors. Whether the poll is newspaper-sponsored or not probably stands for several criteria, including local interest, newspaper prestige, and justification for having allocated resources to conducting a survey. Doubtless numerous criteria enter into editors' judgments concerning the amount of space to allocate to a poll, and further research is needed to investigate such criteria.

Even if the AAPOR standards were strictly adhered to, criticisms of the reporting of polls would remain. Some experts have even

suggested that conformity to the standards can be harmful. Sampling error, in particular, has been singled out as a problem. The spokesman for the Harris organization, which does not routinely include sampling error, argued that reporting sampling error serves no function because the public understands that poll results are estimates. Further, he argued, the public often misinterprets sampling error. On the other hand, the spokesman for Gallup stated that sampling error, along with other information required by the AAPOR standards, is an integral part of the story.

Adhering to the standards does not necessarily address several charges against poll reports, such as their proclivity to undermine political leadership by focusing officials' attention on public sentiment rather than on correct decision making (e.g. Fallows, 1980) or to trivialize elections as horseraces and personality contests (e.g. Broh, 1980). On the other hand, the spokesman for the *Chicago Tribune* argued that polls are an excellent vehicle for presenting issue information to the public because they sustain public interest and can be used to relate issue stands and candidate support.

Editors of the papers agreed that the methodological information required by the AAPOR standards should generally be included in reports of public opinion polls. When asked about newspapers' tendency to omit such information, the Gallup spokesman echoed a common sentiment, stating: "That's too bad."

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Race-of-Interviewer Effects in Telephone Interviews

PATRICK R. COTTER, JEFFREY COHEN, AND PHILIP B. COULTER

SURVEY researchers are well aware that many extraneous factors may affect responses to survey questions. One of these factors is the race of the interviewer. Studies have shown that the responses of both blacks and whites are affected by whether they are interviewed by a member of their own race or by a member of another race (Sudman and Bradburn, 1974; Hatchett and Schuman, 1975–76; Campbell, 1981).[1] According to Hatchett and Schuman (1975–76: 527), "The process for both races seems to be one of avoiding responses that might offend the interviewer of the 'opposing' race, and of being frank (or at least franker) with interviewers of one's own race." Race of interviewer does not affect answers to all survey questions. Rather, the race-of-interviewer effect is generally limited to questions dealing with racial issues (Sudman and Bradburn, 1974; Schuman and Hatchett, 1974; Hyman et al., 1954), and especially to questions asking opposite race respondents about the interviewer's race (Campbell,

[1] Weeks and Moore (1981) found that an ethnicity-of-interviewer effect can occur among other groups.

Abstract Previous studies have found a race-of-interviewer effect on survey questions dealing with racial issues. This effect has been found in both personal interviews and on questionnaires filled out in the presence of an interviewer. This study examines whether a race-of-interviewer effect is also present in telephone interviews. The results show that a race-of-interviewer effect does occur in telephone interviews on racial questions.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:278–284 © 1982 by The Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033–362X/82/0046–278/$2.50

1981). The presence of a race-of-interviewer effect has been found in both personal interviews and on questionnaires filled out in the presence of an interviewer (Sudman and Bradburn, 1974; Campbell, 1981).

In recent years, survey researchers have increasingly relied on telephone interviews to conduct their surveys, primarily because of the lower per unit costs of telephone interviews. The increasing use of this method of interviewing makes it important to determine whether a factor such as race-of-interviewer influences responses in the same manner in telephone interviews as it does in other forms of surveying.

There are at least two reasons why race of interviewer may have little or no effect on responses in telephone interviews. First, in telephone interviews respondents cannot see the interviewer and thus may be unable to determine the interviewer's race. As a result, respondents may feel no need to avoid offending the interviewer. Second, even if the respondent can identify the interviewer's race, the greater physical and psychological distance between respondent and interviewer in telephone surveys may reduce any need the respondent might feel to avoid offending the interviewer.

A race-of-interviewer effect may, however, be present in telephone surveys. Specifically, during the interview respondents may use verbal cues to identify the race of their interviewers. This ability, along with a sense of politeness, may result in respondents seeking to avoid offending their interviewers, despite the distance between them and the interviewers.

Data

The data used to study the existence of a race-of-interviewer effect in telephone interviews were collected by the Capstone Poll at the University of Alabama from a random sample of Alabama citizens 18 years of age and older. A two-stage random digit dialing method was used to select the telephone numbers used in the study (Groves, 1978; Waksberg, 1978). Respondents were randomly selected from among adults living in contacted households. A total of 590 individuals were interviewed. Of those interviewed, 548 answered the questions asking the respondent's race.[2]

Each interviewer participating in the study received training in telephone interviewing techniques. Most of the interviewers had previous telephone interviewing experience. Each of the interviewers is well educated (all have at least some college education) and most are

[2] The six respondents who identified themselves as Hispanic or Oriental are deleted from the analysis.

native southerners. Most of the interviewers (and all the black interviewers) are female.

The telephone numbers used in the study were randomly distributed among the interviewers. The interviewers had no prior knowledge of the racial character of the households they contacted. The question asking the respondent's race was placed at the very end of the survey form. The three black interviewers participating in the study interviewed a total of 137 white and 36 black respondents. The nine white interviewers participating in the study interviewed 302 white and 67 black respondents. The relatively small number of blacks interviewed means that the results involving these respondents should be interpreted cautiously.

The survey contained a number of questions about current political and social issues. Several of these concerned racial issues.

Results

Results of the analysis (Table 1) show that race of interviewer generally has no effect on responses to nonracial questions for both black and white respondents. The only statistically significant relationship ($p < .05$) found for the nonracial questions occurs among white respondents on a question asking about gun control.

Race of interviewer does have an impact on responses to racial questions for white respondents. A statistically significant relationship is found between race of interviewer and responses to 9 of the 13 racial questions. On each of these questions, white respondents interviewed by a black interviewer are more problack than are white respondents interviewed by a white interviewer. The four racial questions on which no significant effect is found deal with the amount of positive change which has occurred in race relations in this country, the respondent's support for desegregation, the respondent's evaluation of the extension of voting rights to blacks, and the occurrence of discrimination in the South.

For black respondents, race of interviewer has a statistically significant effect for only one of the 13 questions dealing with racial issues. On this question black respondents interviewed by a white are more likely to say that it is a good thing that blacks are now allowed to vote than are black respondents interviewed by a black interviewer. Overall, on 9 of the 13 racial questions, the difference between the mean response given by the two groups of black respondents (those interviewed by a white and those interviewed by a black) is less than that found among white respondents. This indicates that

race of interviewer generally has a greater impact among white respondents than among black respondents.

Since all the black interviewers are female while the white interviewers are both male and female, gender rather than race may account for some or all of the relationships found in Table 1. This possibility can be examined by investigating the impact of race of interviewer for only those respondents interviewed by a female.

Results of the investigation (not shown) reveal that race of interviewer continues to have little or no impact on responses to nonracial questions for both black and white respondents.[3] For racial questions, the results parallel those presented above. Race of interviewer affects white respondents' answers to racial questions more strongly than it affects the responses of black respondents.

Conclusion

The existence of a race-of-interviewer effect in telephone interviews was examined in this study. The results of the study are consistent with previous findings concerning a race-of-interviewer effect in other forms of surveying. Specifically, the study found that (1) race of interviewer has little or no effect on nonracial questions, (2) race of interviewer does have an effect on some but not all racial questions, and (3) on racial questions respondents interviewed by a member of another race are more "deferential" to that race than are respondents interviewed by a member of their own race.

The magnitude of the race-of-interviewer effect found here is also similar to that reported for face-to-face interviews (Campbell, 1981). For white respondents the average r^2 is .044 on racial questions on which a significant race-of-interviewer effect was found.

The only inconsistency between the results of this study and previous studies is that a stronger race-of-interviewer effect was found here for white than for black respondents. The general lack of a race-of-interviewer effect among blacks may be the results of the racial questions used in this study. In particular, the questions used here ask about blacks but do not ask directly about whites. Thus, in answering the questions black respondents may have felt no need to be deferential to their white interviewers. If this thinking is correct, then a race-of-interviewer effect will occur in telephone interviews among blacks on racial questions asking their opinions about whites.

It is difficult to determine precisely the reason a race-of-interviewer effect for whites was found on some but not all the racial questions

[3] A table showing the results of this analysis can be obtained from the authors.

Table 1. Race-of-Interviewer Effect for Black and White Respondents for Nonracial and Racial Questions

	White Respondents						Black Respondents					
	White Interviewer		Black Interviewer		Difference	P	White Interviewer		Black Interviewer		Difference	P
	Mean	N	Mean	N			Mean	N	Mean	N		
Nonracial Questions												
Equal Rights Amendment should be defeated (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.46	229	2.63	102	.17	.087	2.77	48	2.84	25	.07	.694
Sex education offered in public schools (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.20	275	2.07	124	.13	.104	1.93	54	2.03	34	.10	.333
Prayers in public schools (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.04	277	2.05	127	.01	.951	1.88	60	1.91	34	.03	.807
Eliminate pornography (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.11	285	2.12	128	.01	.800	2.21	53	2.10	30	.11	.491
Increase defense spending (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	1.90	264	1.99	122	.09	.176	2.22	51	2.48	27	.26	.076
Homosexual's right to teach public schools (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.67	264	2.58	120	.09	.299	2.30	50	2.18	34	.12	.262
Need gun control laws (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.52	271	2.36	121	.16	.051	2.05	57	2.15	33	.10	.399
Creationism taught in public schools (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.04	276	2.04	126	.00	.962	1.90	60	1.94	33	.04	.661
Government not regulate abortion (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.10	277	2.11	128	.01	.951	2.45	58	2.23	31	.22	.143
Bible interpreted literally (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.09	277	2.04	129	.05	.499	1.80	60	1.94	33	.14	.122

Racial Questions												
School busing justified (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	3.24	282	2.98	124	.26	.000	2.46	56	2.53	32	.07	.641
More participation mean fewer poor blacks (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.69	242	2.51	103	.18	.006	2.40	45	2.27	30	.13	.340
Should Washington push school integration (1 = Same schools, 2 = Stay out)	1.76	259	1.50	115	.26	.000	1.29	51	1.29	28	.00	.938
How much real change in position of blacks (1 = A lot, 3 = Not much at all)	1.39	286	1.48	128	.09	.142	1.73	63	1.62	32	.10	518
Civil rights leaders push too fast (1 = Too fast, 3 = Too slowly)	1.52	274	1.82	114	.30	.000	2.25	52	2.29	31	.04	.772
Whites have right to keep blacks out of neighborhood (1 = Whites have right, 2 = Blacks have right)	2.78	282	2.95	122	.17	.003	2.92	63	2.94	33	.02	.800
Favor desegration, segration or something in between (1 = Desegragation, 3 = Segregation)	1.86	258	1.76	113	.10	.164	1.67	55	1.89	27	.22	.222
Washington should improve conditions of minorities (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	2.65	263	2.15	118	.49	.000	1.60	58	1.69	29	.09	.459
Good thing blacks now allowed to vote (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree)	1.77	279	1.71	126	.07	.264	1.38	64	1.73	33	.35	.002
Are blacks discriminated against (1 = Yes, 2 = No)	1.60	275	1.48	122	.12	.037	1.18	57	1.12	32	.06	.536
(If Yes) Racial discrimination higher in South (1 = Yes, 2 = No)	1.79	96	1.68	50	.11	.139	1.41	39	1.22	23	.19	.125
(If Yes) Less discrimination if blacks more active (1 = Yes, 2 = No)	1.63	94	1.46	50	.18	.040	1.23	39	1.21	24	.02	.838
Importance of thinking yourself as black (white) person (1 = Very important, 4 = Not very important)	2.30	285	2.86	118	.56	.000	1.84	63	1.82	34	.02	.933

used in this study. It may be that the questions on which no race-of-interviewer effect was found deal with especially salient issues to whites, or are concerned with issues on which whites do not know how to respond in a deferential manner to blacks.

In conclusion, the results of this study show that a race-of-interviewer effect can occur, at least for whites, in telephone interviews. Some caution is necessary in generalizing this finding, since this study was conducted in a location in which race is an especially salient feature of social and political life. Future studies should examine the existence of a race-of-interviewer effect in telephone interviews conducted in other locations. Until these future studies are conducted, however, the results of this study suggest that survey researchers utilizing telephone interviews should be sensitive to the existence of a race-of-interviewer effect when studying racial questions. Unfortunately, survey researchers will find it hard to control adequately for this extraneous source of variance since it is difficult to arrange a racial match between interviewer and respondent when doing telephone interviews. Perhaps survey researchers, when dealing with racial questions, will have to arrange some sort of contact with the respondent prior to the actual interview in order to determine the respondent's race.

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ACE10-1

POPQAE 46 (3) 301–458 (1982)
ISSN 0033-326X

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The past few years have seen the development of standards for the reporting of survey results in the mass media, and much effort has been devoted to getting the media to adopt disclosure standards. Surprisingly, the scholarly journals over which the survey research community has some control do not themselves have such reporting standards. As a leader in its field, *The Public Opinion Quarterly* will henceforth require that all submissions that make use of survey data not archived at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research or the Roper Center contain the following information:

1. A definition of the population from which the sample was drawn and a statement of the selection procedure sufficient to permit at least approximate replication.
2. The response rate and details of its calculation. (If response rate is not appropriate, the number of refusals.)
3. Dates the survey was conducted.
4. Exact wording of all questions used in the analysis.

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Indicators of Consumer Behavior: The University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers

RICHARD T. CURTIN

THE Survey Research Center at The University of Michigan began a series of periodic consumer surveys more than 35 years ago, under the direction of George Katona. The Surveys of Consumers were developed and based on a theoretical view designated as behavioral or psychological economics (Katona, 1951; 1956; 1964; 1975; 1978; 1980). The underlying theory focuses on the human factor in economic affairs. During the past several decades, changes in consumer expenditures for housing and vehicles have played a major role in determining whether the entire economy slipped into recession or moved toward recovery and growth. The consumer, rather than business or the government, has become the dominant actor in shaping the course of the aggregate economy.

For the analysis of short-run fluctuations in economic activity, consumer outlays can be roughly categorized as either necessary or discretionary expenditures. The aggregate level of expenditures for necessary budget items is more stable over time and shows only small cyclical variation. Consumer decisions regarding necessary expenditures are frequently governed by need and guided by the force of habit, and in some cases, by contractual requirements—as for example, expenditures on shelter or loan repayments. Discretionary expenditures, in contrast, more frequently involve active decision mak-

Abstract Data gathered by the Surveys of Consumers over the past several decades show that changes in consumer attitudes and expectations occur in advance of action. Current data can be measured and used to predict aggregate trends in consumer expenditures for houses, cars, and large household durables, as well as the incurrence of debt and acquisition of financial assets.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:340–352 © 1982 by the Trustees of Columbia University
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ing on the part of the consumer, and the timing of the purchase is subject to greater variation.

Another important characteristic of discretionary expenditures is the investment aspect of these outlays. Houses, vehicles, and large durables are purchased not just for current use, but to provide for future consumption. Since the average usable life of these physical assets is long, and the initial cost is high, consumer purchases often involve the use of loans, to be repaid from expected future earnings. These factors emphasize the need for consumer decisions to take account of expected future developments, not simply their current or past economic situations. Consequently, changes in consumer discretionary expenditures depend not only on income, prices, interest rates, and other traditional market variables, but also on the attitudes and expectations of the decision makers.

Katona postulated that economic optimism breeds consumer confidence and a willingness to make large expenditures and debt commitments, and that economic uncertainty breeds pessimism and a desire to curtail expenditures and rebuild financial reserves. When very many people, at the same time, change from an optimistic to a pessimistic view of economic prospects, Katona postulated, a subsequent and widespread shift toward postponement of discretionary expenditures follows. Since change in attitudes and expectations occurs in advance of action, measures of consumer attitudes and expectations can act as leading indicators of aggregate economic activity. As shown in Figure 1, the Index of Consumer Sentiment has been repeatedly observed to decline prior to recessionary periods (indicated by the shaded portions of the chart).

Survey Content

Many of the questionnaire items used in the Surveys of Consumers date back to the mid-1940s, and were regularly measured three times a year in the 1950s, quarterly from 1960 through 1977, and on a monthly basis since 1978. Each survey contains approximately 40 core questions, each of which probes a different aspect of consumer sentiment. The questions asked cover three broad areas: personal finances, business conditions, and buying conditions. (See Appendix A for a brief description of the core questionnaire items.) Overall assessments of past and expected changes in personal finances are supplemented by measures of the expected change in nominal family income, as well as expected real income changes. Attitudes toward business conditions in the economy as a whole over the near and long-term horizon are measured in detail. Specific questionnaire items



Figure 1. Historical Series—The Index of Consumer Sentiment

NOTE: Each tic mark on the time scale represents the month of January for the indicated year. The National Bureau of Economic Research gives these reference dates for recessions:

November	1948—October	1949
July	1953—May	1954
August	1957—April	1958
April	1960—February	1961
June	1966—November	1967 (growth recession)
December	1969—November	1970
November	1973—March	1975
January	1980—July	1980

A recession is defined as a reduction in the national output of goods and services, generally lasting at least two quarters. A growth recession is defined as a retardation in the rate of growth of output and employment (usually followed by a recession and always the initial stage of a recession).

concerning expected changes in the rate of interest, unemployment, and inflation supplement the more general assessments. Finally, several questions probe for the respondent's appraisal of present market conditions for large household durables, vehicles, and houses. Data on general attitudes toward market price and supply conditions are supplemented by purchase intention data.

The survey measures are not intended to establish the absolute level of consumer sentiment at any given time. They are intended to measure change. Comparisons with previous measurements indicate the direction of change in consumer attitudes and expectations, and to

some extent, the degree of that change. Moreover, the analytic focus is not only on the direction of change, but also on understanding why these changes in consumer attitudes and expectations occur, and how these changes relate to subsequent shifts in consumer behavior.

Consumer attitudes and expectations are constantly changing in response to a continuous flow of events, information, and personal experiences. Even where economic decisions are similar to those made in past situations, there is no guarantee that consumers will respond in the same way, since they are capable of learning and adapting their behavior to changed circumstances. Consequently, a second type of questionnaire item is used to supplement the identical questions asked in each survey. The regularly repeated core questions relate to economic developments which are assumed to be influential at most or all times, such as changes in family income, employment, or prices. But since each new period brings forth new events, each survey also contains several additional questions to ascertain reactions to particular economic developments, such as proposals to change taxes or control prices.

Finally, the surveys contain behavioral measures, especially detail on large consumer expenditures, changes in financial assets and liabilities, household income and employment, and a broad array of demographic characteristics. Overall, a significant part of the questionnaire has remained unchanged for more than a quarter century, and most surveys were supplemented by additional questions formulated according to the requirements of a given time.

A summary measure of trends in consumers' attitudes and expectations is derived from five questions, repeated regularly, which comprise the Index of Consumer Sentiment (Figure 1). (See Appendix B, questions 1–5 for exact questionnaire wording). Two questions are included on past and expected changes in personal finances, two questions focus on the short- and long-term outlook for business conditions, and one question on buying conditions for large consumer durables. Each component question receives equal weight in the calculation of the index. Since it is just as important to know why consumers feel as they do as it is to know how they feel, the index questions are supplemented by questions about people's reasons for their answers. The interviewer probes most answers given by the respondents by asking, for example, "Why do you think so?" or "Why do you say so?" The fixed-question free-response interviewing method yields detailed answers that are recorded as completely as possible by the interviewers. Answers to these probing questions turn up cue words like recession, shortages, unemployment, inflation, and so forth. The frequency of these references at a given time, available

from a content analysis of answers, serves to uncover the salient reasons underlying the changes in attitudes

Sample Design

The samples for the Surveys of Consumers are designed to be representative of all private households in the contiguous United States. Over the history of these surveys, the sample design and survey methodology has included both personal interviews (using multistage area probability methods to select a random cross-section of private dwellings), and telephone interviews (using samples selected from all private households with telephones, based on random-digit-dialing techniques). The basic sample designs differ in that personal interview surveys use census data to assign probabilities of selections to areas (such as to counties, cities, towns, or blocks), whereas national telephone surveys use the unique ten-digit identifier of telephones to generate a random selection of private households.

During the 1950s, the Surveys of Consumer Attitudes were conducted only by personal interviews. Personal interviews remained the dominant form of data collection in the early 1960s, although telephone reinterviews of respondents first interviewed in person at home were interspersed at irregular intervals in the quarterly series of surveys. Since 1976, random-digit-dialed telephone samples have been the dominant form of data collection.

The selection of the sample households, under both designs, is performed after stratification by geography and the level of population density. Stratification by these criteria assures a balanced sample representation of different geographic regions and metropolitan size categories. Both types of samples are drawn so that every eligible household in the contiguous United States has an equal chance of being selected. Several analyses have been performed to determine whether differences in sampling methodologies were related to differences in responses to identical questionnaire items. These studies found minor but not significant difference in overall response patterns (Groves and Kahn, 1979).

Rotating Panel Design

Since January 1978, monthly samples for the Surveys of Consumer Attitudes have incorporated a systematic rotating panel design. For each monthly survey, an independent and representative sample of telephone households is drawn. The respondents chosen in this drawing are then reinterviewed in six months. A rotating panel design

results, with the total sample for any one survey normally made up of approximately half new respondents and half being interviewed for the second time. This combined design permits the regular measurement of change in the aggregate through the use of the independent cross-section samples, and also allows the assessment of change among identical individuals over six-month intervals. The rotating panel design thus permits two separate estimates of change in consumer attitudes and expectations. These two estimates differ more than by just the implied assumptions about measurement and stochastic errors. In economic affairs, it matters a great deal whether a 10 percent aggregate increase in income is distributed evenly among all income classes, or whether sizable income declines on the part of the many were simply offset by even larger increases received by the few.

The rotating panel design attempts to balance benefits with costs, so as to maximize its ability to assess individual change as well as maintain the representativeness of the results. Panel designs provide important information on the attitude-behavior link, and permit, for example, an examination of the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of consumer plans or purchase intentions. The advantages of greater measurement precision of panel designs are also accompanied by greater complexity in the analysis and interpretation of the collected data. Panel studies do not solve problems of causal interpretation, since the observed time sequence of change in attitudes and behavior is not a sufficient or, in some cases, even a necessary condition of the underlying theoretical model. In addition, as the benefits of panel surveys increase with each additional interview, the data also progressively suffer from falling response rates. The tradeoff between losses in representativeness and gains from more detailed panel information promoted the use of the mix of both the new and the reinterview sample segments.

The decision to conduct only one reinterview at six-month intervals was due largely to response rate considerations (see Steeh, 1981). In the past, considerable use had been made of a third interview, and at times a fourth contact. The rotating panel at that time was more complex in that it had one fresh cross-section component, another segment which had been interviewed on one prior occasion, and a final segment which had been interviewed on two or more prior occasions. Because the proportion of respondents from the initial sample successfully contacted for the third interview fell near 50 percent, the decision was made to restrict the rotating panel to just one reinterview. The reinterview span of six months was chosen in part because longer time periods greatly increased the difficulty of

finding and recontacting original respondents, and periods shorter than six months precluded substantial change.[1]

Potential Analysis Designs

The rotating panel design of the Surveys of Consumers enables a flexible array of analysis strategies, including: (a) single cross-section surveys, (b) successive cross-section surveys over time, (c) single panel reinterview surveys, and (d) successive panel reinterview surveys over time. Behavioral models used to describe the process of change generally include three types of variables—those that vary across individuals and over time (such as income), those that vary across individuals but are thought to be constant over at least short periods of time (tastes and preferences, for example), and those that vary over time but are constant across all individuals (such as inflation, or other economy-wide developments). Cross-section analysis is ideally suited to those models which rely on behavioral parameters that vary across individuals but not over time. If, in addition, the model includes variables which are postulated to have a similar affect on all individuals but vary over time, the parameters can then be estimated by the analysis of successive independent cross-section surveys. Panel designs are indicated when behavioral change is viewed as dependent on characteristics that vary among individuals, across their lifetimes, and over time for society as a whole.

The array of research strategies can be illustrated by the potential types of analyses of price expectations, as follows:

1. Single cross-section studies have often been used to determine the accuracy and dispersion of price expectations among population subgroups, as well as to determine the sources of information which consumers use to form their expectations.

2. Successive cross-section surveys have been used in time-series analysis to assess the impact of aggregate changes in price expecta-

[1] It should be noted that the problem of representativeness in multiwave panel surveys is not insurmountable, but it does require enormous research and financial resources. A major panel study now conducted by the Survey Research Center is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which was designed to follow families over an extended period of time in order to monitor changes in family economic well-being. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics has followed, and interviewed annually, a representative sample of American families since 1968. The study has followed the original 1968 panel families which remained intact, and all members of the 1968 families who left home, each year interviewing one primary adult in any family containing a member of one of those 1968 original families. This produces a representative sample of families each year, as new families formed by children leaving home replace families which die off. The panel thus continues to be representative with respect to its basic sampling design.

tions on both consumer spending decisions—due to buy-in-advance price rationales—as well as on consumer saving decisions—due to heightened uncertainty.

3. The panel feature of the sample design has been used to investigate the process of formation and change in price expectations among identical respondents, and how changes in price expectations influenced their subsequent behavior.

4. A time series of pooled panel studies would permit the estimation of the formation and change in price expectations under varying aggregate economic conditions, allowing the estimated process of formation and change in price expectations to shift over time, to reflect learning and adaptation to changed circumstances.

Consumer Behavior

A major analytical focus of these data is the understanding and prediction of aggregate trends in consumer expenditures for housing, vehicles, and large household durables, as well as the incurrence of debt and acquisition of financial assets. The time-series relationship between the Index of Consumer Sentiment and unit sales of single-family homes is shown in Figure 2, and the association between the index and unit sales of new cars is shown in Figure 3. In the following, only research on trends in automobile purchases is highlighted.

A simple time-series model was used in order to trace the relative

Figure 2. The Index of Consumer Sentiment and Total Home Sales



Figure 3. The Index of Consumer Sentiment and Total Unit Car Sales

impact of various measures of consumer sentiment on subsequent purchase behavior. The general model posits that discretionary purchases are a function of consumer ability and willingness to buy—the familiar Katona equation. The model is not intended for prediction purposes, but rather to broaden our understanding of the various roles played by attitudes and expectations in shaping consumer behavior. The behavioral variable analyzed was unit sales of new passenger cars. The income proxy used was real personal disposable income per household. The sentiment variables included were the Index of Consumer Sentiment (see Appendix B, questions 1–5), the overall evaluation of buying conditions for cars, the reasons underlying these evaluations (Appendix B, question 6), and a variable which measured specific intentions to purchase autos (Appendix B, question 7). These various sentiment measures do not represent competing hypotheses; rather, an important objective is to understand the individual circumstances and aggregate economic conditions which promote fulfillment or nonfulfillment of purchase intentions.

As shown in Table 1, the Index of Consumer Sentiment provided the best explanation of trends in car sales. Evaluations of car market conditions, as well as the underlying reasons, proved to be significant predictors; and when the underlying reasons were entered separately, the equation performed better than the overall market evaluation. The frequency of references to high interest rates and limited credit availability have varied inversely with mentions of buy-in-advance price rationales during the past decade, and together they have dominated the overall trends in market attitudes. As respondents explained

Table 1. Regression Analysis of Total Unit Passenger Car Sales in the U.S. (1959:2 to 1981:3, Quarterly data, SAAR)

Independent Variables	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*
Real income per household	1.10*	1.62*	1.36*	1.38*	1.04*
	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Index of Consumer Sentiment		0.07*			
		(0.01)			
Car market attitude			0.03*		
			(0.01)		
Car market reasons					
Low prices				0.002	
				(0.018)	
Buy-in-advance				0.04*	
				(0.02)	
High prices				−.05*	
				(0.02)	
High interest rates				−0.07*	
				(0.02)	
Purchase intentions					0.51*
					(0.12)
Constant	−3.74*	−15.71*	−9.67*	−6.31*	−7.54*
	(2.03)	(2.02)	(1.98)	(1.37)	(1.48)
RSQD-Adj.	.297	.726	.562	.736	.588
SEE (standard error of the estimate)	.809	.752	.782	.746	.767
Durbin-Watson	2.39	2.11	2.28	2.16	2.15
Rho	.64	.23	.43	.22	.41

* Significant at the .05 level.

NOTE: Generalized least squares was used to correct for autocorrelated errors. All predictor variables lagged one quarter. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the coefficients.

it, the high rate of auto sales recorded in 1978 was due to the widespread expectation of price increases coupled with the belief that it was better to buy in advance of those increases, while at the same time interest rates were viewed as low and credit conditions easy. In contrast, the low sales rate recorded in 1981 resulted from widespread postponement because of high interest rates, coupled with the view that prices were currently too high and might fall later.

Finally, the purchase intention variable was a significant predictor, although it explained the least amount of variance in car sales. These results were not unexpected, even if contrary to naive notions of face validity: the intentions question, which directly assesses potential future purchases, did not foreshadow actual behavior as well as the more general measures of consumer sentiment. In part, the more generalized sentiment measures perform better because they also foreshadow changes in purchase intentions. However, these results were obtained in the context of a volatile and uncertain economy, when changes in purchase plans are frequent. In the early 1960s,

when economic optimism and confidence were widespread, purchase intentions data provided greater predictive ability.

International Comparisons

The research potential of the Surveys of Consumers has been enhanced in recent years by the availability of internationally comparative data. Since the early 1970s, 11 countries, in addition to the United States, have regularly monitored changes in consumer attitudes and expectations. The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The questionnaires used in each country include adapted versions of the items developed in the Michigan survey. Consequently, an Index of Consumer Sentiment can be constructed for each country based on comparable questionnaire items.

Preliminary results from an ongoing research project indicate that changes in consumer sentiment foreshadow changes in new car purchases in the majority of the countries investigated (Strumpel el al., 1980). This analysis focused on the basic hypothesis proposed by Katona, and used a highly simplified model to represent the impact of changes in consumer income and willingness on subsequent discretionary purchases. The proxy selected to represent change in income or ability to buy was an index of real wage change in manufacturing industries, since quarterly data on real personal disposable income is not available for 6 of the 12 countries. Overall, the Katona hypothesis received widespread support. In 8 of the 12 countries the Index of Consumer Sentiment provided a significant link to subsequent changes in auto purchases. Although the data place the basic hypothesis in a favorable light, the analysis can be considered only preliminary, not yet being based on adequate evidence. The time period covered by the analysis was short and was dominated by the steep declines recorded in the mid-1970s in all 12 countries. Problems of serial correlation and misspecification, however, will yield to further research coupled with a more extended analysis period.

Appendix A: Core Questionnaire Items

A. PERSONAL FINANCES

Personal finances better or worse than a year ago, and why.
Personal finances better or worse than five years ago.
Personal finances better or worse in a year.
Personal finances better or worse in five years.

Expected change in nominal family income during the next year.
Change in family real income during the past year.
Expected change in real family income during the next year.
Willingness to use savings to make purchases.
Willingness to use debt to make purchases.

B. BUSINESS CONDITIONS

News heard of recent changes in business conditions.
Business conditions better or worse than a year ago.
Business conditions better or worse in a year, and why.
Business conditions good or bad during the next five years.
Expected change in interest rates.
Expected change in unemployment.
Percentage change in prices during the past 12 months.
Percentage change in prices during the past five years.
Expected percentage change in prices during the next 12 months.
Expected percentage change in prices during the next five years.
Whether unemployment or inflation the more serious economic problem.
Confidence in government economic policy.

C. MARKET CONDITIONS

Good or bad time to buy a house, and why.
Good or bad time to buy major household durables, and why.
Good or bad time to buy a car, and why.
Vehicle purchase intentions.
Travel and vacation intentions.

D. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR

Ownership and purchases of cars, houses, and large household durables.
Incurrence and balance owed on mortgages, installment loans, credit cards, and other types of debt.
Ownership and acquisition of stocks, bonds, money market funds, savings accounts, checking accounts, and other financial instruments.

E. DEMOGRAPHICS

Income
Age
Education
Occupation
Household size and composition
Geographic location

Appendix B: Question Wording

INDEX OF CONSUMER SENTIMENT

1. We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago? Why do you say so?

2. Now looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you (and your family living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?
3. Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that during the next 12 months we'll have good times financially, or bad times, or what?
4. Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a whole we'll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?
5. About the big things people buy for their homes—such as furniture, a refrigerator, a stove, television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or a bad time for people to buy major households items? Why do you say so?

AUTOMOBILE MARKET QUESTIONS

6. Speaking now of the automobile market—do you think the next 12 months or so will be a good time or a bad time to buy a car? Why do you say so?
7. What do you think are the chances that you (or anyone else in your family there) will buy or lease a car during the next 12 months—would you say you probably will, probably will not, or are the chances about even, or what? (*If will buy or chances even*) If you do buy or lease a car, would it be a brand new car, or a used car? Would you buy or lease? When do you think you might buy a car?

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The Predictive Value of Consumer Confidence Measures

BURNS W. ROPER

On the theory that business, banking, government, academia, and labor are importantly concerned with what lies ahead in our economy and that, in addition, consumer attitudes and intentions are an important component of what lies ahead, The Roper Organization has experimented with many different measures of consumer confidence, buying intentions, and spending patterns over the last nine and a half years—since the start of Roper Reports in late 1973 (a series of national adult population surveys).

We have tried an extensive number of questions which we have repeated with varying periodicity. Some of them have worked badly. Some of them have looked rather good in hindsight, though they had been too erratic at the time the measurements were taken to make the future clear. Some have worked moderately well. Two look quite promising but require further use before confidence in them can be established. And one has been rather spectacularly predictive—at least up through the time of the 1981 AAPOR conference.

In order to assess how these various measures have worked, we first looked at the U.S. Commerce Department's trend charts of leading indicators, coincident indicators, and lagging indicators (Figure 1). Our hope was that one or more of our measures would track with the leading indicators and hence provide evidence of being predictive, rather than not tracking at all, or tracking with the coincident or lagging indicators and thus being *reflective* of trends rather than *predictive*.

Abstract Relatively simple measures of consumer confidence can frequently lead more complex economic indicators, and/or counter or resist the trends indicated by the industrial and financial segments of the economy. This article describes a number of such consumer survey measurements and compares one of them with a more sophisticated set of economic indicators.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:361–367 © 1982 by the Trustees of Columbia University
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

Figure 1. U.S. Commerce Department Composite Index

At the 1981 AAPOR conference I devoted a good deal of attention to some of the poor measures, partly to lay to rest any assumptions that we claim to be omniscient and partly because it is instructive to know what has not been predictive. Rather than review some of these poor measurements here, I will merely list at the conclusion of this article some of the questions that did not work with a brief comment on each as to what its deficiencies were.

One measure that has tracked rather well, but nevertheless has limited utility, is a question we have asked in December of each year: "Do you expect [coming year] to be a better year for you than [present year], about the same, or not as good as [present year]?" When the difference between those who say "better" and those who say "not as good" is plotted on the Commerce Department's graph, the curve conforms remarkably well to the shape of the leading indicators curve and is well ahead of the coincident indicators line and the lagging indicators line. However, this is the kind of question that can only be asked at the end of each year looking toward the next year. Thus, it constitutes an annual measurement that is too infrequent to pick up short-term fluctuations. It is conceivable that the question could be rephrased so that it asked about "the next 12 months" in comparison to "the last 12 months." We don't know whether people are able to think in 12-month cycles as well as they can in calendar years. If they are able to, then such a revised wording would permit the question to be asked many times during the year and this might prove to be a reliable predictor.

Another measure looks rather promising, although we still do not have enough experience with it to provide really reliable evidence. It is based on the following question: "Taking all things into consideration, money you may have made or lost, changes in your income, what you have done about savings or investments, your present-day living expenses—*all* considered—do you feel you are better off now than you were a year ago, worse off, or about the same?" When the percentage point difference between those who say they are better off and those who say they are worse off is plotted, it appears to conform remarkably well to the leading indicators and is well ahead of either the coincident or the lagging indicators. We are now beginning to ask this question more frequently (it has been on a once-a-year basis up till now), and over the next year we'll have a better idea of how it tracks.

Another question that looks promising is this one: "Here is a list of things people have told us they are concerned about today [card shown respondents]. Would you read over that list and then tell me which two or three *you personally* are most concerned about today?" The card contains a total of 13 items, including such things as: a recession and unemployment, money enough to live right and pay the bills, inflation and high prices, fuel and energy crisis, and drug abuse. When the percentages are plotted for most of the items in the list, there is little evidence of predictiveness, except for the one item "a recession and unemployment." It appears to conform quite well to the leading indicators curve. Again, however, we have not asked the question frequently enough to have good evidence. In addition, it represents a rather "heavy" question to ask repeatedly if its only purpose is to plot the one item "a recession and unemployment."

The single measure that has worked the best comes from this question: "Considering both the availability and cost of things today, as well as your present financial circumstances, do you think now is a good time to buy things you want and need, or a good time to wait, or is it someplace in between?" We have plotted the percentage who say now is a good time to buy, we have plotted inversely the percentage who say now is a good time to wait, and we have plotted the difference between the percentages who say good time to buy and good time to wait. The best conformity to the leading indicators, however, comes from simply plotting the good-time-to-buy percentage. Figure 2 shows how this measure looks compared to the leading indicators, the coincident indicators, and the lagging indicators.

When the good-time-to-buy measure is looked at just against the leading indicators and the highs and lows are noted (Figure 3), it can be seen that up through mid-1981 the good-time-to-buy lows were at



Figure 2. Commerce Department and "Good Time to Buy"

least as early as the leading indicators lows—and mostly earlier. The good-time-to-buy highs were earlier than the leading indicators highs. Not only were the lows and highs generally earlier than those of the leading indicators when plotted on the chart, they were in fact earlier than that, for we are able to report our results in a matter of days after the measurements are taken. The Commerce Department's results are reported a full month after the time period to which they apply—and are frequently revised at a still later date.

In my AAPOR presentation, I closed with the following comments:

Let me conclude by making it clear that I am certainly not advocating scrapping the Commerce Department's leading indicators in favor of our "good time to buy" measure. As excited as I am by our "good time to buy"



Figure 3. Highs and Lows—Commerce vs. Roper

measure, I recognize that its whole track record has taken place in a period of high to very high inflation. Whether it would be predictive in a period of stable, or relatively stable prices, I cannot be sure—much less in the unlikely event of *falling* prices. Moreover, I do not think consumer attitudes are the sole determinant of the economic future. In February of last year [1980] consumer readings—like the leading indicators—were rather bullish. About the first of March the Fed drastically tightened credit controls, and we went into an instant and deep, if short-lived, recession—with a subsequent downturn in consumer readings.

What I *am* saying is that consumer confidence is a major factor in the economic outlook; that relatively simple measures of consumer confidence can be obtained, even if they need further monitoring and refinement; and that our "good time to buy" indicator has been at least as predictive as any other economic model—or economist—has been over the last seven and a half years.

Promising? Definitely. Proven? Not yet.

That was in late May of 1981. We have repeated our good-time-to-buy measurement every 10 weeks since then. And, of course, the Commerce Department has continued its leading indicators measurement every month since then. The September 1981 leading indicators measurement of the Commerce Department (reported at the end of October) showed a sharp drop. By contrast, our good-time-to-buy measure gave a horizontal or level reading, indicating to us sideways drift rather than a recession signal (Figure 4). The October and November leading indicators measurements showed further drops. Our November reading, again, showed level or horizontal movement. This was the first time in eight years that there had been a real disparity between the two measures. Our December measure (reported to our subscribers on December 30) not only did not "finally" show the drop that the leading indicators showed—and that by that time all other economic indicators were showing—it actually showed a tiny one-point *increase* in good time to buy. A one-point increase in



Figure 4. Commerce vs. Roper Through Spring of 1982

and of itself would be relatively meaningless, except that that increase was registered in the face of rather precipitous declines in all other indicators.

By the middle of January, it was rather generally acknowledged that we were in a recession. The only question seemed to be how severe it would be and when we would start to pull out of it—spring, summer, fall, or by year's end? Not surprisingly, this caused me to recall my closing statement at AAPOR: "Promising? Definitely. Proven? Not yet." The weight of evidence suggested that, while the good-time-to-buy measure might be accurately predicting the *consumer* portion of the economy, it did not appear to be predicting the *total* economy.

In February of this year our good-time-to-buy measure finally took a sharp downturn, suggesting that a basically business- and government-led recession had finally caught up even the consumer in its web and *forced* him to pull back his buying intentions.

This interpretation seemed confirmed by a subsequent April survey reading which showed the worst *un*employment and *under*employment we have found in the eight years we have been measuring it. Moreover, this April survey showed a small additional drop in good-time-to-buy.

(The Commerce Department's first report on its April indicators, by contrast, showed a small *rise*. However, Commerce's reports are frequently revised after first being reported. For example, in late January, Commerce reported a rise for December. By late February that "rise" had been revised to a further decline. Moreover, economists generally discounted the April rise, according to the *Wall Street Journal*.)

All of this indicates to me that the good-time-to-buy measure is probably the best single measure there is of the *consumer component* of the economy, even if it is not the perfect measure of the *total* economy that it appeared to be through the summer of 1981. The fact that our good-time-to-buy measure resisted all other downward economic indicators throughout the last half of 1981 would seem to explain why the widely forecast slump in 1981 retail Christmas sales did not take place.

Other questions which have been experimented with but which do not look promising are presented below.

Here is a list of a number of things that fall in the category of major expenditures. Would you read down that list and call off any that you plan to do or get in the next six months—that is, things you have definite plans for, not just that you're considering? [Card shown respondents listed 19 items costing more than $100.]

Charting the average number of prospective purchases over time produces an insensitive indicator. Charting the percentage who plan one or more purchases produces an erratic measure. Possibly weighting the results by the dollar value of the purchase involved would cause this question to be a better indicator. As we have plotted the results in the past, a three-point rise in the percentage who plan to buy a suit costing over $100 is exactly negated by a three-point drop in those who plan to buy a new car.

During the next few months, do you think you are likely to put any money into any of these things—that is beyond investments you may have now? [Card listed nine items including such things as: will invest in savings account, life insurance, mutual funds.]

Results are both insensitive and erratic.

Considering your income and what you have to live on and the cost of living, how would you say your family is making out today—all things considered would you say you are getting along all right, or getting along only fairly well, or feeling quite pinched, or just not being able to make ends meet?

Results too volatile to give clear direction except in hindshight.

Turning now to the cost of living, here is a list of things people have told us they are doing now or going to do to cope with high prices. Would you look down the list and tell me any you and/or your family are doing or planning to do in the next few months? [Card shown to respondents listed eight items including such things as: working longer hours/getting a second job, putting off buying things for the home, cutting down on luxuries, nonessentials.]

Plotting the *number* of things people are doing is insensitive. Plotting the *individual things* people are doing is insensitive for some items and highly volatile and erratic for other items.

Mass and Elite Foreign Policy Opinions

ROBERT W. OLDENDICK AND BARBARA ANN BARDES

THE CONFLICT between strong executive direction and building the necessary consensus for action makes the conduct of foreign policy in a democracy extremely difficult. The expression of public support for foreign policy initiatives is a source of strength in diplomacy, but such support is difficult to gain because the mass public is generally regarded as less informed and unconcerned about foreign policy problems than about domestic issues (Almond, 1950; Caspary, 1970). In fact, the distinction between the foreign and domestic spheres is seen as so great by some scholars that the office of the American chief executive has been described as two presidencies—one oriented to domestic policy and one for foreign policy (Wildavsky, 1966; Cronin, 1980). According to this perspective, the president chooses to exercise initiatives on foreign policy questions precisely because the public is relatively unconcerned and the extreme conflict which erupts between various domestic factions can be avoided. Furthermore, the mass public is viewed as teachable in foreign policy matters; the president can set the agenda, persuade opinion leaders, and lead the

Abstract Since the Vietnam War, public preferences on foreign policy issues have played a greater role in the American political process. Yet comparatively little is known about the manner in which attitudes on international affairs are formed and how they are related to other political cognitions. Using data from two large studies of foreign policy opinion conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1974 and 1978, this research examines the question of how mass and elite opinion differs in a number of foreign policy domains and looks at whether these distinctions have changed across years. In general, there are patterns of difference in the foreign policy beliefs of the elites and the mass public, the most striking being in their "internationalist" view of the U.S. role in world affairs, with smaller distinctions in the domains of human rights, detente, world problems, Americanism, and international organizations.

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:368–382 © 1982 by the Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362X/82/0046-368/$2.50

public to support his foreign policy because the mass public does not have firm beliefs on most foreign affairs problems.

The role of elite groups and the so-called attentive public is particularly important in American foreign policy debates. Since public attitudes are characterized as generally "permissive" and, since World War II, as internationalist, the role of opinion leaders is considered critical. Dahl (1950) saw the members of Congress as agents for the transmission of policy positions to the mass public, while Rosenau (1961) theorized a set of linkages from policy makers through opinion makers and the attentive public to the members of the general population. In the absence of more carefully defined public attitudes toward foreign affairs, elites are seen to play an important role in shaping the public's response to presidential initiatives and creating support for an active role in world affairs. The purpose of this research is to investigate the differences between elite and mass attitudes toward foreign policy questions and to answer certain questions which are raised by these views of elite influence. Do elites actually influence the direction of public attitudes over time? Are elite and mass attitudes on foreign policy issues as different as this view of the public leads us to expect, and to what extent do we find disagreement among the elites mirrored in the general public?

Previous research on the differences between mass and elite attitudes has focused on distinctions of attitude structure and policy content. Following Converse (1964), the general public has been conceived as exhibiting very little constraint among its opinions, lacking the "contextual grasp" to connect "a specific case with the general principle belonging in the same belief system" (1964:230). To cite the general conclusion, it "cannot be claimed that the mass public shares ideological patterns of belief with relevant elites at the specific level any more than it shares the abstract conceptual frames of reference" (1964:231).

Research on the belief systems of community leaders and the elites of political parties has generally confirmed the greater consistency and coherence of elite attitudes (Luttbeg, 1968; Prothro and Grigg, 1960). Recently, Kritzer (1978) has reanalyzed the Converse data, and concluded that elite behavior is conditioned by a much more ideological environment than that of the general public. However, in his investigation of attitude structuring he found that the attitudes of the mass public were not less structured than those of elites when structure is operationalized in terms of the number of factors. He suggests that using single items to analyze structure is not as reliable as using measures based on a series of items or scales. The problem of studying attitude structuring with a limited number of items is one

which we have pointed out in another context (Bardes and Oldendick, 1978), and is particularly acute in the study of opinions on foreign affairs.

In the domain of foreign policy, the actual structure of elite and mass attitudes is subject to considerable debate. While the Converse study showed virtually no constraint within the foreign policy attitudes of the general public as compared to the elites, recent research has reported varying degrees of structure within public attitudes on foreign policy questions. Much of the work has reported that these attitudes are structured along an internationalism-isolationism continuum. Patchen (1970), for example, found "involvement" to be a primary dimension in public views with "militancy" as a second factor, while Modigliani (1972) reported "international interventionism" to be the most important organizing dimension for the public with "administration distrust" as secondary.

These studies, like the Converse research, were based on a limited number of variables which resulted in a relatively low level of constraint, and dimensions which were very broad as well as few in number. Analysis of a much larger database suggests that public attitudes are both more complex, i.e., multidimensional, and more closely related to political philosophy than previously thought (Bardes and Oldendick, 1978).

Furthermore, a comparison of elite and public responses to a comprehensive foreign policy survey showed that public and elite attitudes are similar in terms of dimensionality and their relationship to commonly used measures of political identification (Oldendick and Bardes, 1981). Using the same set of variables drawn from elite and public surveys of foreign policy attitudes conducted in 1974, six factors were found to structure public attitudes while five dimensions organized the views of the elites. Three of the factors—Americanism, Internationalism, and International Organization—appeared to hold the same meaning for both the elite and mass samples. The other three dimensions which organized mass attitudes were Interventionism, Defense Spending, and Leadership, while Militarism and Human Rights dimensions completed the elite set. For both the mass and elite groups, most of the dimensions were strongly related to the political philosophy of the respondents.

Another way to compare elite and mass attitudes toward foreign policy questions is to investigate the substantive preferences of the two groups. However, most recent analyses in this area have examined the attitudes and motivations of either the elites or the general public but not both. For example, Russett and Hansen (1975) surveyed business and military leaders to examine the linkages between

economic self-interest and policy preferences, and found political ideology to be a stronger predictor than self-interest for their elite sample. In a different view, the purpose of Holsti and Rosenau's (1979a, 1979b) survey of American leaders was to ascertain the effects of the Vietnam War on the policy preferences of elites. To summarize the reports on different aspects of this study, they found positions on the Vietnam conflict to be closely related to other foreign policy views, and these divisions reflect a real lack of consensus among American leaders. Neither of these elite studies, however, provides any comment on mass-elite differences.

According to Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979), the "cold war consensus" also no longer exists in the beliefs of the general public. Their examination of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1974 public sample discovered the American public to be divided into three groups—liberal internationalists, conservative internationalists, and the noninternationalists, a group which is also not very interested in foreign affairs. After reviewing the relationship between opinions on a number of foreign policy questions and position in this classification scheme, the authors concluded that the "cleavage in public opinion will hobble the conduct of foreign policy" in the future and that the divisions are clearly linked with domestic ideological positions (1979:70).

Such close analysis of the opinions of the elites as that of Holsti and Rosenau or the examination of public consensus by Mandelbaum and Schneider contribute important information about the policy preferences of specific subgroups. However, such research does not address the question of how elite beliefs differ from the mass public. There is no way, for example, to compare the division of elites in groups such as supporters, converted critics, or critics of the Vietnam War with comparable public motivations (Holsti and Rosenau, 1979a).

Another approach to the study of foreign policy attitudes involves the use of factor analysis in examining the configuration of opinions on international affairs (see, e.g., Wittkopf, 1981). This method of studying foreign policy attitudes provides some insight into the basic dimensions of policy preferences, but the technique's dependence on the number and range of variables leads to widely varying descriptions of the structure of mass and elite foreign policy opinions. Furthermore, the number of dimensions in the final solution can be allowed to include many different issue domains, i.e., from militarism to world problems, or compressed to one or two primary structures. When the selection of items or the research procedures yield only two dimensions of public opinion toward foreign affairs, the two are likely to be one measure of the degree of U.S. involvement and one mea-

sure of the type of involvement, military or humanitarian. Thus, factor analytic techniques can produce a number of interest dimensions which are difficult to compare, or can result in primary classifications such as "liberal internationalist" which obscure the complexity of individual beliefs.

In this research, we will attempt to overcome some of the limitations of factor analysis while retaining the concept of dimensions. Analysis of elite and mass attitudes toward foreign policy issues will compare elite and mass responses to identical questions with the variables grouped into clusters which reflect dimensions identified in previous factor analyses. It will also be possible to compare the distribution of elites and mass opinions at two different times.

Data and Methods

The data used in this study come from two wide-ranging surveys of foreign policy opinion conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1974 and 1978.[1] In both these years, the council commissioned a national survey and a companion elite survey which covered a broad spectrum of foreign policy issues, preferences, and evaluations. The 1974 survey, by Louis Harris Associates, had a sample size of 1,513 for the public sample and 328 for the leadership group. The 1978 survey was conducted by the Gallup Organization. Sample sizes in this year were 1,546 for the general public and 366 for the elite. The same procedures for identifying elites were followed in both years (Rielly, 1980).

In comparing mass-elite opinion on foreign policy issues in these two years, percentage differences on the frequency distribution of the items will be examined. While this method may seem somewhat simplistic, the lack of a common core of "nonconsensus" items across the four surveys made attempts to construct comparable scales relatively futile.[2] These comparisons, therefore, are necessary in outlining the distinctions between the general public and the elite.

Previous investigations have identified nine distinct issue areas of foreign policy attitudes (Bardes and Oldendick, 1978; 1981). On the

[1] The data utilized in this paper were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Neither the original collectors of the data, the sponsor of the studies, nor the consortium bears any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.

[2] A number of recent works (for example, Bishop et al., 1978; Sullivan et al., 1978) have demonstrated the hazards involved in attempting to make cross-time or cross-sample comparisons with items which are not identical in format and content. This problem is only compounded when an attempt is made to construct scales or to use techniques such as factor analysis with such items.

Table 1. Percent Giving "Internationalist" Responses to Questions on International Involvement, Mass and Elites, 1974 and 1978

	Mass74	*Elite74*	*Mass78*	*Elite78*
U.S. take an active role in world affairs	66.8	99.1	59.2	97.0
Goal: worldwide arms control	70.0	86.7	70.1	81.1
CIA should work inside other countries	43.3	34.9	59.4	59.3
Expand economic aid to other nations	10.6	43.3	—	—
Expand U.S. information programs abroad	21.7	21.7	—	—
Favor emergency aid	92.7	99.1	—	—
Leader in negotiations to avoid war	84.8	91.5	—	—
Willingness to give economic aid	37.8	64.8	—	—
Goal: keeping peace in the world	86.5	95.7	—	—
Goal: international cooperation	70.4	87.2	—	—
U.S. responsibility to take active role	87.0	96.9	—	—
Build defenses, let world take care of itself	46.1	91.8	—	—
Strong U.S. only guarantee of peace	83.5	79.5	—	—
International cooperation to solve problems	87.4	96.3	—	—
Favor economic aid to black African nations	—	—	43.6	88.0
Closer ties with W. Europe than 10 years ago	—	—	37.0	36.2
Expand trade with Communist China	—	—	75.2	97.4
Eliminate tariffs	—	—	27.9	76.8

basis of this research, policy questions were divided into these various domains.[3]

Elite-Mass Differences

One of the primary factors in any discussion of foreign policy attitudes is internationalism. As previously mentioned, this was the principal factor in several studies of foreign policy opinions, and how Americans view the world along this internationalist-isolationist continuum remains a prime concern. Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979:41) have summarized how American opinion since 1940 has grown increasingly internationalist. The data in Table 1 reflect this internationalist orientation among both the mass and elite. Support for an active role in world affairs for the United States is particularly strong among the political influentials who are almost unanimous in their feeling that the U.S. should be active in promoting worldwide arms control and international cooperation, keeping peace, and who favor expanding trade with Communist China. Sizable majorities of the general public—although not approaching the consensus positions

[3] Questions considered for inclusion in this analysis were those which dealt with policy positions and which were included in both the mass and elite surveys in a given year. More "evaluative" questions such as "Do you think that giving such economic aid to other countries helps our own national security or not?" and "How would you rate the job the U.S. is now doing in containing Communism?" were not included. While these questions are interesting in themselves and may help account for some of the differences reported here, they are outside the scope of the current work.

found among the elite—also support an activist role for the U.S. The differences between the mass and elite on this dimension come on specific policy positions such as expanding economic aid to other countries, providing aid to black African nations, and eliminating tariffs. In addition, these percentages, and the differences between groups, remain stable over time.

A second important dimension in discussing foreign affairs is that of militarism. In an earlier work (Oldendick and Bardes, 1981), we reported that militarism was a primary organizing dimension, particularly for the elite, and Patchen (1970:662–63) has shown that a similar dimension operates within the mass public. Table 2 presents the percentage of "militarist" responses to questions in this domain. On a number of these issues—for example, the U.S. commitment to NATO, the importance of being a leader in military strength, making and keeping military commitments, and the goal of maintaining the balance of power—there is very little difference between the two groups. On several issues, however, there are some rather sharp distinctions. In both 1974 and 1978 a much higher percentage of the elite favored selling military equipment to other nations and felt the goal of defending our allies' security to be very important. The general public, on the other hand, gave more militaristic responses to the general goals of containing Communism and strengthening friendly countries, and the feeling that power is what really counts in world affairs.

A moderate increase in militaristic responses can be seen between 1974 and 1978, suggesting public dissatisfaction with the U.S. national

Table 2. Percent Giving "Militarist" Responses to Questions on Military Involvement, Mass and Elites, 1974 and 1978

	Mass74	*Elite74*	*Mass78*	*Elite78*
Favor selling military equipment	35.5	58.2	33.6	66.9
Goal: containing Communism	58.0	34.6	63.7	45.2
Goal: defending our allies' security	35.8	47.8	54.0	78.0
U.S. commitment to NATO	73.5	68.3	83.4	87.1
Expand secret operations of the CIA	9.8	2.4	—	—
Expand general activities of the CIA	13.8	7.7	—	—
Leader in military strength	70.4	74.3	—	—
Leader in keeping military commitments	39.5	36.7	—	—
Send troops if friendly country attacked	26.3	38.7	—	—
Goal: promote our own national security	86.0	92.3	—	—
Goal: protect weaker nations	30.6	26.2	37.4	30.6
Goal: maintain balance of power	53.4	56.3	—	—
Goal: strengthen friendly countries	39.6	28.0	—	—
Having power is what really counts	70.3	56.0	—	—
Support some military dictators	—	—	66.6	67.7
Fewer restrictions on the CIA	—	—	20.6	23.5

security posture. In 1978, both the public and elite samples gave more militaristic answers to the questions regarding NATO, defending allies' security, and containing Communism. To some extent, these responses indicate that the mass public is more willing to adopt "militaristic" postures in the abstract but less willing to translate these into specific military actions.

The data for the military spending component of this domain are presented in Table 3. In general there is little difference between the two groups on a general willingness to "expand" military spending, with only small percentages favoring such expansion in either year. On the question of giving military aid, however, a much higher percentage of elites were in favor of such a position in 1974 and 1978. In addition, the issue of expanded spending on national defense is one of the few cases where there is a significant change on an issue between years in both groups. In the public sample, the percentage favoring expanded defense spending rose from 14 percent to 34 percent, while among elites this increase was from 8 percent to 31 percent. Figures to be presented below indicate that members of both groups show some concern about the diminishing role of the United States as a world power, and the data in Table 3 show some willingness to expand defense spending in order to regain some of this influence.

Questions on the United States role as a world leader, presented in Table 4, provide a somewhat mixed view of how the general public and opinion leaders view this issue. While majorities in both groups believe that it is very important to be a leader in economic strength and in science and technology, a higher percentage of the elite group feels this way, while a larger proportion of the public contend that it is important for the U.S. to be a leader in the standard of living. There is also a fair amount of agreement between the two groups on the role the U.S. should play in the world 10 years from now and in the degree of respect this country commands compared with 10 years ago. The public, however, is more likely to feel that the U.S. is playing a more important role in the world compared to 10 years ago, and to believe that this country is falling behind the Soviet Union in power and influence.

Table 3. Percent Giving "Pro-Spending" Responses to Questions on Military Spending, Mass and Elites, 1974 and 1978

	Mass74	*Elite74*	*Mass78*	*Elite78*
Favor giving military aid	22.6	40.1	28.9	60.4
Expand spending on national defense	14.2	8.4	34.0	31.2
Expand defense spending	14.9	9.8	—	—
Expand foreign military aid	3.0	2.3	—	—

Table 4. Percent Giving "Important" Responses to Question on U.S. Role as World Leader, Mass and Elites, 1974 and 1978

	Mass74	*Elite74*	*Mass78*	*Elite78*
U.S. role compared to 10 years ago	30.3	13.1	31.2	15.8
U.S. role 10 years from now	38.8	41.5	53.5	47.2
U.S. respect compared to 10 years ago	12.8	9.8	18.3	27.9
Leader in economic strength	79.8	95.7	—	—
Leader in science and technology	80.0	90.2	—	—
Leader in standard of living	65.6	44.7	—	—
Leader in giving political leadership	54.7	51.1	—	—
U.S. falling behind USSR in power	—	—	55.6	39.3

In sum, these results indicate that the public believes the U.S. should play a more important role in the world and is concerned about maintaining a high level of material wealth. These figures correspond with responses to the "Americanism" domain which are reported in Table 5. Quite clearly, the general populace is much more chauvinistic than is the elite. For example, 88 percent of the public believed that America's real concerns should be at home, not abroad, compared to 26 percent in the elite group. Similar differences exist in the percentages saying it is very important to protect the jobs of American workers (77 percent to 34 percent in 1974; 81 percent to 35 percent in 1978), to protect the interests of American business (41 percent to 17 percent and 48 percent to 27 percent), and to bring democracy to other nations (30 percent to 13 percent and 29 percent to 15 percent). Likewise, almost 45 percent of the mass sample agreed that the United States is rich and powerful enough to go it alone, compared with the less than 5 percent of the elite group which held this position. The smallest difference on this dimension concerned the question of securing adequate supplies of energy, which sizable majorities of the mass and elite group in both years felt was very important. Overall, the largest differences between the mass and elite

Table 5. Percent Giving "Chauvinistic" Responses to Questions on Americanism, Mass and Elites, 1974 and 1978

	Mass74	*Elite74*	*Mass78*	*Elite78*
Goal: secure adequate energy supplies	79.7	77.3	82.3	87.7
Goal: bring democracy to other nations	30.1	13.4	28.6	14.6
Goal: protect American business abroad	41.4	17.4	47.6	26.7
Goal: protect jobs of American workers	76.9	34.5	81.0	35.1
Goal: promote capitalism abroad	19.1	9.4	—	—
America's real concerns should be at home	88.2	26.3	—	—
U.S. is powerful enough to go it alone	44.3	3.8	—	—
Dedication to the spread of free enterprise	80.0	60.5	—	—
Goal: keep up the value of the dollar	—	—	89.3	73.0

samples are found on this Americanism dimension, and these distinctions appear to have remained fairly stable across years. This "America first" orientation of the general public may be the source of greater inconsistency in overall policy preferences. While elites seem to understand the interdependence of the world economy, public responses support both economic assistance and isolationism.

In Mandelbaum and Schneider's recent discussion of American public opinion on foreign policy, they noted the increasing importance of détente as an issue. As they commented, the 1976 presidential campaign was a watershed for foreign policy opinion trends because it brought détente to the fore as an issue over which there is fundamental disagreement (1979:35). The data in Table 6 show how mass and elite opinions on this issue are distributed. Since no items appear on both surveys, comparisons between years are impossible. Moreover, the questions in the 1974 survey were more general in content, while those in 1978 focused on relations with the Soviet Union. In general, however, there is strong support in both groups for the concept of improving relations with our "enemies." This sentiment is somewhat stronger, and almost unanimous, within the elite, with "pro-détente" responses being generally in the 80 percent–90 percent range. The major exception here is on the question of limiting computer sales to the USSR, with about one-third of the general public and of the elite opposed to limiting such sales.

Table 6 also reveals that the mass public is less likely to favor cooperation when it involves a specific interaction with the USSR. The data are insufficient for determining whether this is due to some change in mass opinion or to the public's inclination to be somewhat more supportive of abstract principles than of their application (Prothro and Grigg, 1960). These data are also consistent with the

Table 6. Percent Giving "Cooperate" Responses to Questions on Détente, Mass and Elites, 1974 and 1978

	Mass74	*Elite74*	*Mass78*	*Elite78*
Work closely with USSR to prevent war	82.0	92.8	—	—
Learn to live with USSR and Red China	89.2	96.9	—	—
U.S. and USSR should agree not to allow war	72.5	64.5	—	—
Peace through learning to live with enemies	90.4	90.6	—	—
U.S.–USSR long-term agreements possible	69.3	87.3	—	—
U.S.–China long-term agreements possible	65.5	80.7	—	—
Oppose restricting U.S.–USSR trade	—	—	46.4	80.6
Favor U.S.–USSR joint energy efforts	—	—	68.2	90.4
Oppose prohibiting exchange of scientists	—	—	54.1	87.7
Oppose limiting computer sales to USSR	—	—	33.2	35.5
Favor limiting some nuclear weapons	—	—	70.8	92.1
Favor banning all nuclear weapons	—	—	61.9	60.7

Table 7. Percent Giving "Supportive" Responses to Questions on International Organizations, Mass and Elites, 1974 and 1978

	Mass74	*Elite74*	*Mass78*	*Elite78*
Goal: strengthening the UN	49.7	31.5	51.5	25.5
Leader in support of international org.	57.6	48.5	—	—
Conduct foreign policy through international org.	71.3	58.6	—	—
Only way to keep peace is through international org.	49.0	41.4	—	—

previously reported figure showing the elite to be more internationalist in its views and more likely to believe that international cooperation is necessary for maintaining world order.

This greater support among the leadership group for internationalist positions and cooperation does not extend to support for international organizatons. The percentages in Table 7 indicate that the public is slightly more likely to feel that the goal of strengthening the United Nations is very important, that the U.S. should be a leader in support of international organizations, that this country should conduct its foreign policy through such groups, and that the only way to achieve peace is through these organizations. While the elites are generally favorable toward world involvement, they are less inclined than the public to believe that organizations such as the UN should be strengthened or that policy should be made through such groups. One hypothesis for these differences is that the elite is less willing to release the control which would be necessary to make such an organization strong, and they are more aware that the League of Nations and the UN have not been particularly successful in their attempts to bring about world peace and to solve global crises.

The "moral issues" in foreign policy, which were championed by Jimmy Carter in the 1976 election campaign and which he attempted to inject into decision-making in foreign affairs during his term in office, appear to be more attuned to elite sentiment than to mass opinion. The data in Table 8 reveal that although both groups are

Table 8. Percent Giving "Pro-Human Rights" Responses to Questions on Human Rights, Mass and Elites, 1974 and 1978

	Mass74	*Elite74*	*Mass78*	*Elite78*
Should be more active in opposing apartheid	42.9	60.7	47.5	69.3
Treatment of Soviet Jews not U.S. business	54.0	65.3	54.0	68.8
Pressure countries that violate human rights	76.0	88.2	73.1	81.2
Leader in moral values	63.9	81.0	—	—
Morally wrong to support dictatorship	80.5	73.8	—	—
Defend human rights in other countries	—	—	41.6	35.9

supportive of human rights, slightly higher percentages of the leadership group take "pro-human rights" stances on these issues. The question receiving the most support in this set is that the United States should pressure countries that violate human rights, while the largest difference between the two groups is on the question of whether the U.S. should be more active in opposing apartheid. Moreover, the basic support for human rights stances, as well as differences between the groups, appears to be unchanged after several years of presidential emphasis.

In addition to being generally more supportive of human rights positions, the elite group tends to feel that the goal of solving world problems is more important than does the general public. Although the data shown in Table 9 are not extensive, they do indicate that the elites believe that such things as improving the standard of living in less developed countries, combating world hunger, and helping solve world inflation are important foreign policy goals.

Conclusions

To summarize these data, it can be said that there are definite distinctions between the mass and the elites on foreign policy questions. The two groups differ most on the degree of internationalism expressed in their views. Elites are much more supportive of an activist role for the U.S. in world affairs than is the general public, and also demonstrate far greater understanding of the interdependence of nations. The leadership group is also much more favorable toward détente, advocates advancing human rights positions, and believes that the U.S. should be a leader in solving world problems. The electorate, on the other hand, tends to be much more chauvinistic, to believe that the U.S. is strong enough to go it alone, and that its primary concerns should be at home. Paradoxically, the general public also wants the U.S. to continue to play a strong international role in world affairs. In addition, the general public is more supportive of international organizations than is the elite.

For the most part, these data raise more questions about the foreign policy process than they answer. There is virtually no evidence that

Table 9. Percent Saying "Very Important" to Questions on the Role of the United States in Solving World Problems, Mass and Elites, 1974 and 1978

	Mass74	*Elite74*	*Mass78*	*Elite78*
Goal: improve standard of living	40.4	62.8	37.0	64.1
Goal: combat world hunger	62.4	77.0	62.3	66.4
Goal: help solve world inflation	67.7	82.0	—	—

elites such as those interviewed for the council studies have any influence over mass opinions. Although these leaders hold political office, direct the mass media, or lead major interest groups, their opinions diverge sharply from those expressed by the mass public. The frequencies for these two surveys do not show any closing of the gap between mass and elite attitudes on such questions as supplying military equipment and military aid, on foreign policy goals, or on support for human rights. This may be due to the long-term nature of some of the issues on which opinion in both groups may have crystallized, the failure to determine which issues were "emerging" or at a "critical change" stage and therefore most susceptible to leadership effects, or the fact that the four-year span between surveys was not sufficient for detecting the shaping influence of the elite. Rather than converging opinions, the most important shifts discovered were the parallel increases in militaristic or defense-related questions for both the mass and elite samples. Clearly, these data raise questions about the conception of elites as agents for transmitting positions to the electorate.

The role of the president as the "teacher" of citizens also finds little support in this research. Public support for U.S. actions to secure human rights in other nations did not increase during the Carter presidency. Although there is little reason to expect the public to support policies such as "pressuring countries that violate human rights" in the 1974 data, human rights were a major campaign issue in 1976 and a high priority of foreign policy after the 1977 inauguration of Mr. Carter. If presidential leadership of foreign policy opinion is likely, the 1978 council survey should show this effect. In fact, there is more evidence for a shift in public opinion against the president's announced position over this four-year period. Both the elites and masses increased their expressed support for many different kinds of defense activities—for the CIA, for NATO, for more defense spending, and for defending our allies. In contrast to this shift toward hawkishness, the Carter years emphasized peacemaking and arms reduction as national goals. This public rejection of the president's priorities not only lessens our estimation of the president's powers of persuasion but also raises the question of what other factors might explain such changes in both mass and elite beliefs. The candidates for such influence include external events and media interpretations of the relative military strength of the United States. The problem of explaining such changes in mass perceptions of the national image is one which demands more research and multiple levels of data.

The disparities between elite and mass foreign policy opinions reported here reinforce observations by other scholars that there is little

consensus on foreign policy questions. This study provides a link betwen the elite studies of Holsti and Rosenau and the analyses of public opinion provided by Mandelbaum and Schneider, Wittkopf, and others, by showing that there is as little consensus between elites and the general public as within those respective groups. While the electorate does express strong support for some general principles of U.S. policy, there is little agreement on the kinds of issues, such as selling military equipment, which demand the specific application of general principles. To conclude, these data suggest that, rather than being a consensus awaiting presidential policy initiatives, public opinion on foreign policy issues is divided, and every specific decision in this area is likely to generate opposition from some segment of society. Moreover, the president cannot depend upon the tool of elite influence to rally the public to his side on foreign policy questions.

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The Polls:
Attitudes Toward American Jews

GERALDINE ROSENFIELD

CONGRESSIONAL debate in the fall of 1981 over the sale of AWACs to Saudi Arabia evoked heated public discussion, including some highly critical remarks in the media about the "Jewish lobby" and Israel's "veto" over American foreign policy. Coupled with news coverage of increasing vandalism of Jewish institutions, such stories have led some observers to conclude that there is a resurgence of antisemitism in the United States.

Is there a resurgence? What do studies about the attitudes of Americans toward Jewish fellow Americans tell us?

Surveying attitudes toward Jews in the United States started in the 1930s, with the triumph of the Nazis in Germany and their vigorous propaganda abroad. American Jewish organizations and individuals wanted to learn the extent of antisemitism in this country and to develop ways to counteract it.

By the early 1960s over a hundred surveys of attitudes toward American Jews had been conducted. These were compiled and analyzed in *Jews in the Mind of America.*[1] Charles Herbert Stember, the editor, concluded that antisemitism was "a disappearing problem in the United States." But to this day is has not disappeared entirely.

In October 1964 the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley conducted the first national survey to assess the extent and nature of contemporary antisemitism. The results were published as *The Tenacity of Prejudice*[2] and dealt with attitudes toward discrimination in its various forms, social distance, and traditional antisemitic beliefs.

Gertrude Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, who edited the volume, developed an index of 11 antisemitic beliefs which has served as a point of re-

[1] New York: Basic Books, 1966.

[2] New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Part Four in a series based on the University of California Five-Year Study of Anti-Semitism in the United States under a grant from the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. The field work was done by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. Questions which were asked in this study are identified below as "NORC, October 1974."

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Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:431–443 © 1982 by the Trustees of Columbia University
Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033–362X/82/0046–431/$2.50

ference for subsequent studies, particularly the Yankelovich study of February 1981. The index is composed of negative stereotypes about Jews: that they are power-hungry, unscrupulous in money matters, irritating in manner, aggressive, clannish, and disloyal to the United States.

Between 1964 and 1974 not much surveying was done, probably because Jewish organizations thought antisemitism to be relatively quiescent. Since the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the subsequent oil embargo, and the fears of Jews that the war would arouse antisemitism and endanger the security of Israel, there have been numerous polls and several wide-ranging surveys examining attitudes toward American Jews and toward Israel.

This report draws from accessible data in *The Tenacity of Prejudice*; Louis Harris & Associates, *A Survey of the Attitudes of Americans Toward the Arab-Israel Conflict and Toward Jews in the United States*, December 1974, and *A Study of Attitudes Toward Racial and Religious Minorities and Toward Women*, November 1978; Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., *Antisemitism in the United States*, February 1981;[3] and from the following polls:

The Gallup Organization: September 1965, May 1967, March 1969, November 1975, August 1979,[3] April and October 1980,[3] March and November 1981,[3] and March 1982.[3]

Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc.: April and October 1974, January 1975, January 1976, and December 1979.[3]

The findings of these polls are similar to those of other polls on attitudes toward Jews conducted during the same period.

Such evidence as the polls provide from the 1960s to the present seems clearly to point to a sharp decline in prejudice against Jews and a marked increase in their social acceptance as individuals and as a group. Although Jews are less than 3 percent of the American population and are concentrated in major metropolitan areas, their religion is acknowledged as one of the three principal faiths in the Untied States, and acceptance of Jews is general.

Nevertheless, some negative stereotypes persist. At one time or another, in one context or another, a small but varying proportion see Jews as being more loyal to Israel than to the U.S., as unscrupulous, aggressive, or too powerful. Who holds fast to these traditional antisemitic beliefs? In a perceptive and comprehensive analysis, *Anti-Semitism and Israel: A Report on American Public Opinion*,[4] William Schneider found a "powerful correlation between stereotypical anti-Semitism and education: the higher the level of formal education, the lower the level of anti-Semitism." Subsequent polls bear this out: the least educated are the most antisemitic.

As Schneider points out in his report: "Perceptions of Jewish power are not related to education in a linear fashion. . . . The well-educated were more likely than others to say that Jews were powerful in areas where in fact Jews are powerful—the movie industry and the national television networks. However, the well-educated were slightly less likely than others to see Jews as powerful in areas where they are not—in major American corporations and in big labor unions."

[3] Commissioned by the American Jewish Committee.

[4] Prepared for the American Jewish Committee, December 1978.

Another important point made by Schneider is that while whites and blacks shared in the general trend of gradually declining antisemitism from 1964 to 1974, the decline in white antisemitism was substantially greater than in black antisemitism. Similarly, the 1981 Yankelovich study concluded that together with education, race is the demographic factor most closely associated with antisemitism: "1 out of 5 whites can be characterized as high or moderate in antisemitism. However, among blacks the figure is nearly 2 out of 5." Again, other polls agree.

For this review we have selected six kinds of questions, representing a range of attitudes toward Jews as individuals and as a group. Four are based on negative stereotypes: dual loyalty, excessive power, irritating personality, and financial unscrupulousness. The fifth is frequently used as a measure of social and political prejudice: voting for a Jew for president.

The sixth question is one that Gallup uses to evaluate the intensity of pro or anti feelings for a particular group. Respondents are asked to place the group on a scale of −5, most negative, to +5, most positive. The findings suggest that people react to scales differently from the way in which they answer the typical poll question. Two striking findings are (a) the increase from 1975 to 1981 of 17 percent in the number of nonwhites offering a favorable opinion of Jews, and (b) the secondary importance, for this question, of income and education. Age is important: in 1975 and again in 1981 the highest favorable opinions were expressed by those over 50.

Negative Stereotypes

1. DUAL LOYALTY

NORC AND YANKELOVICH: *Please tell me whether this statement is probably true or probably false. Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America.*

	NORC Oct 1964	*Yankelovich Feb 1981*		
	Probably True	*Probably True*	*Probably False*	*Not Sure*
Total	30%	30%	32%	38%
Race				
White	30	28	34	37
Negro/black	32	36	21	44
Religion				
Catholic	—	25	37	38
Protestant	—	32	29	39
Age				
Under 35	23			
35–54	27			
55+	42			
Under 39	—	30	33	37
40–54	—	25	40	36
55+	—	33	24	43
Education				
Less than H.S.	46	36	23	41
H.S.	29	30	27	43
Some coll.	19	22	43	35
Coll. grad.	12	24	49	27

GALLUP: *Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States.*

	August 1979			*April 1980*			*November 1981*			*March 1982*		
	Ag.	*Dis.*	*N.O.*	*Ag.*	*Dis.*	*N.O.*	*Ag.*	*Dis.*	*N.O.*	*Ag.*	*Dis.*	*N.O.*
Total	29%	50%	21%	34%	47%	20%	34%	50%	17%	30%	43%	26%
Race												
White	28	54	19	32	49	19	32	52	16	29	45	26
Nonwhite	36	25	39	45	32	23	47	31	22	43	27	30
Religion												
Catholic	32	54	14	36	48	16	31	52	17	32	45	23
Protestant	29	45	27	35	45	20	36	48	16	30	41	29
Age												
Under 35	29	53	18	30	53	17	30	51	19	25	50	25
35–49	25	53	23	33	49	18	31	56	13	35	42	23
50+	31	46	23	38	39	23	39	44	17	33	37	30
Education												
Less than H.S.	37	35	28	40	31	28	41	32	27	37	30	33
H.S. graduate	33	45	22	37	47	17	36	50	14	32	40	28
Some college	22	61	18	27	57	16	29	56	15	25	52	23
College graduate	13	77	10	20	68	12	22	71	8	22	63	16
Income												
Under $7,000	35	35	31	40	38	22	32	45	23	33	35	32
$7,000–$11,999	28	43	29	40	37	23	41	33	26	35	36	29
$12,000–$14,999	31	53	16	36	44	20	38	43	20	36	38	26
$15,000–$19,999	24	58	18	32	45	23	31	57	12	34	36	30
$20,000+	26	60	14	27	58	15	32	56	12	26	53	22

Ag. = Agree; Dis. = Disagree; N.O. = No Opinion.

YANKELOVICH: *Do you feel that most of the Jewish people in this country feel closer to the U.S. or Israel?*

	April 1974				*January 1975*				*January 1976*				*February 1981*			
	U.S.	*Isr.*	*Both*	*N.S.*	*U.S.*	*Isr.*	*Both*	*N.S.*	*U.S.*	*Isr.*	*Both*	*N.S.*	*U.S.*	*Isr.*	*Both*	*N.S.*
Total	41%	34%	8%	17%	51%	26%	5%	18%	45%	27%	4%	24%	41%	27%	8%	24%
White	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	43	25	9	23
Black	22	50	11	18	47	27	5	20	27	42	3	29	39	33	3	26
Religion																
Catholic	43	31	10	16	51	30	7	11	42	27	4	26	40	24	11	24
Protestant	37	38	7	18	52	26	2	19	46	26	4	24	40	28	7	25
Age																
Under 35	41	38	6	14					47	30	2	21				
35–49	42	28	8	22					47	26	5	21				
50+	39	33	11	17					42	24	6	28				
Under 35					56	28	3	13								
35–49					45	27	3	25								
50–64					54	21	10	14								
65+					41	27	7	24								
Under 39													43	30	8	22
40–54													45	28	9	18
55+													38	21	8	33
Education																
Less than H.S.	37	36	9	18	52	27	6	16	29	38	4	30	33	27	7	32
H.S. graduate	40	36	8	17	44	30	3	22	41	28	4	27	37	31	8	24
Some college	39	33	10	18	55	24	5	14	54	23	5	17	52	24	9	15
College graduate	55	24	7	15	60	18	6	15	61	16	5	17	52	19	10	19

N.S. = Not Sure.

2. EXCESSIVE POWER

NORC: *Do you think Jews have too much power in the United States?* (October 1964)

	Yes
Total	11%
Race	
White	11
Negro	9
Age	
Under 35	5
35–54	9
55+	18
Education	
Grade school	18
High school	10
Some college	4
College graduate	5

YANKELOVICH: *Do you think that Jews [blacks, Italians, Japanese] have too much power in the United States?* (February 1981)

	Yes	*No*	*N.S.*
Total	20%	67%	13%
Race			
White	18	71	12
Black	11	43	26
Religion			
Catholic	23	64	14
Protestant	18	68	14
Age			
Under 39	18	74	8
40–54	20	67	13
55+	24	53	23
Education			
Less than high school	23	56	21
High-school graduate	18	70	11
Some college	22	67	11
College graduate	16	79	4

NOTE: Jews ranked first in this selection: Jews, 20; blacks, 14; Italians, 12; Japanese, 8.
N.S. = Not Sure.

YANKELOVICH: *A number of groups have been mentioned by some people as having too much influence over U.S. policies. Do you feel American Jews [big business/corporations, organized labor, oil companies, church interests, Zionist organizations, Arab interests, CIA, media] have too much influence?*

	January 1975[a]			*January 1976*[b]			*December 1979*[c]		
	Have	*Not*	*D.K.*	*Have*	*Not*	*D.K.*	*Have*	*Not*	*D.K.*
Total	37%	49%	15%	26%	48%	26%	17%	62%	21%
Black	42	52	6	19	39	42	30	52	19
Religion									
Catholic	42	48	9	33	44	23	14	62	24
Protestant	36	47	18	25	50	25	19	61	20
Age									
Under 35	32	57	12	23	57	21	16	63	21
35–49	36	50	14	26	43	30	18	61	21
50–64	41	43	17	—	—	—	18	59	23
50+	—	—	—	29	42	28	—	—	—
65+	47	29	23	—	—	—	16	65	18
Education									
Less than H.S.	37	44	19	23	41	36	19	56	25
H.S. graduate	39	43	18	28	42	30	16	59	25
Some college	36	54	10	26	56	19	18	64	18
College graduate	32	60	7	26	61	13	16	69	16
Income									
Under $10,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	56	23
$10,000–$20,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	65	19
$20,000+	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	64	21

[a] American Jews and Arab interests shared sixth place on a list of nine special-interest groups. Above them were oil companies (80 percent), big business (78), organized labor (60), media (50), and CIA (42).

[b] The results were similar to those in the 1975 poll. Arab interests ranked sixth, with 40 percent, and American Jews seventh, with 26 percent.

[c] In December 1979 the CIA and media were omitted, while environmentalists and black groups were added. American Jews were at the bottom of the list, with 16 percent. Consistently, most Americans see as the dominant power groups the oil companies, the business corporations, and the labor unions. Religious and ethnic groups and special-interests groups such as anti-abortionists and environmentalists are seen as too powerful by less than a quarter of Americans.

D.K. = Don't Know.

GALLUP: *Many people believe that some groups have too much political influence in an election year. Which, if any, of the groups listed on this card do you feel has too much political influence in this election Year? Groups: Jews, the Catholic Church, Born Again/Evangelical Protestants, blacks, Hispanics, labor unions, business corporations, Zionists, pro-abortion groups, anti-abortion groups.*

	Jews Have Too Much Influence	
	Oct 80[a]	*Nov 81*[b]
Total	8%	11%
Race		
White	7	10
Nonwhite	10	11
Religion		
Catholic	8	11
Protestant	7	10
Age		
18–34	8	9
35–49	10	11
50+	6	11
Education		
Less than H.S.	8	9
H.S. graduate	7	8
Some college	10	16
College graduate	7	11
Income		
Under $7,000	10	16
$7,000–$11,999	8	8
$12,000–$14,999	4	13
$15,000–$19,999	7	6
$20,000+	8	11

[a] Labor unions (45 percent) and business corporations (42 percent) are perceived as having too much influence in an election year. Jews (8 percent), Hispanics (5), and Zionists (4) rank lowest. In the middle range, but still considerably under 20 percent, are blacks (16 percent), the Catholic Church (13), pro-abortionists (13), Born-Again Protestants (11), and anti-abortionists (4).

[b] In November 1981 the following changes were made in Gallup's question: oil companies instead of business corporations, Arab interests added, Hispanics and abortion groups omitted. For complete table see p. 439. In March 1982 half the sample was asked the same question as in October 1980 and November 1981. Half was asked the question with "power" replacing "political influence." There was no significant difference in the responses to the two wordings.

GALLUP:

Group	Percent Who Feel Group Has Too Much Influence	
	November 1981	*March 1982*
Oil companies	70	NA
Labor unions	46	43
Business corporations	NA	42
Arab interests	30	24
Blacks	14	12
Jews	11	9
Born Again/Evangelical Protestants	10	9
The Catholic Church	9	8
Zionists	4	NA
None of these	4	8
Don't know	9	13
	207[a]	168[a]

[a] Total exceeds 100% because of multiple responses.
NA = Not asked.

3. IRRITATING FAULTS

NORC and YANKELOVICH: *Please tell me whether the following statement is probably true or probably false: Jews have a lot of irritating faults.*

	NORC Oct 1964	*Yankelovich Feb 1981*		
	Prob. True	*Prob. True*	*Prob. False*	*Not Sure*
Total	40%	19%	48%	33%
Race				
White	40	19	50	31
Negro/black	44	20	35	45
Religion				
Catholic		17	51	33
Protestant		21	46	33
Age				
Under 35	34			
35–54	39			
55+	48			
Under 39		18	50	31
40–54		18	51	31
55+		23	40	37
Education				
Less than H.S.	46			
High school	39			
Some college	39			
College graduate	30			

HARRIS: *Here are statements made about Jews. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree with the statement: Jews are irritating because they are too aggressive.*

	December 1974			*November 1978*		
	Ag.	*Dis.*	*N.S.*	*Ag.*	*Dis.*	*N.S.*
Total	31%	51%	18%	27%	55%	18%
White	—	—	—	27	57	16
Black	25	42	33	29	37	34
Religion						
Catholic	33	55	12	—	—	—
Protestant	32	49	19	—	—	—
Age						
18–34	25	58	17	21	63	16
35–49	33	52	15	28	55	18
50+	37	41	21	33	45	21
Education						
Less than H.S.	31	42	27	26	43	31
H.S. graduate	32	50	18	30	53	17
Some college	29	59	13	27	61	12
College graduate	34	57	9	23	71	6
Income						
Under $7,000	29	46	25	23	45	32
$7,000–$14,999	31	54	15	27	58	15
$15,000–$24,999	34	56	11	28	60	13
$25,000+	44	48	8	29	64	7

Ag. = Agree; Dis. = Disagree; N.S. = Not Sure.

4. SHADY PRACTICES, GREED

NORC and YANKELOVICH: *Please tell me whether this statement is probably true or probably false: Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want.*

	NORC Oct 1964	*Yankelovich Feb 1981*		
	True	*True*	*False*	*N.S.*
Total	42%	23%	47%	31%
Race				
White	40	21	49	30
Negro/Black	58	36	27	38
Religion				
Catholic	—	25	49	26
Protestant	—	22	43	35
Age				
Under 35	36	—	—	—
35–54	41	—	—	—
55+	51	—	—	—
Under 39	—	20	50	30
40–54	—	20	57	23
55+	—	30	33	37
Education				
Grade school	54	32	34	34
High school	42	23	42	34
Some college	36	15	60	25
College graduate	21	13	64	23

N.S. = Not Sure.

HARRIS: *Do you tend to agree or disagree? When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will choose money.*

	December 1974			November 1978		
	Ag.	*Dis.*	*N.S.*	*Ag.*	*Dis.*	*N.S.*
Total	34%	41%	25%	34%	43%	24%
White	—	—	—	32	45	23
Black	48	20	32	56	14	30
Religion						
Catholic	30	46	24	—	—	—
Protestant	33	42	25	—	—	—
Age						
18–34	29	48	23	29	49	21
35–49	29	46	25	29	46	25
50+	43	31	27	45	30	25
Education						
Less than H.S.	45	26	29	47	23	30
H.S. graduate	36	39	25	36	39	25
Some college	27	52	22	27	54	19
College graduate	16	64	20	19	64	16
Income						
Under $7,000	44	29	28	44	29	28
$7,000–$14,999	35	42	22	38	40	22
$15,000–$24,999	24	56	20	29	50	21
$25,000+	22	57	21	27	57	15

Ag. = Agree; Dis. = Disagree; N.S. = Not Sure.

Social/Political Prejudice

5. A JEW AS PRESIDENT

GALLUP: *There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates—their education, age, race, religion, and the like. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Jew, would you vote for him?*

	September 1965			May 1967			March 1969		
	Yes	*No*	*D.K.*	*Yes*	*No*	*N.O.*	*Yes*	*No*	*N.O.*
Total	80%	15%	5%	82%	13%	5%	86%	8%	6%
Religion									
Catholic	90	6	4	92	5	3	93	2	5
Protestant	75	19	6	77	16	7	82	11	7
Age									
21–29	90	6	4	87	8	5	94	3	3
30–49	82	12	6	86	10	4	89	6	5
50+	73	23	4	75	18	7	79	12	9
Education									
Grade school	65	28	7	66	25	9	68	18	14
High school	84	11	5	84	11	5	91	5	4
College	92	5	3	93	5	2	95	3	2
Income									
$3,000–$4,999	76	18	6	73	20	7	85	10	5
$5,000–$6,999	82	13	5	84	10	6	80	9	11
$7,000+	88	8	4	90	8	2	93	4	3
$10,000+	—	—	—	91	7	2	94	4	2

D.K. = Don't Know; N.O. = No Opinion.

YANKELOVICH: *Considering the state of the country and the world today would you consider it good for the country or bad for the country to have as president someone who was of the Jewish faith (business executive, priest, intellectual, atheist, southerner, right-winger, black, woman, physically handicapped).*

	October 1974[a]				*April 1979*[b]		
	Good	*N.G.*	*N.S.*	*DK/ NA*	*Good*	*N.G.*	*N.S.*
Total	42%	32%	24%	2%	45%	23%	31%
Race							
Black/Nonwhite	30	41	23	5	43	34	23
Religion							
Catholic	46	28	25	2	54	16	29
Protestant	38	36	24	1	40	29	31
Age							
Under 35	39	33	27	2	46	24	31
35–49	45	30	23	2	48	20	31
50–64	44	31	25	—	41	25	34
65+	46	32	19	4	48	25	28
Education							
Less than H.S.	33	42	23	2	—	—	—
H.S. graduate	45	30	23	1	44	26	30
Some college	46	23	30	1	—	—	—
College graduate	55	16	17	2	48	15	37

[a] Jew ranks seventh on the list, following southerner (60), physically handicapped (53), business executive (51), woman (48), black (46), and intellectual (43).

[b] Same question with changes in list: Jew, business executive, priest, college professor, atheist, woman, black, labor leader. More people think a woman (59), a business executive (59), and a black (55) than a Jew (45) would be good for the country.

YANKELOVICH: *Suppose your political party wanted to nominate a Jew (black, Italian, Japanese) for president of the United States, would this disturb you very much, somewhat, very little, or not at all?* (February 1981)[a]

	Very Much	*Somewhat*	*Very Little*	*Not at All*	*Not Sure*
Total	9%	12%	14%	59%	6%
Race					
White	9	12	14	60	5
Black	9	14	17	48	11
Religion					
Catholic	7	12	12	65	3
Protestant	9	14	16	54	8
Age					
Under 39	8	12	12	64	4
40–54	9	8	18	59	6
55+	12	16	13	50	9
Education					
Less than H.S.	16	13	16	48	8
H.S. graduate	7	13	14	60	6
Some college	6	14	14	62	3
College graduate	3	10	10	73	5

[a] Here Italians score highest, 62 percent, as people whose nomination would not be disturbing. Jews come a close second, with 59. There is a drop to 50 percent for Japanese and to 48 for blacks. We may infer that asking people what would be good for the country or whether they would be disturbed by certain nominations elicits or permits a less positive response than the direct question about voting for a qualified candidate.

Group Evaluation

6. RATING JEWS—GALLUP: *How far up or down the scale would you rate Jews as a group?*

	November 1979											*March 1981*										
	+5	*+4*	*+3*	*+2*	*+1*	*D.K.*	*−1*	*−2*	*−3*	*−4*	*−5*	*+5*	*+4*	*+3*	*+2*	*+1*	*D.K.*	*−1*	*−2*	*−3*	*−4*	*−5*
Total	23%	10%	18%	11%	16%	12%	4%	2%	1%	—	3%	28%	12%	18%	11%	12%	11%	4%	1%	1%	—	2%
Race																						
White	23	10	19	11	16	12	3	1	1	1	3	27	12	19	10	12	11	4	1	1	—	2
Nonwhite	19	8	14	15	16	12	8	3	1	—	4	34	10	12	11	12	8	4	2	1	1	6
Religion																						
Catholic	28	12	19	12	13	7	4	2	1	—	2	31	15	20	9	10	9	3	1	1	1	1
Protestant	20	10	20	11	17	13	2	1	2	1	3	28	11	17	12	12	10	4	1	1	—	2
Age																						
18–24	14	8	19	14	19	11	6	2	2	—	5	20	1	19	13	16	9	8	2	1	—	2
25–29	16	10	17	12	22	12	3	3	1	1	3	30	11	21	11	11	5	5	1	3	—	3
30–49	24	10	20	12	17	10	3	1	1	—	2	27	11	19	10	14	11	3	2	1	1	3
50+	28	11	17	9	11	14	4	1	2	1	2	31	13	16	10	10	14	2	1	1	—	2
Education																						
Grade school	21	8	20	13	12	13	7	1	2	—	3	30	11	13	9	18	12	4	1	1	—	2
High school	24	10	17	11	16	11	3	2	1	1	4	29	12	18	11	11	9	4	2	1	—	3
College	22	10	20	12	18	12	3	1	1	—	1	23	12	20	10	12	15	4	1	1	1	1
Income																						
Under $5,000	24	7	22	9	7	13	9	1	2	—	6	27	11	21	10	18	7	3	—	1	—	3
$5,000–$9,999	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	27	14	11	12	15	8	7	3	—	—	3
$5,000–$6,999	23	8	11	9	26	12	5	2	1	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
$7,000–$9,999	16	14	21	9	12	16	5	2	2	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
$10,000–$14,999	19	10	21	13	17	9	3	3	1	1	3	29	10	18	14	9	10	3	2	2	1	2
$15,000–$19,999	28	12	18	12	14	9	4	—	1	1	1	34	11	21	7	8	9	2	2	2	1	4
$20,000+	25	11	19	12	18	10	2	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
$20,000–$24,999	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	24	13	19	9	11	15	5	1	1	—	3
$25,000+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	27	11	19	11	14	13	4	1	1	—	1